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Justin D’Ambrosio
2017
This dissertation lays the foundation for a new theory of non-relational intentionality.
The thesis is divided into an introduction and three main chapters, each of which serves
as an essential part of an overarching argument. The argument yields, as its conclusion, a
new account of how language and thought can exhibit intentionality intrinsically, so that
representation can occur in the absence of some thing that is represented. The overarching
argument has two components: first, that intentionality can be profitably studied through
examination of the semantics of intensional transitive verbs (ITVs), and second, that pro-
viding intensional transitive verbs with a nonrelational semantics will serve to provide us
with (at least the beginnings of) a non-relational theory of intentionality. This approach is
a generalization of Anscombe’s views on perception. Anscombe held that perceptual verbs
such as “see” and “perceive” were ITVs, and that understanding the semantics of their ob-
ject positions could help us to solve the problems of hallucination and illusion, and provide
a theory of perception more generally. I propose to apply this strategy to intentional states
and the puzzles of intentionality more generally, and so Anscombe’s influence will be felt
all through the dissertation.
In the first chapter, titled “Semantic Verbs are Intensional Transitives”, I argue that
semantic verbs such as “refers (to)”, “applies (to)”, and “is true (of)” have all of the features
of intensional transitive verbs, and discuss the consequences of this claim for semantic theory
and the philosophy of language. One theoretically enriching consequence of this view is
that it allows us to perspicuously express, and partially reconcile two opposing views on
the nature and subject-matter of semantics: the Chomskian view, on which semantics is an
internalistic enterprise concerning speakers’ psychologies, and the Lewisian view, on which
semantics is a fully externalistic enterprise issuing in theorems about how the world must
look for our natural language sentences to be true. Intensional Transitive Verbs have two
readings: a de dicto reading and a de re reading; the de dicto reading of ITVs is plausibly a
nonrelational reading, and the intensional features peculiar to this reading make it suitable
for expressing a Chomskian, internalist semantic program. On the other hand, the de
re reading is fully relational, and make it suitable for expressing the kinds of word-world
relations essential to the Lewisian conception of semantics. And since the de dicto and de
re readings are plausibly related as two distinct scopal readings of the very same semantic
postulates, we can see these two conceptions of semantics as related by two scopal readings
of the very same semantic postulates.
In chapter two, titled “Hallucination and the New Problem of Empty Names”, I argue
that the problem of hallucination and the problem of empty names are, at bottom, the
same problem. I argue for this by reconstructing the problem of empty names in way that
is novel, but implicit in much of the discussion on empty names. I then show how, once
recast in this light, the two problems are structurally identical down to an extremely fine
level of granularity, and also substantially overlap in terms of their content. If the problems
are identical in the way I propose, then we should expect that their spaces of solutions are
also identical, and there is significant support for this conclusion. However, there are some
proposed solutions to the problem of hallucination that have been overlooked as potential
solutions to the problem of empty names, and this realization opens new non-relational
approaches to the problem of empty names, and to the nature of meaning more generally.
In chapter three, titled “Intensionality is Additional Phrasal Unity”, I argue for a novel
approach to the semantics of intensional contexts. At the heart of my proposal is the
Quinean view that intensional contexts should, from the perspective of the semantics, be
treated as units, with the material in them contributing to the formation of a single pred-
icate. However, this proposal is subject to a number of objections, including the criticism
that taken at face value, this would render intensional contexts, which seem to be fully
productive, non-compositional. I begin by discussing the concept of the unity of the phrase,
and pointing to various ways that phrases can gain additional unity. I then proposes that
the intensionality of intensional transitive verbs is best construed as a form of semantic
incorporation; ITVs, on their intensional readings, meet all of the criteria for qualifying
as incorporating the nominals in their object positions. I then give a semantics for ITVs
that builds on existing views of the semantics of incorporation structures, and gesture at
how this can be extended to intensional clausal verbs, including the so-called propositional
attitude verbs.
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Chapter 0
Introduction
0.1 Unpotting the History of Intentionality
Minds are really the ultimate multi-purpose tools. With them, we manage to think about
all sorts of things: existent, nonexistent, true, false, useful, and fanciful. But we don’t only
think about things; we also desire, hope, fear, need, notice, plan, ponder, love, and suspect
things, and even these are just a fraction of the things our minds help us do. But despite
how varied our mental activities and lives are, there is something that holds these various
mental states and activities together: they are all about, or directed toward things. Some
would put this by saying that all of our various mental states have objects, or are directed
toward objects. But regardless of the phrasing, this fact seems to give us a clue as to how
we should understand mental phenomena generally. Mental states are about, or directed
out toward the world, and this directedness or aboutness seems to be at least part of what
makes mental states distinctive.
The term “intentionality”, as it is used in modern philosophy, is a technical term that
philosophers use to talk about this kind of directedness. Even qua technical term, “inten-
tionality” has a long and complex history.1 The term comes from the Latin word “intentio”,
which roughly means “direction toward”, or “striving toward”. The use of “intentio” as a
technical philosophical term can be traced back at least to Augustine, who used it in both
a practical sense, roughly matching our “intend”, and in a related cognitive sense [Caston,
1See [Caston, 2001, Perler, 2001b], among other articles in [Perler, 2001a].
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2001]. In its cognitive sense, Augustine used “intentio” as a form of striving or will that
“directs the faculty of sense toward its object and keeps it fixed on it”. Roughly speaking,
Augustine used “intentio” like we use “attention”. However, through the middle ages, use
of “intentionality” moved more toward a purely cognitive use, one similar to our ordinary
notion of “aboutness” [Pasnau, 1997, Burnyeat, 2001, Perler, 2001a]. Intentionality played
a significant role in many scholastic theories of the mind, and was often characterized as
the feature of of minds in virtue of which they can come to be about objects.
After the scholastic period, use of the term “intentionality” declined markedly, and
didn’t figure prominently in the theoretical vocabulary of philosophers again until being
rehabilitated in the late 19th century by Franz Brentano [Brentano, 1973, Caston, 2001,
Crane, 1998, 2014b]. It was with Brentano’s rehabilitation that “intentionality” came to
have its more-or-less modern meaning, which is closely related to the notion of representa-
tion. Roughly speaking, the things that exhibit intentionality are just those things that are
representational. So for instance, pictures, paintings, photos, some words, and plausibly all
mental states are representational, and so exhibit intentionality. If we are attracted to a
view of intentionality on which representations are about their intentional objects, then we
can say that all of the representational entities above have intentional objects.
Brentano’s rehabilitation of intentionality had deep ramifications for the philosophy of
mind. Brentano held that intentionality was the characteristic feature of the mental: the
feature that distinguishes mental phenomena from all other phenomena [Brentano, 1973].
Let’s call this thesis “Brentano’s Thesis” [Crane, 2014c]. In modern terminology, Brentano’s
thesis says that all and only mental phenomena are representational. Of course, this for-
mulation can’t be quite right, because there seem to be many non-mental representations.
However, there are refinements in the area that make the view much more plausible. My
central concern is not with Brentano’s thesis, but with the concept of intentionality more
generally. However, Brentano’s thesis plays an important motivating role in any investi-
gation of intentionality, because even the possibility that intentionality can serve as the
distinguishing feature of the mental gives intentionality a central theoretical role in investi-
gations of human cognition.
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0.2 The Features and Puzzles of Intentionality
Brentano thought that intentionality was characteristic of mentality, but throughout its
history, there have been features that were themselves seen as characteristic of intentionality.
If some form of Brentano’s thesis turns out to be true, then it will likewise turn out that
these features are the defining features of the mental. So what are those features? The most
traditional one is what we can call Nonexistence.2 Roughly speaking, Nonexistence is just
the slightly puzzling fact that we are able to think about and represent things that do not
exist. Alternatively, we might say that many representations have nonexistent intentional
objects. Brentano had a version of this feature in mind when he claimed that the defining
feature of intentionality was what he called “intentional inexistence” [Brentano, 1973, Crane,
2014c]. His idea was that, in many cases, the intentional object of a mental state does not
exist in the world, but rather exists immanently, and only immanently, to the mind. That is
to say, many intentional objects are mere intentional objects, and do not have any existence
outside of the intentional acts or states to which they are immanent. Thus, on Brentano’s
view, the ability to think of merely intentional objects—which do not exist, at least in the
same sense that ordinary objects exist—is a central feature of intentionality, and in turn is
potentially a defining feature of the mental.
The features of intentionality are often not just considered features: often they come to
be seen as puzzles, and many of these puzzles have a distinguished philosophical lineage.
For instance, we often hear about the puzzle or problem of Nonexistence. However, it is
not in itself a puzzle that we are able to think about the non-existent. This is just a fact,
acknowledged by basically everyone, and one that no ordinary person would even think
twice about. However, the fact becomes a puzzle when we try to work out a theory of how
we manage to do it, i.e. when we try to provide a general theory of intentionality. The hope
is to be able to provide a theory of intentionality that does not leave us with a puzzling
philosophical residue. Many theories of intentionality—for example, the intentional object
view to which I have several times alluded—make the claim that we think about objects
that do not exist, and for some, this leads to residual questions. What are non-existent
2See Caston [2001], Crane [2012].
3
objects? What are merely intentional objects? How do they differ from ordinary objects?
Do we need to give an account of their metaphysics? Of course, there are theories that
address just these residual questions, but the hope, and particularly my hope, is to be able
to give a theory that makes thought about the nonexistent exactly as unremarkable as it
is to the folk. As will become clear, I think views of intentionality that posit intentional
objects often times fail to explain exactly what needs to be explained, and this is still often
the case after providing a view of their metaphysics.
Nonexistence, like, as we will see, the other features of intentionality, can be detected by
noting the failure of certain class of inferences. We can start at the most basic. Sentences in-
volving verbs such as “think (about)” are not existence-entailing within their complements.
For instance:
(1) John is thinking about a unicorn
does not entail:
(2) A unicorn exists.
The same is true for intentional verbs that take clausal as opposed to phrasal complements.
Consider “believes”:
(3) John believes that unicorns have horns.
(4) Unicorns exist.
Clearly, (3) does not entail (4). Similar things can be said for a large class of verbs that
express intentional notions, some of which have already been mentioned: “search”, “need”,
“want”, “hallucinate”, “sense”, “experience”, “desire”, “suspect”. None of these notions
are existence-entailing, which provides some evidence that Nonexistence is a good test for
intentionality in addition to the long history; it is present in most states that are obviously
representational.
Another feature of intentionality that has a distinguished philosophical lineage is what
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we can call Nonspecificity. It will be easiest to illustrate Nonspecificity with an example
(due to Victor Caston) [Caston, 2001]. Suppose that I greet someone. It is not possible
to greet someone who is not of a particular height. Every person is of a particular height.
But it is certainly possible for me to think of someone without thinking of a person of any
particular height. In this sense, my thinking can be Nonspecific. The same holds for a host
of other attitudes. I can perfectly well search for a bear, without searching for a bear whose
fur is a particular shade (of brown, or any other color), even though every bear has fur
of a particular shade. Even more generally, I might think of a bear, but not think of any
particular bear, while of course, if I get attacked by a bear, it must have been a particular
bear that did the attacking. In other words, just as a writer may not fix how many total
cells are in the body of one of his fictional characters, I may not have fully specific thoughts.
Moreover, for beings like us, it may even be impossible to have fully specific thoughts about
things like ordinary objects; the world may well be too complex to represent specifically in
thought. How could I, for instance, have a thought that was as detailed as every contour
of a face? Such complexity does not seem capturable in thought; our representations of the
world are lossy.
Similarly to the case of Nonexistence, Nonspecificity can be detected inferentially, by
seeing what is entailed by instances of representation. Importantly, such inferential criteria
are not yet anything specific to language; at this point we are just considering the nature of
certain intentional states, and seeing what they entail, and what they fail to entail. We then
express these entailments, or lack thereof, in language. Consider the following sentence:
(5) I am searching for a dog.
Clearly, I need not be searching for a particular dog, so (6) does not follow:
(6) I am searching for a particular dog.
It may well be the case that I am searching for a Vizsla, but not a particular one, and yet (5)
can still aptly describe my search. Thus we have our first inferential test for Nonspecificity.
But there are also slight variations on this inference that fail to hold for intentional locutions.
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Consider the following inference:
(7) I imagined a man.
Every man has a specific number of hairs on his head.
Therefore, I imagined a man with a specific number of hairs on his head.
Obviously, this inference is no good. Why? Because “imagine” is an intentional verb, and
what I imagine will typically not be one of the many concrete, flesh-and-blood men in the
world, each of whom has a particular number of hairs on his head. Instead, when I imagine
a man, I might imagine him incompletely, conjuring only some properties and not on others.
It is obvious that we don’t imagine things down to every detail. Our imaginings can be
incomplete, and allow for further determination, and it is this lack of full specificity that is
unique to, and characteristic of, intentional states.
But not only can intentional states fail to be fully specific, but they can also be more
and less specific. I can represent things in greater or lesser amounts of detail, and different
states may represent in greater and lesser degrees of specificity. For instance, I might think
of a dog, without thinking any particular one, and I certainly need not think of a dog with
any particular color of fur, or of any particular size. In this sense, representation can occur
at certain levels of generality or specificity (or perhaps “abstractness”), and we can think
about this generality or nonspecificity in terms of representing determinables without their
determinates. I can represent a dog, qua determinable, without representing any of its
determinates, or I can represent it with all of its determinates, which would yield (at least
something close to) a fully specific thought.
What this points us to is that with respect to specificity, some kind of hierarchy, or
algebra, is needed to adequately account for the structure of intentionality. This hierarchy
may be a hierarchy of properties, as developed in property theory, or perhaps something even
higher-order: a hierarchy of properties of properties.3 Intentionality allows us to represent
parts of the hierarchy without representing others. In the case of ordinary objects, it may
3For different developments of property theory, see Chierchia and Turner [1988], Bealer and Mo¨nnich
[2003]. For an account of the hierarchy of higher-order properties, or generalized quantifers, see Peters and
Westerstahl [2008].
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be the case that possessing a certain property entails the possession of many others, this is
rarely the case when we are considering representation. Representation lifts the strictures
of metaphysical necessity: just because everything is some particular size does not mean
that we must represent them as such, nor does it mean that just because a grizzly bear is
of the species Ursus Arctos that I must represent it as one. The structure of intentionality
need not fully mirror metaphysical structure.
But how exactly to interpret this hierarchy is still an open question. We might interpret
the hierarchy as a collection of properties that are the objects of our intentional states, or
we might interpret it as a conceptual hierarchy in which they elements of the hierarchy
are various ways that we can represent the world. This latter option points us toward the
idea that intentionality generally, and many intentional states more specifically, are not
representations of properties, but rather guide us toward the world in certain ways with
varying degrees of generality. On such a view, intentionality is direction toward the world,
and the direction is provided by the content of certain representations. But importantly, the
direction and specificity of our representations is not given by an intentional object. Rather,
we use representations to point ourselves toward aspects of the world. Representations are
kind of like internal maps.
The last feature of intentionality, which is perhaps its most well-known, is related to
(Non)specificity, in that it concerns our ability to focus on particular aspects of objects
and not others. In allowing us to focus on particular aspects of objects, intentional states
are “finer grained” than objects themselves. Since the linguistic turn, this has often been
captured by saying that we can think of—or search for, want, fear, or hope for—things under
some descriptions but not others. That is to say, even if two descriptions or names pick out
the same object, we need not have the same attitudes toward the object characterized in
the two different ways. The attitudes may only hold toward the object characterized in a
certain way—the object qua described in a certain way, or qua having a certain name.
This last feature is often associated with the property of contexts within sentences called
“referential opacity”. Roughly speaking, a context within a sentence is referentially opaque,
or just “opaque”, if substitution of coextensive expressions within that context can change
the truth value of the sentence. Alternatively, we can give an inferential characterization of
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opacity, by noting the failure of inferences such as that from (8) to (9), even if the shortest
spy is Ortcutt:
(8) John is looking for Ortcutt.
(9) John is looking for the shortest spy.
John may be looking for Ortcutt without looking for the shortest spy, so while both “Ort-
cutt” and “the shortest spy” may have the same extension, substitution of one for the other
need not preserve truth-value. On the assumption that “Ortcutt” and “the shortest spy”
are constituents of (8) and (9) respectively, and assuming that the truth-value of a sentence
is a function of the extensions of its constituents together with its syntax, this failure to pre-
serve truth-value shows that the truth of the above sentences is sensitive to something over
and above the ordinary extensions of the expressions. This sensitivity to more than mere
extension is what is meant by calling a contexts within a sentence “referentially opaque”.
These three features form the core of a cluster of features that are characteristic of
intentionality. But the status of these features at the center of the cluster of features raises
two important points. First, these are not the only features that arise in discussions of
intentionality. Historically there have been others as well. For instance, it is often seen as
characteristic of intentional states that they come in two forms: a de dicto form and a de
re form. Some authors have characterized this distinction as one between nonspecific and
specific or relational and notional forms of intentionality, which correspond to de re and de
dicto readings of intentional reports. These two readings are often associated with two scopal
readings of intentional reports, and the non-equivalence of the readings on which a quantifier
is interpreted inside and outside of the verb phrase. However, this is not a universally
recognized distinction, and it is closely associated with the semantics of intentional reports,
so for the moment it will suffice to note it and delay further discussion until our discussion
of the linguistic hallmarks of intentionality in the next section.
However, these properties do not provide a hard and fast criteria for identifying inten-
tional states. Instead, these features are merely symptomatic of intentionality. For it may
well be the case that there are some intentional phenomena that lack all of these features,
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and there may also be non-intentional phenomena that have some of these features. Once a
theory of intentionality is developed, the theory may make some of these features criterial
for intentionality, but that conclusion is a consequence of substantive theorizing, rather
than a starting point for the investigation. I myself am inclined toward treating these fea-
tures, with appropriate qualifications, as definitive of intentionality, and so definitive of the
mental, but very little in what follows will turn on this view. Rather, as we proceed, I will
treat these features as indicative of intentionality, and so I will treat an account of them as
an important aspect of a theory of intentionality. However, I will allow that there may be
intentional phenomena that do not exhibit these features, and so may admit of a different
sort of explanation. However, I believe that these features can be used to help construct a
novel and nuanced account of our representational lives.
0.3 Intensionality as the Mark of Intentionality
Thus far we have discussed three properties that are traditionally associated with inten-
tional states: Nonexistence, Nonspecificity, and Opacity. Importantly, we’ve talked about
these three features as features of the metaphysics of intentionality: they are data concern-
ing intentionality that our theory of intentionality needs to explain. But we also gave these
features inferential characterizations, and these inferential characterizations show us that
intentionality manifests itself in language in distinctive ways. It turns out that the three
inferential features of intentionality are the definitive features of the class of Intensional
Transitive Verbs (ITVs), and perhaps the class of intensional verbs more generally. In one
sense, this is a surprising confluence. When linguists discuss the features of intensionality,
they rarely acknowledge that these features have been discussed for a millenia-and-a-half as
the features characteristic of intentionality. Rather, as a linguistic phenomenon, intension-
ality, characterized by these three inferential patterns, has mostly been divorced from its
origins in the theory of intentionality, and few authors have explicitly connected the project
of giving a semantics for verbs that exhibit these features with the philosophical project of
providing a theory of intentionality. So even though intensional verbs are relatively well-
studied in linguistics, and linguists have developed a great deal of semantic machinery to
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deal with their features, I suspect that reconnecting the study of intensionality to its history
will come as a surprise to many working semanticists. However, in another sense, this con-
fluence is exactly what we should have expected. In our theorizing about a phenomenon,
we found that it had characteristic features, and we captured these features by noting the
failures of certain kinds of inferences. Since these inferences fail for a certain class of reports,
and these reports are made using certain verbs, it makes sense that these inferences can be
used to delimit a distinctive class of verbs: those connected to representation.
A verb is considered transitive when it takes a noun phrase in its object position, oc-
curring in sentences of the form NP V NP′.4 A transitive verb V is considered intensional
when sentences of the above form exhibit some combination of the following three properties.
Nonexistence: NP V NP′ has a reading which fails to entail NP′ exists, where NP′ is
upward-entailing.5
Nonspecificity: NP V NP′ has a reading that fails to entail NP Vs a particular NP′.
Opacity: NP V NP′ has a reading that fails to entail NP V NP∗, where NP′, and NP∗
are extensionally equivalent.6
These three features are laid out as criteria for a transitive verb to qualify as intensional.
However, it has been largly overlooked that they also serve to single out to intensional verbs
that take clausal complements. Thus, arguably, these three features are characteristic of
intensionality generally; showing that these features are present is intensional clausal verbs
is merely a matter of changing the syntactic characterization.
4However, many verbs that are technically intransitive are treated as transitive when they occur in
constructions of the form NP V P NP′, where P is a preposition. This is typically done when the
combination of intransitive verb and preposition have a transitive verb as a near-synonym, such as in the
case of “seeks” and “is looking for”. Many of these verb + preposition combinations behave identically to
transitive verbs, and so unless otherwise noted, I’ll treat them as intensional transitives also.
5By “upward entailing” I mean to include positively quantified NPs like: “a dog”, “the men who robbed
him”, “four gorgons”, “infinitely many numbers”, as well as proper names, and bare plural NPs. I mean to
exclude negative NPs like “no dogs”, “no one”, etc. By “empty” I mean that nothing in the world answers
to the NP.
6It’s important to note that there are many ITVs that do not have all of these features: typically, the
presence of even one of these properties is sufficient to classify a verb as intensional. However, verbs like
“seek” are paradigmatically intensional in that they exhibit all three of the properties. As will become clear,
I am arguing that not only are our semantic verbs intensional, they are like “seek” in being paradigmatically
intensional.
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The thing to note is that these three inferential features—which play the role of data
for which a semantic theory must account—are just the features of intentionality that we
laid out above, in a linguistic guise. Thus, we find ourselves in a situation that should feel
familiar from other areas of philosophy. On the one hand we find ourselves investigating
a phenomenon of philosophical interest—intentionality—and isolating its core properties.
But we also find that these properties are manifest in the various semantic features of
verbs expressing the notions that we are interested in. Nonexistence, Nonspecificity, and
Opacity are the three distinguishing metaphysical features of intentionality, and they are
also the three core properties of intensionality, a purely linguistic phenomenon. Thus, the
inferential criteria serve to couple the metaphysical and semantic levels of investigation.
Insofar as we provide inferential criteria for the metaphysical features of intentionality, we
tie our metaphysical investigation to a semantic investigation which attempts to provide
truth-conditions for the reports in question that account for the inferential patterns.
This leads us to the view that intensionality, a linguistic phenomenon, is the mark of
intentionality, the phenomenon that is plausibly characteristic of the mental. The view that
intensionality is the hallmark of intentionality is an old view, and goes back to Chisholm,
and was championed by Anscombe [1965]. Since the question of whether intensionality can
serve as a criterion for intentionality is highly controversial, I don’t wish to make any strong
claims about the connection between them here.7 I won’t, for instance, try to show that the
intensionality of a report is a necessary and sufficient condition for a state to be intentional.
However, I do think there is a strong connection between the two phenomena. I hold that
the inferential characterization of the metaphysical features of intentionality is the best one
we have, and it just so happens to overlap perfectly with the linguistic characterization of
intensionality. In a case such as this, there seems to be very little difference between between
investigating the lexical semantics of intensional verbs and theorizing about intentionality
itself; lexical semantics makes use of metaphysical insight, and metaphysics can likewise
draw on the insights of lexical semantics. This might sound like a strong commitment
to a linguistic approach to metaphysics, but it is not: I am denying that, in certain cases,
there is an important distinction to be made between metaphysical investigation and lexical
7See Crane [1995] for a discussion of the relationship between intentionality and intensionality.
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semantic investigation.
0.4 Semantics and Metaphysics: Anscombe’s Project
If intensionality is the mark of intentionality, as Anscombe [1965] and Chisholm [1956]
thought, then it points the way to a new project, one which Anscombe herself saw clearly
and began to pursue. The project is as follows. If the three features characteristic of
intentionality are manifested as the core features of intensional language, any theory of the
nature of linguistic intensionality will likewise serve as an approach to the metaphysics of
intentionality. Anscombe pursued this project in a very specific way: she wanted to use
the semantics of perceptual locutions such as “see” and “perceive” to solve the problems
of hallucination and illusion, which are themselves puzzles of intentionality. Her approach
was to investigate what kind of thing could serve as the direct object of perceptual reports
when no concrete existing object was a candidate for the job. Consider the following:
(10) John sees a dancing dragon.
On Anscombe’s view, “sees” is an intensional transitive verb, and seeing is an intentional
state. She held that if we can provide a semantics for sentences like (10), and more specifi-
cally, if we can find semantic values for NPs such as “a dancing dragon” that occur in the
object positions of intensional transitive verbs, then we will have found the objects of hal-
lucination, and taken a huge step toward solving the problem of hallucination. She extends
this kind of reasoning to other perceptual verbs for which the problems of hallucination
and illusion can be formulated. Thus, on Anscombe’s view, providing the correct semantics
for perceptual reports stands to illuminate the metaphysics of hallucinatory and illusory
perceptual states, and perhaps perceptual states more generally.
Anscombe’s insight forms the foundation for this project, but her project is limited in
scope, and faces several difficulties that this thesis hopes to overcome. First, Anscombe’s
proposal is specific to perceptual verbs. But it is not merely perceptual verbs that exhibit
the features of intentionality; rather, many, and perhaps all intentional verbs exhibit these
features, and just as with perceptual verbs, investigation of their semantic features can in-
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form our theories of their nature. However, I don’t wish to hold that such a strategy can only
be deployed in one direction, using semantics to uncover metaphysics. As I stressed above,
in this case, among others, I do not think that there is a substantive difference between
doing lexical semantic theorizing and giving an account of the nature of the thing expressed.
Lexical semanticists deploy metaphysical intuitions just as readily as metaphysicians deploy
semantic intuitions, and different intentional verbs may exhibit different combinations of
the inferential features, and will exhibit different profiles of intensional semantic behavior.
So while I hold that Anscombe’s basic strategy is correct, my proposal is more general. I
hold that the intensional semantic profiles of all intentional verbs will need to be reflected in
the semantics we provide for reports of the phenomenon, and these profiles can be deployed
in our understanding of the natures of the states that the verbs express.
Second, Anscombe’s approach was originally worked out for perceptual verbs; her pro-
posal concerned what she called a “grammatical feature” of verbs of sensation and percep-
tion: namely, their intensionality. However, it is hotly contested whether her basic semantic
claims concerning perceptual verbs are true. Many theorists hold that perceptual verbs are
fully extensional, and there has been a debate raging since well before Anscombe wrote
over whether non-factive, intensional readings are available for perceptual reports. I my-
self think that perceptual verbs have intensional readings, and I have empirical work in
progress that attempts to establish this claim. However, it is not essential to my project
that any particular perceptual verb exhibit the features of intensionality. Even if some per-
ceptual reports turn out to be fully extensional, some related verbs will be required to report
the phenomena of hallucinatory and illusory perceptual experiences, and these verbs—for
instance, “hallucinate”—verifiably exhibit the features of intensionality, and Anscombe’s
proposal can be generalized to them. Thus, even if we lose the ability to apply Anscombe’s
strategy to all perceptual reports, we can still deploy her insight to develop an account of
hallucinatory perception. However, while the intensionality of perceptual verbs provides
a rich area for further research, nothing in the remainder of this thesis will serve as an
argument for the claim that perceptual verbs have intensional readings.
The strategy for investigating intentionality that emerges is a generalized Anscombian
strategy. Since there is broad convergence between the properties of intentionality and
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the features of intensionality, and the two categories are held together by the inferential
criteria, we can expect there to be a fine-grained correspondence between our theories of
the metaphysics of intentionality and our theories of the semantics of intensionality. Thus,
not only do the semantic and metaphysical projects dovetail, but they stand to gain a
lot from one another. Semantic accounts of intensionality can be seen as views on the
nature of intentionality and intentional objects, and similarly, theories of the metaphysics
of intentionality can be translated into semantic terms. This is in keeping with the tradition
in philosophy on which giving a semantics for a particular term or collection of terms is
integral to understanding the nature of the object of investigation, and plays an important
role in argumentation for and against the view.
The style of investigation which intertwines semantic and metaphysics in this way is
common in many fields: metaethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics,
just to name a few. Since this kind of approach is so common, it is surprising that modern
analytic philosophers working on intentionality rarely seem to investigate the systematic
connection between theories of intentionality and the semantics of the locutions used to
report them. The Anscombian program has gained little traction. Perhaps this is due to
the fact that the semantics for intensional transitive verbs in particular is a difficult semantic
project. But similar projects have been undertaken on the nature of belief, knowledge, and
the good, and the semantics for reports of these phenomena are equally complicated. In any
case, an investigation of the semantic features of intentional reports stands to shed light on
phenomena as diverse as perception, sensation, hallucination, illusion, imagination, belief
(in), reference, satisfaction, and truth (of), among many others.
The next section will be devoted to categorizing views of intentionality in light of the
generalized Anscombian strategy. This strategy will treat different approaches to the se-
mantics of intensionality as potential views on the metaphysics of intentionality. What is
most fruitful about this approach is that there is a wealth of semantic resources that have
yet to be marshalled to address the problems of intentionality. Thus we can bring these
semantic resources to bear on many verbs—as well as other parts of speech, such as nouns,
adjectives, and prepositional phrases—that exhibit intentional notions, and these resources
can provide us with the foundations of different views on the nature of representation,
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intentionality, perception, sensation, reference, and myriad other phenomena expressed in
intentional language.
0.5 Metaphysical Views and Semantic Views
Views of intentionality break down along two axes. First, views of intentionality can either
be relational, non-relational, or mixed, where mixed views involve at least one relational
and non-relational component. I count views of intentionality as relational if they take
intentional states to be, or essentially involve, relations to intentional objects, whatever the
nature of those objects turns out to be.8 Relational views of intentionality are paired with
relational views of the semantics of intentional verbs, on which the intentional verbs that
express the intentional state in question take arguments in both their subject and object
positions. Roughly speaking, when an intentional state is ascribed with an intensional
verb, the intentional object will be an, or the, internal, direct object argument of the
verb, while the subject will be the external argument. Relational views of intentionality,
as I will construe them, hold that the semantic value of the intensional complement of
an intentional verb is the intentional object of the state that the verb expresses. Given a
particular intentional verb that exhibits all three features of intensionality, the relational
view holds that accounting for the peculiar features of intentionality is a matter of finding
the correct type of object to assign as the semantic value of the complement.
Nonrelational views of intentionality are harder to characterize, and have often been
overlooked. Roughly speaking, non-relational views hold that intentionality results from
the non-relational, intrinsic features of a representation or a representational state. For
instance, consider (11):
(11) Huey is searching for a superhero.
The nonrelational view of intentionality holds that Huey does not need to stand in a relation
8I am using “object” here in the broadest possible sense, to include entities, properties, relations, quanti-
fiers, propositions: anything that we can dream up that can play the role of an argument in the direct-object
position of a verb. However, I am restricting my usage of “object” to a metaphysical sense of “object”, and
so I am not using “object” in the grammatical sense, although I think the two senses are related. By “direct
object”, I think that most people mean something like the theme of the verb.
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to anything at all in order for him to be searching for a superhero. He might, for instance,
need to be in a certain state, and he also might, for instance, need to have a certain
representation that guides his search, but importantly, there is no thing to which his search
relates him. Searching is not a relational state, and although it may be directed, searches
need not have direct objects. As we will see below, there are several ways of spelling out to
the nonrelational approach more precisely, and I will defend one such approach at length
in chapter three. However, since much more ink has been devoted to spelling out relational
views of intentionality, much of the rest of this introduction will focus on providing an
account of the various nonrelational approaches.
There are also mixed views of intentionality that involve both a relational and a non-
relational component. Such views hold that the intentionality of a representation involves
a relational and an intrinsic feature of that representation. One notable kind of two-factor
view is one which countenances both an intentional object and intentional content, where in-
tentional content is meant as the “way in which the object is represented”.There are several
views with this structure, the earliest of which is Brentano’s, as well as Anscombe’s. Tim
Crane, who takes inspiration from both Brentano and Anscombe, also holds a two-factor
view.
The second axis along which views of intentionality break down concerns the nature of
the content assigned by the content-specifying phrases or clauses within the complements of
intentional verbs. It has been common in the last 50 years of theorizing about language and
the mind to treat all intentional states as propositional attitudes, or as states with propo-
sitional content. This is certainly true in the literature in the philosophy of mind, where
the paradigm cases of mental states are beliefs and desires, both of which are construed as
relations to propositions or representations with propositional contents. Non-propositional
intentional states, such as “thought about” have been, for the most part, either overlooked
or assimilated to propositional attitudes. This approach to intentionality takes a cue from
the trend in philosophy of language to privilege propositional contents over other kinds of
contents. For instance, both Quine and Lewis had worries about the assignment of contents
to subsentential linguistic expressions. One reason for Quine’s skepticism was his view that
the syntax of natural language is underdetermined, and that there is no fact of the matter
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concerning the subsentential structure of English sentences. But as if that view weren’t
enough, Quine also held that reference was inscrutable, and that meaning was fundamen-
tally indeterminate; he was a skeptic about the possibility of semantics in general. Lewis
was not a skeptic about the possibility of semantics generally, but he held that assignment
of reference to subsentential expressions was only holistically constrained by the conven-
tion of truthfulness and trust that links a community to a language, and that within these
constraints, various assignments of subsentential contents were possible. Thus, Quine and
Lewis both held that the only things that we have stable intuitive judgments about are
the truth-conditions of sentences, and these judgments can be maintained in the face of
various permutations of the references of the subsentential constituents. Thus, they view
assignment of extension to subsentential constituents as merely instrumental to the compu-
tation of truth-conditions: semantic values are necessary for compositional construction of
sentence meanings, but different assignments can fulfill this task equally well.
This approach has some immense benefits, the first of which is that it ties our theory
of intentionality to theories that systematically assign propositional contents to sentences,
i.e. formal semantic theories that assign truth-conditions to sentences. Insofar as having
truth-conditional content is one way of being about the world, this seems close to what is
wanted from a theory of intentionality. Second, at least as Quine and Lewis pushed for
the view, it stands to solve the problem of Nonexistence by reducing it to the problem of
falsehood. When we think of something that doesn’t exist, we are having a propositional
thought, and provided our account of propositions is not object-dependent, such thought
poses no particular puzzle. It also points toward solutions to the other two problems of
intentionality. Further, the propositional view of intensionality is paralleled by a view on
the semantics of intensional transitive verbs also originally due to Quine: the view that
all intensional transitive verbs are actually covertly propositional, or should be analyzed as
propositional attitudes. The view was originally proposed by Quine [1956], and championed
by the early Montague [1974b]. The view has been defended in a modern form by Larson
et al. [1997].
However, viewing all intentionality as truth-conditional or accuracy-conditional is a
massively simplifying assumption that seems to ignore very basic intuitions concerning how
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our minds come to think about the world. For instance, when I think of a dog, or of the
number three, is the content of my thought propositional? Am I thinking that such things
exist, or have such and such a property? It seems not. It seems that I can think of objects
simpliciter; not every thought of something is a thought that something is the case. Further,
on the semantic side, there are good reasons to think that not all intensional transitive verbs
can be reduced to instances of clausal complementation, despite the arguments given by
Larson [2002], Larson et al. [1997].
A less restrictive, and more psychologically and phenomenologically realistic view of
intentionality would be more ecumenical: it would allow that we can think about many
different sorts of things, and we can do so without always having an attitude toward a
proposition. There is no unique mechanism or type of content associated with intentionality,
but rather, different kinds of intentional states may have different kinds of contents. On
my view, the modes of intentionality are at least as multifarious as our common-sense
intentional vocabulary, and we should take such common-sense intentional vocabulary at
face value, rather than shoehorning it into a predetermined theoretical box. Similarly, I
think we should approach the semantics of intensional constructions at face value, rather
than by presuming that they can be paraphrased away into simpler and better-understood
idioms. This approach promises a more realistic account of intentionality that is informed
by the semantics of intentional locutions of various kinds. We should take the semantics of
intentional reports seriously, and let them play a guiding role with respect to the nature of
intentional objects and contents.
There seem to be three basic kinds of semantic values that theories of ITVs assign to their
phrasal complements, and these three views yield three different metaphysical approaches to
intentionality. Consider a paradigmatic intentional state: thinking about something. Let’s
suppose, for example, that Huey is thinking about a superhero, and let’s presume that
superheroes don’t exist. We can either hold that the semantic value of this complement
is an entity, a property, or a property of properties.9 The distinction between relational
9Often, in formal semantics, quantified NPs receive generalized quantifiers as their semantic values. Gen-
eralized quantifiers are properties of properties, but in this introduction I don’t want to presume knowledge
of any technical semantic or logical machinery, so I’ll use the slightly less technical notion of a property of
properties. The general idea is that quantified NPs will have distinctively quantificational semantic values,
and such quantificational semantic values are one approach to forming a theory of intentionality.
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and non-relational views will then determine whether the entity, property, or quantifier
assigned to the complement is the intentional object of the state ascribed, or merely serves
to characterize the state itself. In semantic terms, relational views will make the entity,
property, or quantifier the direct-object argument of the verb, whereas on nonrelational
views, they will bear a different relation to the verb: they will not be the verb’s direct
object.
Let’s think about how the various relational views might account for this state. First,
consider an entity-based view. On such a view, Huey might be thinking of a particular
superhero, say, Superman. In this case, we might hold that Superman is a particular entity
who just happens to not exist, and it is in virtue of being related to this nonexistent object
that John is thinking of it. This is an example of a Meinongian view, that commits us to
there being nonexistent objects. Superman is such an object. But John may not be thinking
of an particular superhero; he may be thinking of a superhero, but not a particular one, or
of a not-fully-specified superhero. On the entity view, we will then have to approach John’s
case as an instance of reasoning with arbitrary, or nonspecific objects. There are also some
two-factor views that fall into the entity category. On most two-factor views, what John
is thinking of is an object, but two-factor views allow that John can think of the object,
or represent the object, in a particular way. Such views make a distinction between the
intentional object of a state—the object that is thought of—and the intentional content:
how it is represented. I take Brentano’s conception of intentionality to be one of these views
[Brentano, 1973], along with Anscombe’s [Anscombe, 1965] and (possibly) [Crane, 2012].
The second approach to our example above is to hold that John is thinking of a property.
When John is thinking of a superhero, he bears a relation to a property, which serves as
the semantic value of the indefinite description in the object position of the intentional
report, and on a relational view, the semantic value of the intensional complement of the
ascription is the intentional object of the state the verb expresses. We can see this property-
based view of intentionality as having one of its sources in Quine. While Quine was no
fan of psychological idioms, his theory of linguistic intentionality can perfectly well be
adapted into a general theory of intentionality. Quine’s theory of linguistic intentionality
is one given in terms of predicates and quantification. For instance, on Quine’s view,
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names are general terms—i.e. predicates—that denote sets of objects, although if we do
a bit of violence to Quine’s own view, we can say that predicates denote properties. On
this modified Quinean view, sentences like “”Pegasus flies” are about Pegasus, roughly,
because they are about something that satisfies a particular property: the property of being
Pegasus. Accordingly, Quine paraphrases the sentence “Pegasus flies” using a predicate and
a quantifier, as ∃x(Pegasizes(x) ∧ Flies(x)). Such views have been refined and defended
by Fara [2015], who holds that both definite and indefinite descriptions are also predicates
[Fara, 2001].
The view that we can develop from the Quinean approach to empty names is one on
which the complements of intensional transitive verbs, such as “thinking of” in our example,
have predicative type. This view has semantic precedent, although it has not been proposed
as a view of intentionality. For instance, Zimmermann [1993, 2001, 2006] holds that all
intensional transitive verbs have complements of predicative type, and that intensional
transitives express relations to properties. This dovetails extremely well with Fara’s view
of names and descriptions as predicates. On Fara’s view, names are predicates, and so
contain free variables; in keeping with the ordinary treatment of predicates, the semantic
value of a name is a property. When the name is used in a sentence, the free variable is
implicitly existentially bound, and quantifier domain restriction is applied to yield or at
least approximate uniqueness. Such a view could be applied uniformly to the complements
of intensional transitive verbs, letting the fact that the predicate is interpreted inside of the
scope of the verb suppress existential commitment.
The last relational view is one on which intentionality is a relation to a set of proper-
ties, or a quantifier. This was originally Montague’s proposal. Montague proposed that
intensional transitive verbs like “seeks” were relations between a subject and an inten-
sional quantifier: a function from worlds to sets of properties. This, Montague held, is
a perfectly general account of the semantics of intensional transtive verbs, and moreover,
one that accords with his approach to the semantics of noun phrases more generally. In
assigning intensional quantifiers to phrases in the object-positions of ITVs, Montague as-
signs objects that seem to capture nonspecific searches, and searches for certain numbers
of objects. Further, bearing a relation to an intensional quantifier doesn’t seem seem to
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be existence-entailing, and intensional quantifiers are individuated finely enough to capture
Opacity. Many subsequent theorists have followed Montague’s lead, in particular Richard
[2013], Moltmann [1997, 2008], and in certain ways, Forbes [2006].
Nonrelational views of intentionality have historically received little attention, largely
due to the dominance of the view that our thoughts and representations have intentional
objects. Part of the goal of this thesis is to remediate this oversight by an developing
an alternative, non-objectual, nonrelational theory of intentionality. There aren’t many
well-known examples of non-relational theories of representation, but one prominent exam-
ples comes from the philosophy of perception; adverbialism about perception is the most
well-known nonrelational theory of an intentional phenomenon. But adverbialism need not
be seen as strictly a view on the nature of perception; rather, like we did above with the
Anscombian strategy, we can consider what adverbialism looks like when considered as a
view of intentionality generally. On the metaphysical level, Adverbialism about intention-
ality is the view that to think about, perceive, or sense something is to think, perceive, or
sense in a particular way. If we take the label Adverbialism at face value, then specifying
the particular way in which we think will be done by an adverb; in the case of Huey and his
superhero, an Adverbialist account of Huey’s intentional state would construe “a superhero”
as an adverb that specifies the way that Huey is thinking.
However, the original motivations for Adverbialism, as a theory of perception, came from
the desire to solve the problems of hallucination and illusion without recourse to sense-data.
Treating the content-specifying phrases or clauses of perceptual reports as adverbs was one
way to accomplish this goal; it was one version of a non-relational theory of such, but there
are others. In particular, one need not assimilate the content-specifying phrases or clauses
of perceptual and intentional reports to adverbs in order to give a nonrelational theory of
intentionality. Rather, there are many linguistic resources that we can deploy to develop
such a theory; treating the intensional complements of intentional verbs as adverbs was only
a first attempt that was largely dismissed because it was lacking in linguistic and theoretical
sophistication and plausibility.
There is, however, one theory of representation that is thoroughly nonrelational: Good-
man’s. Goodman holds that representing something is not a matter of bearing a relation
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to a particular object, existent or otherwise, but is rather to be a representation of a par-
ticular sort. For example, for a picture to be a picture of Pickwick, from the Dickens
novel, is not to represent some fictional object, but is rather for the very painting itself
to have certain features, intrinsically. Goodman makes this idea explicit with a proposal
for a paraphrase: “Picture of Pickwick” is best understood as a “Pickwick-picture”. The
proposal can be generalized to a proposal for all intentional reports; chapter three develops
just such a proposal in a linguistically rigorous way. But the main point to note here is that
Goodman’s proposal presents one way of satisfying the desiderata that originally motivated
the development of Adverbialism without invoking adverbs. Goodman does, however, use
classifiers: the hyphenated paraphrase classifies the picture as one of a particular sort using
an adjective, which is similar in spirit to how an adverb classifies, or helps to classify, an
event. Thus Goodman’s proposal is similar to the adverbial view, but points to a broader
approach to nonrelational intentionality: both adjectives and adverbs can serve as the basis
for non-relational theories of intentionality.
Goodman’s view is not the only non-relational view on the market. There are several
nonrelational proposals concerning the semantics of intensional transitive verbs that can
themselves form the bases of nonrelational theories of intentionality, but are not explic-
itly adverbial. For instance, Graeme Forbes [2006] and Friederike Moltmann [2013] offer
proposals concerning the semantics of intensional transitive verbs that do not treat such
verbs as having a direct-object argument. Forbes, for instance, treats intensional transitive
verbs within an event-semantic framework, and posits a special thematic role for the no-
tional reading of an intensional transitive. This new thematic role takes as an argument
a quantificational phrase, and the quantificational phrase, on his view, “characterizes” the
event in question, for instance, a search, or a desire, or the relevant mental state, where
“characterization” is spelled out in terms of satisfaction conditions.
Forbes and Moltmann’s semantics for intensional transitives are very different, but both
treat the intensional phrasal complements of ITVs as supplying quantificational material
to logical form. The quantificational material contributed by the NPs helps to specify
satisfaction conditions for the intensional verb. However, neither view treats intensional
NPs as direct-object arguments of the verb; the semantics that Moltmann provides treats
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Entity Property Quantifier
Relational Meinong, Prior,
Parsons, Crane,
Brentano,
Anscombe
Quine, Tarski,
Fara, Zimmermann,
Strawson
Montague, Richard,
Johnston
Nonrelational Goodman,
Chisholm
Goodman,
Chisholm, Dayal
Forbes, Moltmann
Mixed Brentano, Crane,
Anscombe,
Johnston
Anscombe∗ Johnston∗
Table 1: Views on Intentionality, Categorized by Content-Type and Relationality
intensional positions syncategorematically, while Forbes treats them non-thematically. Syn-
categorematic treatments are useful in accounts of intensionality because they allow us to
specify how an expression contributes to the truth-conditions of sentences containing it with-
out supplying it with a semantic value. This strategy should be familiar from first-order
logic: when we give the semantics for expressions of first order logic like the quantifiers, we
do not assign them semantic values, but rather state how the contribute to truth-conditions
in the metalanguage. The resulting categorization looks something like Table 1.
On the one hand, we can classify views of nonpropositional intentionality as relational or
non-relational, and on the other hand, we can classify them in terms of the semantic value
that their ascriptions assign to their object-positions.10 Or, in less semantic terms, we can
classify them in terms of their relationality, and in terms of the nature of their contents.
The problem cases for this classification are the two-factor views, represented by Brentano,
Crane, and Anscombe. Since their views involve two factors, each of these factors may be
of different sorts. For instance, on Anscombe’s view, every intentional state involves an
intentional object, and intentional objects, for Anscome, are something like objects under
descriptions. So the intentional object, which serves as the semantic value of the intensional
NP complements of intentional verbs, comprises an entity and a description, or an entity
10There is a problem with this way of categorizing the views. Moltmann’s semantics for ITVs is syn-
categorematic, which means that she does not assign a semantic value to the phrase in the object position
of an ITV at all. But she does provide the entire construction with truth-conditions. However, in her
syncategorematic specification, she uses a schematic letter whose instance is a quantifier, even though that
quantifier is not, technically speaking, the semantic value of the NP. So I have classified her as assigning
quantifier-type contents to the object-position NP, even though this only occurs as a part of the derivation
of the fnal truth-conditions.
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and some property of that entity. Thus, Anscombe’s two-factor view should actually take
up two categories on each of our axes; it has a relational and a non-relational component,
as well as involving both an object and a property. For simplicity, I have given mixed views
their own category on the relationality axis, and then marked the two types of contents
they involve with a second occurrence of the name under another content-heading.
0.6 Locating the Project
My project in this dissertation is to propose a new non-relational theory of linguistic, mental,
and perceptual intentionality. The framing assumption is Anscombian: by addressing the
semantics of intentional verbs, and providing them with a non-relational semantics, I develop
a non-relational theory of the metaphysics of intentionality. The three chapters to follow
each complete an important part of this project, and together they form the basis of a
research project that explores the semantics of semantic, perceptual, and psychological
verbs and uses these semantic insights to open new avenues of investigation of each of these
areas. Below are summaries of the contributions that each of the three chapters make to
the overall project, followed by a discussion of how they fit together into the foundation of
an important research proposal.
0.6.1 Semanic Verbs are Intensional Transitives
In the first chapter, titled “Semantic Verbs are Intensional Transitives”, I argue that seman-
tic verbs such as “refers (to)”, “applies (to)”, and “is true (of)” have all of the features of
intensional transitive verbs, and discuss the consequences of this claim for semantic theory
and the philosophy of language. One theoretically enriching consequence of this view is
that it allows us to perspicuously express, and partially reconcile two opposing views on
the nature and subject-matter of semantics: the Chomskian view, on which semantics is an
internalistic enterprise concerning speakers’ psychologies, and the Lewisian view, on which
semantics is a fully externalistic enterprise issuing in theorems about how the world must
look for our natural language sentences to be true. Intensional Transitive Verbs have two
readings: a de dicto reading and a de re reading; the de dicto reading of ITVs is plausibly
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a nonrelational reading, and the intensional features peculiar to this reading make it suit-
able for expressing a Chomskian, internalist semantic program. On the other hand, the de
re reading is fully relational, and make it suitable for expressing the kinds of word-world
relations essential to the Lewisian conception of semantics. And since the de dicto and de
re readings are plausibly related as two distinct scopal readings of the very same semantic
postulates, we can see these two conceptions of semantics as related by two scopal readings
of the very same semantic postulates.
The methods by which I argue for this claim are partly empirical and partly theoretical.
I begin by discussing three empirical studies showing that “refers to”, as it is used in
English to state speaker’s reference, has all three of the features of intensionality. I then
argue that we have reason to treat “refers”, as it is used technically in semantic theorizing,
as intensional as well. I argue for this on two grounds. First, on many views, semantic
reference is ultimately determined by instances or patterns of speaker’s reference, and so
will inherit the intensionality of speaker’s reference. Second, I argue that treating “refers”,
as it is used technically in semantics, as an ITV has several important theoretical benefits,
including that it points the way toward providing semantic values for empty names, and
promises to provide semantic values for empty names that are as fine-grained as those of
the NP complements of ITVs more generally. Since ITVs are often hyperintensional within
their complements, this offers us the prospect of providing expressions with hyperintensional
semantic values. And lastly, treating semantic verbs as ITVs allows us to satisfy a final
Chomskian desiderata on a theory of reference: it allows for a notion of nonspecific reference.
0.6.2 Hallucination and the New Problem of Empty Names
In chapter two, titled “Hallucination and the New Problem of Empty Names”, I argue that
the problem of hallucination and the problem of empty names are, at bottom, the same
problem. I argue for this by reconstructing the problem of empty names in way that is
novel, but implicit in much of the discussion on empty names. I then show how, once recast
in this light, the two problems are structurally identical down to an extremely fine level
of granularity, and also substantially overlap in terms of their content. If the problems
are identical in the way I propose, then we should expect that their spaces of solutions
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are also identical, and there is significant support for this conclusion. I characterize the
space of possible responses to each of the problems, and then discuss the pairings between
prospective solutions to each of the problems. However, there are some proposed solutions
to the problem of hallucination that have been overlooked as potential solutions to the
problem of empty names, and this realization opens new approaches to the problem of
empty names, and to the nature of meaning more generally.
One notable option for the treatment of empty names that has been overlooked is what I
call semantic adverbialism, the semantic counterpart of perceptual adverbialism. I propose
a way of defending semantic adverbialism by invoking the idea defended in chapter one, on
which semantic verbs are intensional transitives. One appealing view of the semantics for
the intensional, de dicto reading of an ITV is to treat it as non-relational. On this view,
noun phrases in the object-positions of ITVs serve as modifiers, helping to form complex
predicates. Since adverbs are one kind of modifier, this allows us to formulate a theory of
semantic meaning that is adverbial in spirit, if not in letter. The approach I propose is more
general, and might be better termed “adjunctivism”. There are several specific semantic
proposals that pursue this general idea: one due to Forbes [2006], another due to Moltmann
[2008, 2013], and a third proposed in chapter three. Whichever nonrelational proposal we
decide on, it will allow us to formulate a version of semantic adverbialism. I then discuss
the possibility of generalizing this semantic approach to the problem, which would unify our
approaches to the semantics of intensional verbs with our approaches to both the problem
of empty names and the problem of hallucination.
0.6.3 Intensionality is Additional Phrasal Unity
In chapter three, titled “Intensionality is Additional Phrasal Unity”, I argue for a novel ap-
proach to the semantics of intensional contexts. At the heart of my proposal is the Quinean
view that intensional contexts should, from the perspective of the semantics, be treated as
units, with the material in them contributing to the formation of a single predicate. How-
ever, this proposal is subject to a number of objections, including the criticism that taken
at face value, this would render intensional contexts, which seem to be fully productive,
non-compositional. The paper begins by discussing the concept of the unity of the phrase,
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and pointing to various ways that phrases can gain additional unity. It then proposes that
the intensionality of intensional transitive verbs is best construed as a form of semantic
incorporation; ITVs, on their intensional readings, meet all of the criteria for qualifying as
incorporating the nominals in their object positions. Some of the criteria for qualifying as
incorporated are even identical to the criteria for qualifying as intensional.
One form of incorporation that manifests itself in English is where an object-position
nominal is moved to the front of the verb and compounded with it. Sometimes sometimes
such compounding is marked with hyphenation, as in “apple-pick”, but other times the
result is fully lexicalized, as with “babysit”. I propose to treat the semantics of intensional
transitives on the model of semantics for these kinds of incorporated constructions. Follow-
ing Dayal [2003, 2011], I treat the intensional NPs in the object-positions of ITVs as verbal
modifiers, which combine with the verb to form a new, morphologically complex word. I
show how such a proposal is compositional, and accounts for all three of the traditional
features of intensionality: Nonexistence, Nonspecificity, and Opacity. I also gesture at how
this proposal can help make sense of varying judgments concerning inference patterns within
such contexts. I then extend the proposal to intensional verbs that take clausal comple-
ments, such as “believes” and “desires”, and also to intensional NPs, such as “picture of a
house”. In the former case, I propose that the clausal complements function like phrasal
compounds, in which a whole phrase serves as a unified modifier of the main verb. This
proposal serves as one vindication of the Quinean approach to intensionality from within
modern linguistics.
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Chapter 1
Semantic Verbs are Intensional
Transitives
1.1 Introduction
There is a strand of thought concerning the nature and subject matter of semantics on which
semantics does not state relations between words and the world. On this view, semantics
does not issue in truth-conditions, nor do its lexical postulates state relations between words
and objects; instead, semantics is an internalistic enterprise that concerns the psychology of
language users. This is the view proposed by Chomsky [1977, 1995, 2000], various versions of
which are held by theorists working in the Chomskian tradition, including Pietroski [2003,
2005, 2006, 2008, forthcoming], Collins [2008, 2009, 2014], and Jackendoff [1983], among
many others. On Chomsky’s view, semantics attempts to explain how syntax interacts with
our conceptual and intentional systems. It is only relative to an extremely detailed context,
along with fine-grained aspects of speakers’ intentions, interests, beliefs, and desires—which
may turn out to be theoretically intractable—that we can ever say that a word picks out
a particular object in the world. Further, Chomsky thinks that even so relativized, there
are still often no objects that are suitable candidates to serve as the worldly referents of a
word, but this does not in any way threaten to deprive words of semantic significance. I
will not rehash Chomsky’s arguments for these claims here, but his main point is clear: the
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semantic features of words are not the result of their relation to any objects in the world,
and the mind plays an important role in determining the semantic features of words in a
way that renders assignment of objective reference either impossible or pointless.
But there is a competing line of thought according to which semantics does not con-
cern speakers, their psychologies, or what makes them linguistically competent. Rather,
semantics is a theory of the contents of natural language expressions, where such contents
are ultimately found in the world, or constructed mathematically out of pieces of reality.
On this view, semantics makes use of lexical postulates that express genuine relations be-
tween words and objects or collections of objects, and from these premises, semanticists
derive theorems about what the world must look like for natural language sentences to
be true. This is the Lewisian conception of semantics [Lewis, 1970, 1984, 1986], the main
ideas of which are held by Soames [1987, 1989, 1992, 2002, 2005], Sider [2011], Williamson
[2013], and Yablo [2014], among many others. Lewisian semantics is partly a metaphysical
theory—it is a version of the theory of truthmaking.1,2
In this paper, I argue for the adoption of a novel view of our foundational semantic
notions that allows us to capture the core insights of each of these two views of semantics
while also revealing how they conflict, and how they are systematically related. Philosophers
of language and semanticists working both inside and outside of the Chomskian tradition
have largely assumed that reference, application, and truth (of) are purely extensional, and
state relations between words and particular objects or other pieces of reality. This is why
some Chomskians have claimed that semantics should jettison the notions of reference and
truth altogether, while many Lewisians have claimed that semantics should not concern
itself with speakers, their psychologies, or what makes them linguistically competent.3 My
1These two conceptions of the nature and subject-matter of semantics go by various names in the liter-
ature, but the distinction is ubiquitous. Sider [2011] aptly terms the two conceptions “linguistic semantics”
and “metaphysical semantics”, although his conception of metaphysical semantics is a bit more specific than
the one applicable here. The idea of truth-making comes largely from D. M. Armstrong [1997, 2004]. I
recognize that there are important differences between the positions here, but each of them holds, roughly,
that semantics states word-world relations, and that content is externalistic.
2Following Davidson [1966, 1967a], some theorists, most notably Larson and Segal [1995] have tried to
maintain that semantics is both a theory of semantic competence and a theory of word-world relations, but
these views remain problematic for various reasons. See Szabo´ [1997] and Gross [2006] for discussion.
3Importantly, not all Chomskians claim that we should jettison the notions of reference and truth
altogether, although this is the lesson that some, including Pietroski [2003, 2005, 2006] at various points,
draw from Chomsky’s arguments. I think that the best way of understanding Chomsky’s own comments in
[Chomsky, 1995] and [Chomsky, 2000] is as endorsing a view on which semantics does make use of reference,
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central claim is that there are strong empirical and theoretical reasons to treat the verbs
we use in our semantic theorizing—including “refers (to)”, “applies (to)”, and “is true
(of)”—as intensional transitive verbs (ITVs). ITVs have two readings: an intensional, de
dicto reading as well as a relational, de re reading. Stating our semantic theory with the
de dicto readings of our semantic verbs yields a theory that captures the core insights
of the Chomskian approach to semantics, while the de re reading yields a theory that is
fully relational, and issues in truth-conditions. These two approaches are related—and
compatible—in that they are expressed by two different readings of the very same semantic
vocabulary, and plausibly, the distinction between these two readings is one of scope.
A semantic theory stated with the de dicto readings of our semantic verbs can serve
as a Chomskian semantic theory because it provides us with new, intensional versions of
reference and application that satisfy several important Chomskian desiderata.4 The de
dicto reading of a sentence involving an ITV can be true even when the noun phrase in its
object position is empty, and also when that noun phrase does not pick out a specific thing.
The object-positions of ITVs also resist substitution of even co-intensive noun phrases. This
allows the theory to assign extremely fine-grained semantic values to expressions, even when
those expressions are empty or do not pick out a particular object. The ultimate nature of
this theory will depend on the semantics we provide for ITVs more generally, but on several
plausible views, including the one I favor, the correct semantics for the de dicto reading
is non-relational. However, ITVs also have a reading on which none of these intensional
features are present: their de re reading. The de re reading of a sentence containing an
ITV expresses a relation between the subject and a particular, existent object or collection
of objects, and does so independently of how that object or those objects are characterized
by the object position of the sentence.5 Stating a semantic theory with this reading of our
application, and truth, but construes them non-relationally, or intensionally.
4Many of the arguments that Chomsky gives for abandoning the relational conception of semantics are
based on the fact that reference and application exhibit intensional features, and he seems to hold that
expressions refer, but that reference is not a relation, at least to ordinary objects. Admitting a de dicto
reading of our semantic postulates allows us to capture this view precisely. More on this explication of
Chomsky’s view in §7.
5Chomsky also allows that we can introduce technical senses of reference, application, and truth that
allow speakers to talk about the same stuff, for instance, in science (see Pietroski [forthcoming, p. 6] and
references therein). Thus, this proposal should be particularly amenable to the Chomskian, particularly
because, as we will see, I think that the relational readings of our semantic verbs are just this: technical
readings that are stipulated and divorced from ordinary usage.
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semantic vocabulary allows us to spell out the relational conception of semantics, on which
semantics has metaphysical implications.
My argument begins by showing that, in English, semantic verbs like “refers (to)” and
“applies (to)” exhibit all of the features of intensional transitive verbs. However, in English
these verbs are used to report things that speakers do: they are used to report speaker’s
reference and application. But when these verbs are used to state the semantic features of
words, as they are in semantic theorizing, they are used technically. Accordingly, I provide
several arguments that the technical usage should incorporate the intensional features of
the natural language expressions. First, I argue that all theories of semantic reference ap-
peal to speaker’s reference in their explanations—a fact that is rarely acknowledged—and
so semantic reference should inherit the intensionality of speaker’s reference. I then argue
that our technical terms need to ultimately be explained using non-technical vocabulary
that we already understand, especially when such vocabulary is readily available. Further,
in the case of our semantic verbs, there are practically no theoretical disadvantages of incor-
porating ITVs into our semantic theory because ITVs subsume the traditional, extensional
semantic notions as special cases. Lastly, making use of intensional transitive verbs in our
semantic theorizing is theoretically enriching in a number of important ways, one of which
is that it allows us to capture and systematize the relationship between the two conceptions
of semantics above. But the view also allows us to make headway on several recalcitrant
problems in the philosophy of language and the foundations of semantics, including the
problem of empty names and the Foster problem, along with its intensional variant.
1.2 Intensional Transitive Verbs
A verb is considered transitive when it takes a noun phrase in its object position, occurring
in sentences of the form NP V NP′.6 A transitive verb V is considered intensional when
sentences of the above form exhibit some combination of the following three properties.
6However, many verbs that are technically intransitive are treated as transitive when they occur in
constructions of the form NP V P NP′, where P is a preposition. This is typically done when the
combination of intransitive verb and preposition have a transitive verb as a near-synonym, such as in the
case of “seeks” and “is looking for”. Many of these verb + preposition combinations behave identically to
transitive verbs, and so unless otherwise noted, I’ll treat them as intensional transitives also.
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Nonexistence: NP V NP′ has a reading which fails to entail NP′ exists, where NP′ is
upward-entailing.7
Nonspecificity: NP V NP′ has a reading that fails to entail NP Vs a particular NP′.
Opacity: NP V NP′ has a reading that fails to entail NP V NP∗, where NP′, and NP∗
are extensionally equivalent.8
To see these properties in action, let’s consider a canonical example. We can see that the
verb phrase “looking for” exhibits Nonexistence by noting that (1) has a reading does
not imply (2):
(1) John is looking for the fountain of youth.
(2) The fountain of youth exists.
This establishes that “looking for” exhibits Nonexistence.
“Looking for” also exhibits the second property of ITVs, Nonspecificity. Consider a
case where “looking for” has an indefinite noun phrase in its object position, such as the
following:
(3) John is looking for a capable business partner.
Clearly, there is a reading of (3) that does not entail (4):
(4) John is looking for a particular capable business partner.
John may merely be seeking to share his entrepreneurial tasks with someone he thinks will
help his business, and he might be satisfied with a great number of different individuals.
We can bring this out with the following continuation:
7By “upward entailing” I mean to include positively quantified NPs like: “a dog”, “the men who robbed
him”, “four gorgons”, “infinitely many numbers”, as well as proper names, and bare plural NPs. I mean to
exclude negative NPs like “no dogs”, “no one”, etc. By “empty” I mean that nothing in the world answers
to the NP.
8It’s important to note that there are many ITVs that do not have all of these features: typically, the
presence of even one of these properties is sufficient to classify a verb as intensional. However, verbs like
“seek” are paradigmatically intensional in that they exhibit all three of the properties. As will become clear,
I am arguing that not only are our semantic verbs intensional, they are like “seek” in being paradigmatically
intensional.
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(5) John is looking for a capable business partner—but no one in particular.
Lastly, “looking for” exhibits Opacity: given two coextensive NPs, substitution of one for
another within its complement does not preserve truth:
(6) John is looking for Ortcutt.
(7) John is looking for the shortest spy.
In this case, John might not know that Ortcutt is the shortest spy, and so the goal of his
search may be to find Ortcutt and not the shortest spy. Thus (6) may be true while (7) is
false, which means that “looking for” exhibits Opacity.
These inferential tests indicate that there is a reading of sentences containing ITVs on
which their object-position is not existence-entailing, can receive a nonspecific interpreta-
tion, and resists substitution of co-extensive expressions. However, there is also a reading
that does not have these features. Consider John’s search for a capable business partner
above. As we saw, John need not be looking for any particular person. However, he might
be, and (3) can also be used to report just such a search. We can bring out this other kind
of search with the following paraphrase:
(8) There’s a particular capable business partner for whom John is looking.
The truth-conditions of (8) differ from those of the reading which we brought out with (5)
above. This indicates that (3) ambiguous between two readings. I will call the reading
brought out by (8) the de re reading of (3), and the reading brought out in (5) its de dicto
reading. Distinguishing between these two readings is in keeping with a long tradition.
Quine [1956] originally distinguished between what he called the notional and relational
readings of sentences like:
(9) I want a sloop.
The relational, de re reading of (9) can be brought out with the following paraphrase:
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(10) There is a sloop such that I want it.
The notional, de dicto reading can be captured by the idea that I seek “mere relief from
slooplessness”, and brought out with the continuation in (11):
(11) I want a sloop—but no particular one.
In the current literature these two readings are often called “specific” and “nonspecific” or
“extensional” and “intensional”.9 In what follows, I will continue to use the terms de re
and de dicto, because they are somewhat more theoretically neutral than the other pairs of
terms used to mark the distinction, and they don’t tie the two readings to any one of the
properties of ITVs. Additionally, the distinction between de re and de dicto is commonly
captured in terms of scope, which I think is the best way to capture the distinction between
the two readings of ITVs.10 We will return to issues of scope below.
The non-equivalence of the (scopal) readings of a construction involving a transitive
verb is sometimes seen as criterial for the intensionality of that verb, because the resulting
ambiguity is not present in purely extensional verbs. A test for this non-equivalence often
appears under the name “failure of quantifier exportation” [Moltmann, 1997].11 If the
9The ambiguity is sometimes taken to arise only when the NP in object position is an indefinite descrip-
tion [Moltmann, 1997, Zimmermann, 1993, 2001, 2006]. But like Mark Richard [2013], I think this is mistake.
While there may be a specific/nonspecific ambiguity that arises in connection with indefinite descriptions,
this is simply a special case of the ambiguity that is characteristic of ITVs, which is much broader, and can
occur with definite as well as indefinite NPs in object position: for instance, in “John imagined London” or
“John needs the antidote”. Thus I differ from semanticists who take Nonspecificity as a necessary condition
for a transitive verb to qualify as intensional.
10While a scopal analysis of the de re/de dicto distinction is plausible, the relationship between the de
re/de dicto distinction is complicated. I adopt a two-way distinction here merely for ease of exposition,
but recognize that, as Kripke [1977] showed, no two-way distinction can do justice to iterated intensional
verbs, and the scopal readings they generate. Ultimately I believe that explaining the different readings
of intensional sentences as different scopal readings is the correct explanation, and so may need to jettison
the terminology I have chosen to use here. However, Janet Fodor [1970], in her dissertation, shows that
intensional verbs have more than just two readings—she claims that in some cases they have four, and argues
that they lack enough scopal readings to capture the four-way distinction. Fodor claims that the intensional
status and the quantificational force of phrases in intensional positions an be evaluated independently. The
four readings then correspond to each of the four possible combinations of (the presence or absence of)
Nonspecificity and Opacity. If the basic scopal analysis holds, it would predict only two of the readings,
since on the scopal analysis, the entire noun-phrase can scope only either over or under the verb, and
thus, Nonspecificity and Opacity are predicted to co-occur. This indicates that there are not enough
permutations of scope-bearing elements in intensional sentences to capture their readings, and so the different
See [Keshet, 2008] for an overview, [Szabo´, 2010] for a defense of Fodor’s specific opaque reading, and Keshet
[2011] for a new scopal account of de re and de dicto that accommodates Fodor’s data.
11Failure of quantifier exportation is an idea originally due to Quine [1956], but see [Kaplan, 1968] for a
discussion. Richard [2013] calls the two scopal readings of intensional constructions the D-reading and the
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quantifier in the verb’s complement fails to export, and can yield a falsehood when moved
to a position where it takes scope over the verb, this shows the non-equivalence of the two
readings, as in the following example:
(12) John is looking for a unicorn. 9
A unicorn is such that John is looking for it.
In more generality, the inference that fails is :
(13) NP Vs Q N 9
Q N is/are such that NP Vs it/them. Moltmann [1997]
I will not take failure of quantifier exportation as criterial for intensionality, because I think
the test is more coarse-grained than the tests mentioned above: quantified NP complements
can fail to export either because they are non-specific, or because they are empty. However,
I will sometimes treat the ability to elicit two distinct readings as weak evidence for the
intensionality of a verb, due to the fact that judgments about intensionality can be subtle,
and testing for the presence of a second reading provides us with another resource for its
detection.
1.3 Representational Verbs
Analyses of ITVs often restrict themselves to considering just a few paradigmatically in-
tensional verbs, for example: “seek”, “need”, and “want”. This can sometimes give the
impression that the class of verbs which displays some combination of the above features is
relatively small. However, Friederike Moltmann [2008] lists six categories of transitive verbs
that have intensional readings:
1. (Simple) predicates of absence: need, lack, omit, fit (into, onto)
2. Psychological verbs of absence: promise, desire, want
3. Predicates of transaction and possession: own, possess, owe, offer, buy, accept, have
R-reading, and takes the presence of the ambiguity as criterial for intensionality.
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4. Verbs of representation: draw, paint, portray, imagine, represent, show, indicate, point
(to), talk (about), signify
5. Epistemic predicates: see, recognize, find, discover, count
6. Verbs of creation in the progressive: is building, is creating, is putting together
This shows that the category of intensional transitive verbs is surprisingly broad, especially
considering that several of the “epistemic predicates” are usually taken to be paradigmat-
ically extensional. However, for our purposes, the most important category of ITVs are
the verbs of representation. Not only are these verbs intensional, in that they exhibit
Nonspecificity; they exhibit all three properties above, making them paradigmatically
intensional.12
In what follows, I will argue that “refers to” and the other semantic verbs mentioned
above are paradigmatically intensional. Their intensionality, together with the fact that
semantic verbs clearly express intentional notions, makes it plausible that semantic verbs fall
into the category of representational verbs. More specifically, my arguments will establish
that, in English, “refers to” is roughly synonymous with “talks about” or “is about”. The
intensionality of notions of aboutness and subject-matter is well-established [Mart´ı, 1989,
Perry, 1989], and it has been widely noted that “about” is an intensional preposition, which
occasions intensional contexts [Montague, 1974b]. But while the intensionality of aboutness
is well-known, the intensionality of “refers to” and “applies to” is surprising: what words
12To see this, consider the following examples:
(14) a. The hammer and sickle represent a strong and industrious nation.
b. Dali drew a strange man.
c. The movie portrayed a pair of outlaws.
d. John imagined a distant city.
e. Newly developed economic metrics indicate a rise in stock prices.
It may well be the case that all strong and industrious nations are also unjust nations, and vice-versa, but
the hammer and sickle need not represent an unjust nation. Similarly, all strange men may be sad men,
and vice-versa, but Dali need not have drawn a sad man. Similar arguments can be made for the rest of
the verbs. Thus representational verbs exhibit Opacity. It is also quick to see that none-of these verbs
are existence-entailing. What about Nonspecificity? Clearly, the hammer and sickle need not represent
a particular strong and industrious nation, Dali need not have drawn a particular man, and John need not
have imagined a particular city, nor do the new economic metrics need to have indicated a particular rise
in stock prices. Thus, these verbs display all three traditional features of ITVs, and are paradigmatically
intensional.
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refer to and apply to are typically taken to be thoroughly extensional notions, and “refers”
is supposedly an extensional verb par excellence.13
One last verb deserves comment: “means” is also paradigmatically intensional, and this
fact is highly suggestive. If semantics is supposed to be a theory of meaning (and what
else could it be?), then it seems that any collection of semantic verbs that does not exhibit
intensionality in the way that “means” does is certain to be inadequate for specifying a
theory of meaning.14 Showing that semantic verbs have an intensional reading goes a long
way toward showing that they can serve to state such a theory.
1.4 Speaker’s Reference and Application are Intensional
This section presents empirical data showing that “refers to”, as it is used in English to
report speaker’s reference, is much closer to intensional than extensional with respect to all
three of the core features of intensionality.15 To collect this data, I designed and ran three
studies, each of which tested “refers to” for one of the three traditional features using the
13My proposal is connected to a point made by David Lewis, in his paper “‘Tensions” [Lewis, 1983],
that has been drastically underappreciated. In the paper, Lewis shows that there is, in an important sense,
no absolute difference between languages that are extensional and languages that are intensional. Instead,
given a language in which every expression is assigned an intension, that language can be transformed into
a language in that is fully extensional: just let each expression of the new language have, as its extension,
the function that was the intension of the expression in the original language. Given a certain approach
to the semantics of ITVs, this is what treating “refers to” and “applies to” does: it makes an expression’s
intension its referent.
14This is closely related to points made by Davidson [1967a, 1976] in response to what has come to be
known as the Foster Problem [Foster, 1976]. Foster famously showed that a theory of truth could issue in
theorems that were not interpretive. He pointed out that the theorems of a truth-theory—biconditionals
pairing sentences of the object-language with their truth-conditions—did not provide a tight enough con-
nection to serve as meaning-theorems. For example, such a theory could have theorems that were true but
obviously not meaning-giving, such as “ ‘Snow is white’ is true iff grass is green”. Davidson responded by
claiming that the biconditionals needed to be laws of nature, and should be prefixed with an intensional
operator, “Necessarily”, which rules out the simplest such cases. However, Soames [1989] recapitulates the
Foster problem in the intensional setting, and tries to show that no theory that derives truth-conditions from
reference and satisfaction clauses can suffice as a theory of meaning. Soames shows that given any reference
and satisfaction clauses, ones that are intensionally equivalent can be constructed, and these clauses allow
us to derive identical truth-conditions for sentences with obviously different meanings. In a sense, my strat-
egy is the reverse. On my view, reference and satisfaction clauses have a reading that is hyperintensional,
and so Soames’s intensionally equivalent clauses can be distinguished from one another. This means that
derivations involving them will yield different meanings, although it is unclear whether these derivations
will themselves provide specifications of truth-conditions. Truth-conditions can be derived from the other
reading of our reference and satisfaction clauses: their extensional reading.
15The intensionality of speaker’s reference is not a new idea. However, this is, to my knowledge, the first
time that the standard linguistic criteria for being an intensional transitive verb have been explicitly applied
to “refers” to establish its intensionality. It is also, to my knowledge, the first empirical work has been done
to support the conclusion.
37
inferential tests laid out above. Each study compared “refers to” to one paradigmatically
intensional and one paradigmatically extensional transitive verb, and then took note of
statistical differences with respect to one of the properties. As we will see below, “refers
to” was closer to intensional in all three studies, and in the cases of Nonexistence and
Opacity, did not differ statistically at all from “seeks”, a paradigmatically intensional verb.
1.4.1 Experiment 1: Nonexistence
The first study tested “refers to” for Nonexistence.
Methods
In the study, 237 participants filled out a brief questionnaire.16 Each participant was
randomly assigned to one of three conditions, either Intensional, Refers, or Extensional,
and answered one question associated with that condition. In what follows, I will refer
to the three conditions—intensional vs. refers vs extensional—as “verb categories”. The
questions associated with the verb categories differed only in that they contained either a
paradigmatically intensional verb (“search”), “refer to”, or a paradigmatically extensional
verb (“touch”) as their main verb. To make sure the results were not peculiar to one
particular noun phrase, participants were then assigned to one of four vignettes (Unicorns,
Elves, Magical Fountains, or Dodos).
Each participant was asked to suppose that they knew that a certain kind of entity did
not exist, but that their friend, John, didn’t. For example, the first vignette consistent only
of the following sentence:
Unicorns Suppose that you know that unicorns do not exist, but your friend John doesn’t.
The participant was then asked one of the three questions below, depending on the
condition to which they had been assigned:
Intensional Is it possible for John to search for a unicorn?
Refers Is it possible for John to refer to a unicorn?
16Participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Sample was 51.25% male, mean age 35.5.
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Extensional Is it possible for John to touch a unicorn?
The other vignettes, and the questions associated with them, differed only in that they
had a different indefinite noun phrase in place of “a unicorn”; instead, the other three used
“an elf”, “a magical fountain”, and “a dodo”, respectively. Participants responded to the
questions on a 7-point Likert scale, with an answer of 1 indicating a response of “definitely
not” and 7 indicating “definitely yes”. Thus, if a participant responded with a high score
on a question, it indicated that the participant took the verb to exhibit Nonexistence,
whereas a low score indicates the opposite.
Results
The average rating for each of the verb categories across the four vignettes can be found
in Figure 1.1. The key thing to notice is that the ratings for “refers” were much closer
Figure 1.1: Mean ratings by condition in Experiment 1. Error bars show standard error.
to those given for the paradigmatically intensional verb than the extensional verb. When
these averages were compared, the rating for “refers” did not differ significantly from the
intensional case, but was significantly higher than that for the extensional case (p < .001),
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and this difference was consistent across the four vignettes. Further, comparing the means
for the Refers and Extensional conditions revealed a large effect size.17
Discussion
The results are striking, and seem to establish unequivocally that “refers” exhibits Nonex-
istence: it appears to pattern completely with “search for”, and bear very little similarity
to “touch”. Consider the following sentences:
(15) John is referring to a unicorn.
(16) John is referring to an elf.
On the supposition that an affirmative response to the Refers question above indicates
that (15) has a reading that does not entail the existence of unicorns, then the results
indicate that sentences such as (15) and (16) exhibit Nonexistence. This, I think, should
be somewhat surprising; it is often the case that philosophers of language take genuine
reference to require existence. These results pose a dilemma for such theorists: either they
are flatly wrong about the nature of reference, or the version of reference with which they
are concerned is not the one that ordinary speakers make use of and have intuitions about.
I will discuss this question at length in §5 and §6.
1.4.2 Experiment 2: Nonspecificity
The second experiment tested “refers” for Nonspecificity.18
17The results were analyzed using a 3 (verb category: intensional vs. “refers” vs. extensional) x 4
(vignette) ANOVA. As expected there was a significant main effect of verb category, F (2,225) = 66.6, p <
.001, but there was no significant main effect of vignette, F (3,225) = 2.2, p = .084, and no significant
interaction, F (6,225) = 1.2, p = .3. To explore the differences between the intensional case, the extensional
case, and the case of “refers”, I used Tukey’s post-hoc tests. Unsurprisingly, participants gave higher ratings
in the intensional condition (M = 5.35, SD = 2.1) than in the extensional condition (M = 1.96, SD =
1.78), p < .001. Ratings for “refers” (M = 4.99, SD = 2.16) were significantly higher than those for the
extensional case, p < .001, d = 1.53, but not significantly different from those for intensional case, p = .495.
18Two anonymous referees point to the fact that Nonspecificity is itself a property that is slightly
unclear. For instance, if John is looking for a dog, he might be looking for a specific property, even if he is
not looking for a specific dog. I take Nonspecificity to be present in cases where an agent is not related
to any particular entity. The idea that an ITV might relate the subject to a specific property is, I believe, a
piece of theory that attempts to explain the basic intensional datum, which is that when indefinites appear
in the object position of an ITV, they need not pick out particular entities: they need not refer, or provide
an entity that serves as the argument to the verb. Further, such indefinites are not merely instances of what
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Methods
In the study, 236 participants answered three questions each, one question for each of the
three conditions, Intensional, Refers, and Extensional.19 The Intensional question
contained a paradigmatically intensional verb (“look for”), the Refers question involved
“refers to”, and the Extensional question contained a paradigmatically extensional verb
(“touch”). The questions were presented in a random order. Each question asked the
participant to suppose that the subject was involved in a particular activity or in a particular
state, and then queried whether it was possible for the activity or state to be directed toward
something nonspecific. The activities and states were all characterized using an indefinite
NP in the object position of the main verb, so the questions assessed whether a nonspecific
interpretation was available for the indefinite. To make sure that answers did not depend on
the specific NPs used in the questions, each participant was assigned to one of five vignettes
(Dog, Person, Book, CC-Cookie, or Cigarette) at random, each of which involved a
different indefinite noun phrase. For instance, the first set of questions was as follows:
Intensional Suppose that John is looking for a dog. Is is possible for John to be looking
for a dog, but not a particular one?
Refers Suppose that in a conversation, John is referring to a dog. Is it possible for John
to be referring to dog, but not to a particular one?
Extensional Suppose that John is touching a dog. Is it possible for John to be touching
a dog, but not a particular one?
The other sets of questions differed only in that they contained a different indefinite NP
within the complement of the transitive verb. Since each respondent answered a question
containing a verb from each category, they were able to compare the three questions asked,
and adjust their answers accordingly. Participants responded to the questions on a 7-point
Likert scale, with an answer of 1 indicating a response of “definitely not” and 7 indicating
Zimmermann [2001] calls “unspecificity”: namely, cases where what particular entity the indefinite picks out
is left unspecified. I take the inferential test I introduced above and the questions in Experiment 2 to be
genuine tests for nonspecifity, rather than unspecificity. When an object is left unspecified, the continuation
“but no particular one” is not appropriate.
19Participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Sample was 63.1% male, mean age 25.5.
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“definitely yes”. Thus, if a participant responded with a high score on a question, it
indicated that the participant took the verb to exhibit Nonspecificity, whereas a low
score indicates the opposite.
Results
Figure 1.2: Mean ratings by condition in Experiment 2. Error bars show standard error.
As Figure 1.2 shows, the average rating for “refers” was intermediate between the inten-
sional and extensional cases. Ratings for “refers” were significantly lower than the inten-
sional verb, and significantly higher than the extensional one.20 However, the average was
still closer to intensional than extensional, and the effect size when comparing the mean for
Refers to the for Extensional was larger than the effect size when comparing Refers to
Intensional.21
20The data were analyzed using a mixed-model repeated measures ANOVA, with verb category
(Intensional vs. Refers vs. Extensional) as a within-subject variable and vignette (Dog vs Person
vs. Book vs. CC-Cookie vs. Cigarette) as a between-subject variable. As we would expect, there was a
significant main effect of verb category, F (2, 231) = 100.4, p < .001. There was no significant main effect of
vignette, F (4,231) = 1.5, p = .192. There was a significant interaction, F (8,462) = 3.2, p = .002.
21To further explore the effect of verb category, and establish whether “refers” is intensional or extensional,
I ran separate ANOVAs comparing each pair of verb categories. As we would expect, ratings for the
intensional verbs (M = 5.99, SD = 1.53) were higher than those for the extensional verbs (M = 3.45, SD =
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Discussion
The results show that “refers” differs significantly from both paradigmatically intensional
and paradigmatically extensional verbs with respect to Nonspecificity; the average for
“refers” was intermediate between the intensional and extensional cases. This indicates
that with respect to Nonspecificity, certain verbs can have an intermediate status. This
intermediate status poses a question for standard ways of categorizing verbs as intensional
vs. extensional. Most semanticists take the distinction to be binary: either an intensional
reading is available or it is not. The results show that a more nuanced approach is required.
It may be that intensional readings are heard by some speakers and not others, or it may
be that many speakers hear a genuinely intermediate rating. Preliminarily, the variance in
responses for “refers” indicates that some speakers get the nonspecific reading while others
do not. But then this poses a problem for the lexical semantics of intensional verbs: when
speakers are divided about a verb’s intensionality, should a lexical-semantic theory encode
it?
However, this problem is not too worrying in the case of “refers”. Across the vignettes,
the mean for “refers” was much closer to intensional than to extensional. If we keep to the
relatively standard assumption that the distinction between intensional and extensional is
binary, then it seems we have good grounds for saying that “refers” exhibits Nonspeci-
ficity. The averages clearly fall on opposite sides of the midpoint of the scale, which is
4.
Overall, this is an even more surprising result than that of the first experiment.22 Even
when we restrict ourselves to consideration of speaker’s reference, reference is ordinarily
2.45), F (1,231) = 155.7, p < .001. Ratings for “refers” (M = 5.14, SD = 2.07) were significantly higher than
those for extensional verbs, F (1,231) = 86.25, p < .001, d = .74. Ratings for “refers” were also significantly
lower than those for intensional verbs, F (1,231) = 24.05, p < .001, d = .48. Looking at the differences
between vignettes, we found that, in contrast to the first experiment, there was an interaction between which
indefinite NP was involved in the vignette and whether a nonspecific reading was available for “refers”. In
particular, in one of the vignettes—CC-Cookie—the ratings for “refers” were closer to extensional, although
still intermediate, while in the other four vignettes the ratings were closer to intensional. There are two
possibilities for explaining this interaction. One is that the CC-Cookie vignette was an anomaly. The
other is that there is a genuine interaction between the NP in the object position of a verb, and whether a
nonspecific reading is available.
22It is also worth noting that the sample size for this experiment was quite large: in contrast to the
other experiments, each of the participants in this experiment answered 3 questions: one for the intensional
condition, one for “refers”, and one for the extensional condition, and so there were 237 data points available
for each question, as opposed to around 80 in the other experiments.
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presumed to be fully specific. The fact that a nonspecific reading is often available gives us
strong reason to think that reference is not a relation between a speaker (or a word) and an
object. Nonspecificity cannot be explained by positing nonexistent objects, as is often done
to explain Nonexistence, or by positing senses or conceptual covers, as is often done to
account for Opacity.
1.4.3 Experiment 3: Opacity
The third experiment tested “refers to” for Opacity.
Methods
In the study, 231 participants filled out a brief questionnaire.23 Each participant was ran-
domly assigned to one of three conditions, either Intensional, Refers, or Extensional,
and answered one question associated with that condition. As with the previous experi-
ments, the questions associated with the verb categories differed only in that they contained
either a paradigmatically intensional verb (“search”), “refer to”, or a paradigmatically ex-
tensional verb (“touch”) as their main verb. For the sake of generality, each participant was
randomly assigned to one of four vignettes (Art Collector, Chief Justice, Murderer,
or Spy). As an illustration, the first vignette was the following:
Art Dealer Suppose that the person with the largest art collection in the country just so
happens to be the national record holder in the high jump.
Participants were then asked to answer one of the following three associated questions:
Intensional Now suppose that Mary is looking for the person with the largest art collection
in the country. Does it have to be true that Mary is looking for the national record
holder in the high jump?
Refers Now suppose that in a conversation, Mary is referring to the person with the largest
art collection in the country. Does it have to be true that Mary is referring to the
national record-holder in the high jump?
23Participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Sample was 46.9% male, mean age 33.5.
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Extensional Now suppose that Mary is touching the person with the largest art collection
in the country by shaking his hand. Does it have to be true that Mary is touching
the national record-holder in the high jump?
The other vignettes, and the questions associated with them, differed only in that they
made use of a different pair of definite descriptions. Participants answered their question
on a 7-point Likert scale, with an answer of 1 indicating “definitely not” and an answer of 7
indicating “definitely yes”. In this case, lower scores indicated a higher degree of Opacity.
Results
The average rating for the three questions corresponding to the different verb categories
can be found in Figure 1.3. As in the first study on Nonexistence, but in contrast to the
Figure 1.3: Mean ratings by condition in Experiment 3. Error bars show standard error.
second study on Nonspecificity, the average rating for “refers” did not differ significantly
from the average rating for the intensional case. But as with both previous studies, “refers”
differed significantly from the average rating for the extensional case, with a moderate effect
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size.24 In contrast to the previous two studies, however, a significant main effect of vignette
was observed, and like the study addressing Nonspecificity, we observed a significant
interaction between vignette and the status of “refers”.
Discussion
As we can see from the figure above, “refers” again patterns with the paradigmatically
intensional verb as opposed to the paradigmatically extensional verb. However, this data is
less clear than the previous two experiments. We observed an overall effect of vignette on
participants responses, and also an interaction between the vignette and participants ratings
for “refers” relative to the controls. I think these facts are due to a slight anomaly in two
of the four intensional questions, which received higher ratings than the others. The effect
of the intensional questions getting these lower scores was to bring the overall intensional
average up, and closer to that of “refers”. Thus, while the average for “refers” does not
differ significantly from that of the intensional condition, my conclusion is that with respect
to Opacity, “refers” is best construed as intermediate between intensional and extensional,
rather than patterning perfectly with verbs of search.
Even though it is likely that the results only support an intermediate status for “refers”
with respect to Opacity, this intermediate status is still surprising. This shows that our
ordinary notion of reference differs from the technical notion of extension with respect to
granularity: reference is, to some degree, dependent on description. The idea that reference
is description-dependent is even more surprising considering that opaque contexts are often
defined as contexts in which coreferential terms are not substitutable. If we keep this
definition, but treat “refers” as opaque in its object position, it may turn out that no
contexts are opaque. They are all fully extensional; it is just that “refers” itself is opaque.
But alternatively, we can define an opaque context as one in which co-extensive expressions
24The results were analyzed using a 3 (verb category: Intensional vs. Refers vs. Extensional) x 4
(Art Collector vs Chief Justice vs. Murderer vs. Spy) ANOVA. There was a significant main effect
of verb category, F (2,219) = 16.67, p ¡ .001, and a significant main effect of vignette, F (3,219) = 6.47, p <
.001. To explore the differences between the intensional case, the extensional case, and the case of “refers”, I
used Tukey’s post-hoc tests. Unsurprisingly, participants gave lower ratings in the intensional condition (M
= 3.61, SD = 2.52) than in the extensional condition (M = 5.65, SD = 2.00), p ¡ .001. Ratings for “refers”
(M = 4.19, SD = 2.45) did not differ significantly from the intensional case, p = .215, but were significantly
lower than those for the extensional condition, p < .001, d = .64. We also observed an interaction effect of
verb category and vignette, F (6,219) = 3.98, p = .001.
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are not substitutable, although this will force us to divorce reference from extension.
1.4.4 Conclusions
Together, the results of the three above studies indicate that speakers recognize intensional
readings of sentences such as
(17) John is referring to a unicorn.
(18) John is referring to a dog.
(19) Mary is referring to the person with the largest art collection in the country.
On its intensional reading, (17) can be true, but does not entail the existence of unicorns.
Similarly, speakers seem to recognize a reading of (18) on which John is referring to a dog,
but not to a particular one. And finally, speakers recognize a reading of (19) on which Mary
need not be referring to the national record-holder in the high jump, even if that person
happens to also be the person with the largest art collection in the country. But “refers”,
like “seeks”, also has an extensional reading: there is a reading of (18) on which John
is referring to a particular dog, just as he may be seeking a particular dog. As mentioned
above, I will call the intensional reading of a sentence involving and ITV its de dicto reading,
and I will call its extensional reading its de re reading, and I will call the forms of reference
reported by these two readings “reference de dicto” and “reference de re”.
However, one might worry that, even given the data above, speakers’ judgments are not
being driven by the presence of a genuine reading of the sentence whose presence needs a
semantic explanation, but instead are being driven by pragmatics. After all, it is common
practice to attempt to explain, or explain away, subsitution failure within the contexts of
attitude verbs by appealing to pragmatics. However, there are several reasons why such
an approach is unlikely to succeed in this case. First, “refers” patterns quite closely with
a paradigmatically intensional verb, “seeks”. It is possible that the intensional features
of “refers” recorded in the studies are due to pragmatics, but if this is true, why should
we not say the same for “seeks”? It doesn’t seem that there is a reason why we should
treat the intensional features of the two verbs differently. Thus, one can hold that the
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intensionality of “refers” is due to pragmatic features only if one believes the same thing
about all intensional verbs, which amounts to the denial that there any genuinely semantic
intensional phenomena in natural language. But most working semanticists believe that
some verbs are intensional, and that this intensionality is a datum for which a semantic
theory must account, and I am content for my view to depend on this view, which seems
to be the consensus view among semanticists.
But there are also more specific reasons why the intensionality of “refers” cannot be
pragmatic. Ordinarily, the intensional phenomenon that philosophers try to explain away
using pragmatics is Opacity. And I think that, restricting attention to this particular
aspect of intensionality, these attempts at pragmatic explanation are plausible, for it seems
that the phenomenon of Opacity does not interact with the rest of our semantic machin-
ery. It seems to be a relatively isolated phenomenon. However, the above studies show that
“refers” also exhibits Nonspecificity, which does interact with the rest of our semantic
machinery, and these interactions give us reason to think that the phenomenon is seman-
tic. First, the presence of a nonspecific reading for an object-position indefinite licenses a
peculiar form of quantification that has come to be called special quantification, on which
a quantifier replaces the entire quantified NP in object-position:
(20) a. John is referring to a ruby.
b. John is referring to something.
c. John is referring to something valuable.
Special quantifiers are ordinarily existential, and are formed from combinations of a deter-
miner and the morpheme “-thing”. Accompanying the possibility of special quantification
are restrictions on the kinds of anaphora licensed by nonspecific indefinites. Notably, (20-a)
does not license anaphoric reference with ordinary pronouns, nor does it entail readings on
which the indefinite takes scope over the verb:
(21) a. 9 John is referring to it.
b. 9 There is a ruby to which John is referring.
c. 9 A ruby is such that John is referring to it.
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Rather, intensional indefinites only license special anaphora, which makes use of special
pronouns and descriptions, such as “the same thing”, “one”, “what”, and possibly “that”:
(22) a. John is referring to what Bill is referring to.
b. John is referring to one, too.
c. John is referring to a ruby. Bill is referring to the same thing.
d. Johh is referring to that (?)
The inferential behavior above seems to indicate that “refers” has two readings, only one of
which licenses a nonspecific interpretation for the indefinite, and neither of which entail the
other. Further, the two readings seem most naturally treated as two scopal readings, par-
ticularly in light of the sentences in (21), and scope is a distinctively semantic phenomenon.
These inferential patterns are not easily explained pragmatically, and thus we have reason
to take the intensional features of “refers” at face value.
One final point is in order: it is not just “refers” that is intensional in English. It is
plausible that verbs expressing speaker’s predication, such as “ascribes” and “attributes”,
also exhibit intensional features in both their direct and indirect object positions. Consider
the following sentence:
(23) Jack ascribes supernatural powers to a relic.
In (23), “a relic” can be read either specifically or non-specifically. Further, Jack may
not ascribe healing powers to a small piece of wood, even if that’s just what the relic
is (perhaps it’s a shard of the cross). Additionally, there may be no such property as
possessing supernatural healing powers, and even if there is, Jack need not ascribe it to a
relic by any other name. Thus, both the direct and indirect object positions of (23) are
intensional. Further, if we replace “ascribes” with “attributes” in (23), the exact same
arguments suffice to show that it is intensional as well.
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1.5 Semantic Reference and Application are Intensional
All of the sentences in the studies above have speakers as subjects, which means that the
studies have an important limitation: they only establish that “refers” is intensional when
we use it to report what speakers are referring to. Borrowing a distinction from Kripke
[1977], the studies show that speaker’s reference is intensional, but semantic reference may
well still be intensional. This section will provide arguments that semantic reference does
in fact inherit the intensionality of speaker’s reference. However, statements of semantic
reference are less common in ordinary language than statements of speaker’s reference, and
so the semantic verbs that figure in these statements are best considered technical terms.
As a result, surveying native speakers about their features will not help us understand how
they function; native speakers can’t be expected to have intuitions about technical terms,
and further, since these terms are technical, semanticists are at liberty to stipulate their
features. In light of this, the next three sections will provide some arguments that semantic
reference does inherit the features of speaker’s reference, along with arguments that we
should make use of intensional semantic vocabulary in our theorizing.
Let’s start with some metasemantic arguments. First, on many views, what a word
refers to is ultimately determined by how speakers use that word: linguistic intentionality is
explained in terms of the intentionality of thought. On such views, semantic reference will be
determined by instances or patterns of speaker’s reference. But the last section showed that
speaker’s reference is intensional: it is much closer to a paradigmatically intensional notion
than it is to an extensional one. Accordingly, on views that privilege the intentionality
of thought, it is natural to expect that the intensional features of speaker’s reference will
carry over into our account of semantic reference. If semantic reference does inherit the
intensionality of speaker’s reference, semantic reference will come in two forms: reference de
re and reference de dicto. These two forms of reference are a generalization of the traditional
notion of reference, which subsumes the traditional notion as a special case. Reference de
dicto is a novel form of reference that exhibits the intensional features characteristic of the
intensional readings of ITVs, while reference de re is the traditional, extensional notion of
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reference that is transparent, specific, and existence-entailing.25
Following Tim Crane [2012, p. 113], we can distinguish four main theories of linguistic
intentionality: descriptive, pictorial, causal, and functional. I think it is reasonably clear
that on the descriptive, pictorial, and functional accounts of intentionality, instances or
patterns of speaker’s reference ultimately determine what a word refers to, so I will only
discuss them briefly. However, causal theories of reference also ultimately rely on speaker’s
reference, but I think this fact is less obvious, and rarely appreciated, so I will discuss the
causal theory at greater length. In the case where an image fixes what a linguistic expression
is about, it is plausible that the image is one associated with the expression by a speaker,
and further, that no image could be about an object without an agent who intends or takes it
to be so.26 Similar things can be said about the descriptive case: presumably, if a linguistic
expression refers to something in virtue of being associated with a particular description, it
is because some particular speaker or group of speaker’s associates this descriptive content
with the expression. Thus the reference of the word will be dependent on instances of
speaker’s reference involving a description, which as we showed above, exhibit the features
of intensionality.
The idea behind functional theories of reference is that a word’s reference is determined
by fulfilling a certain function: say, allowing an agent or group to successfully navigate their
environment. On a view such as that in Millikan [2004], a word refers to an object just in
case, roughly, taking it to refer to that object confers an advantage on an agent or group.
This is explicitly a case in which patterns of speaker’s reference serve to determine semantic
reference. Thus, while I do not take these observations to remove all possibility that on one
of these views, semantic reference could be determined independently of speaker’s reference,
I do take them to make the involvement of speaker’s reference plausible, and thus make it
25I am open to the possibility that the three features of intensionality can come apart; in fact, it is my
belief that they do come apart, and can be treated separately. So like Fodor [1970], I do not think a two-way
distinction is adequate to explaining them. However, I am using the terminology of de re and de dicto more
to streamline the discussion than because I think the terminology captures a deep distinction. Rather, I
think the important thing is just that semantic verbs are ITVs, and that ITVs have different readings that
can be accounted for in terms of scope. The de re/de dicto distinction is only adequate for describing scopal
distinctions in simple cases.
26See Putnam’s example of a likeness of Winston Churchill that happens to have come to be accidentally
in the sand.
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plausible that semantic reference inherits its intensionality.27
Accounts of the causal theory of reference ordinarily begin with a discussion of a baptism:
a case where a speaker initially uses a word and attempts to attach it to a piece of non-
linguistic reality. Although various theorists differ on the details of how baptism works,
and baptisms themselves come in various forms, their canonical form is when a speaker
uses a word to pick out a piece of non-linguistic reality with which they are in causal
contact, and this causal or perceptual contact then serves to fix the reference of the term
on its subsequent uses. On other views, the baptist is seen as fixing a condition; when an
object uniquely satisfies the condition, that object is fixed as the referent of the expression.
However, causal theories struggle to account for cases of reference to abstract objects, such
as numbers, where there is no causal connection. Given a causal theory of reference, it is
not plausible to think that we refer to the number 6 in the same way that we refer to Barack
Obama.
However, it has been largely overlooked that every case of baptism involves a speaker
intending to refer to something, and thus involves an act of speaker’s reference. This
provides at least the beginnings of a solution to the puzzle of how we can refer to things with
which we are not in causal contact. As we saw in the last section, speakers can successfully
refer de dicto whether or not they are genuine causal contact with an object, and whether
or not the condition they specify is uniquely satisfied, or satisfied at all. As a consequence,
speakers can initiate causal chains with acts of speaker’s reference de dicto, even if they
fail to refer de re. Causal or perceptual connection to an object might be required for the
term to have a de re reference, and when such connections are present, the baptized term
will come to have both a de dicto reference and a de re reference: roughly speaking, an
intension and an extension. However, when such connections are absent, the baptized term
will not have an extension, but the de dicto speaker’s reference will the name or term in
question with distinctive intensional semantic features. That is to say, the act of speaker’s
27One anonymous referee makes the point, however, that it is plausible that speaker’s thoughts are
intensional and idiosyncratic—at least in terms of their granularity—in a way that meanings in a public
language are not. Even though different speakers may all refer using, for instance, a mode of presentation,
the extension is all that such uses have in common, and so we ought to assign the extension as the reference
of that expression. However, this can be accommodated on my view, for saying that semantic reference
is intensional is merely to say that it has an additional, intensional reading. The extension of a lingusitic
expression can be assigned with the de re reading of a reference clause.
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reference built into every baptism can guarantee that the term is not semantically trivial.
In a case like that of Leverriere and Vulcan, this means that we can capture Leverriere’s
act of reference with (24):
(24) Leverriere used “Vulcan” to refer to the planet responsible for the irregularities in
Mercury’s orbit.
And his successful act of speaker’s reference initiated a particular usage for “Vulcan”, which
we can capture with the de dicto reading of (25):
(25) “Vulcan” refers to the planet responsible for the irregularities in Mercury’s orbit.28
It is this true reading that allows us to explain why (25) sounds true, while (26) is totally
wrong:
(26) “Vulcan” refers to Phlogiston,
or why (27) seems to be a fine way of specifying one aspect of Vulcan’s semantic profile:
(27) “Vulcan” refers to Vulcan, not to Nibiru!29
Neither Vulcan, Phlogiston, nor Nibiru exist, and so if (25) is false on account of Vulcan’s
non-existence, we are left without a way to distinguish why (25) sounds so much better than
(26), and why (27) seems like a good way of capturing one of “Vulcan”’s semantic features.
Similarly, in ordinary speech, if someone asks me what “unicorn” refers to, I would
obviously respond by saying that it refers to unicorns. Whether or not unicorns exist seems
to be totally beside the point.30 The following seems to capture my willingness to respond
that way:
28Mark Sainsbury [2005] states reference clauses using universally quantified biconditionals. His reference
clauses can be paraphrased in the following way: for all x, “Vulcan” refers to x if and only if x is identical to
Vulcan. This allows for uniformity in our reference postulates. However, Sainsbury operates with a negative
free logic, which makes all statements containing empty names false. This, in my opinion, is an intolerable
result, for it makes sentences like “Sherlock Holmes is famous” false.
29Nibiru is a planet that was supposed to collide with Earth at the end of the Mayan calendar in 2012,
resulting in our planet’s destruction. Thankfully, Nibiru does not exist.
30Compare this point to Parsons [1979, 1980].
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(28) “Unicorn” refers to unicorns.
In contrastive cases, the intuition is even stronger:
(29) “Unicorn” refers to unicorns, not to flying horses generally!
(30) “Sherlock Holmes” refers to a famous literary detective, not to a Tolkien character!
Thus it is plausible to think that statements of semantic reference made true by a causal
chain inherit the Nonexistence of the act of speaker’s reference that originated the causal
chain.
Similar arguments can be made to show that semantic reference is opaque. Suppose
that a Babylonian sees a star in the evening and baptizes it “Hesperus”. This is an act of
speaker’s reference, and speaker’s reference, as we argued above, exhibits Opacity. This
means that the Babylonian can refer to Hesperus while not referring to Phosphorus or
Venus, from which it seems to follow that (31) has a false reading:
(31) The Babylonians used “Hesperus” to refer to Phosphorus.
But if we trace the semantic features of “Hesperus” back to its original uses in acts of
Babylonian speaker’s reference, there is nothing to prevent those features from being pre-
served in our statements of semantic reference, and neglecting them completely seems to
be an oversight. Speaker’s reference is ambiguous between a de re reading and a de dicto
reading, and we lose nothing if we treat semantic reference as inheriting both of these read-
ings. Rather, they make available a more general notion of semantic reference. If we see
semantic reference as anchored in an act of speaker’s reference, then (32) will have both a
true reading and a false reading:
(32) “Hesperus” refers to Phosphorus.
The true readig is inherited from the transparent, de re form of the Babylonian’s acts of
speaker’s reference, while the false reading is inherited from their opaque, de dicto reference.
Inheritance of these two readings allows us to satisfy several important constraints on
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a theory of semantic reference. First, it is often considered important that statements of
semantic reference are obvious, or even a priori. This is important because this is the only
way they can appropriately figure into a theory of meaning, into psychological explanations,
and into explanations of communication. To see this, consider (33):
(33) “Hesperus” refers to Hesperus.
If our theory of meaning is fully extensional, then (33) will entail (32). But (32) obviously
does not state a fact about the meaning of “Hesperus”. Thus our semantic theory will have
consequences that are themselves not statements of meaning, and that no reflection on our
knowledge of meaning could ever reveal. Further, suppose that we try to explain an act
of successful communication with the sentence “Hesperus is bright”. Suppose that John
utters the sentence to Bill. Bill looks up in the sky and sees Hesperus, comes to agree with
John, then forms the belief that Hesperus is bright. One part of our explanation for how
Bill came to have that belief is that John uttered the word “Hesperus”, and “Hesperus”
refers to Hesperus. But were we to state our explanation by saying that “Hesperus” refers
to Phosphorus, our explanation would be a bad one. It would not explain how Bill came to
have his belief on the basis of John’s linguistic act. Similar things can be said concerning
successful communicative interactions with empty terms. This shows that explanations of
communication are intensional, and so if reference is to play a role in a theory of commu-
nication, reference must be intensional also. Allowing statements of semantic reference to
have a de dicto reading accomplishes both of these tasks: it allows us to specify the mean-
ings of expressions in a way that is independent of such metaphysical facts, and at a degree
of granularity that is appropriate for a theory of meaning and a theory of communication.
This seems like the right result, since “means” itself is an intensional transitive verb, and
the approach promises to unify our theory of meaning, theory of communication, and theory
of reference through a simple mechanism.31
31It is instructive to point out the connections between this argument and the arguments given by
Chomsky [1995, 2000]. His basic claims is that what we are referring to depends in intricate ways on our
intentions, goals, interests, and other aspects of our psychology, not on a pairing with an external object.
This is just another way of saying that reference should cohere with the rest of our psychological and
communicative lives.
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1.6 Technical Terms and Ordinary English
The previous sections argued that in English, semantic verbs are intensional transitives,
and gave metasemantic arguments showing that the technical notion of semantic reference
does, or a least should, inherit their intensionality. But this does not establish that we must
make use of the English terms in theorizing about the meanings of English expressions. You
might think that even if semantic verbs are intensional in English, we should still do our
linguistic theorizing with totally extensional vocabulary. It is surely the prerogative of the
semanticist, you might argue, to define technical terms as she sees fit, and to stipulate that
“refers to” and “is true of” hold only between linguistic expressions and specific, existing
objects or collections of objects.
In general, I agree that theorists are at liberty to define their terms how they see fit.
However, if semantics is going to define “refers to” and “true of” so that they do not resemble
their natural language counterparts, semanticists need to have a reason for this divergence.
Perhaps these technical definitions are more fruitful than employing ordinary intensional
language, or the intensional language is not clear enough to be suitable for theorizing. But
there can be no such reasons, because traditional, extensional semantic postulates are just
one reading of the ambiguous, intensional semantic postulates. Traditional, word-world
connections are stated by the de re readings of constructions that are systematically am-
biguous between de dicto and de re construals. Thus, semantic postulates stated in English
subsume the technical reading of those postulates as a special case. The English words are
simply more flexible, and more general. Accordingly, while we lose some univocality by
stating our theory with intensional semantic vocabulary, the flexibility gained allows us to
recapture the traditional notions of reference and truth-of, while also allowing for a pair of
new notions corresponding to the de dicto readings of our semantic postulates.32
32Further, if we treat our semantic vocabulary as technical, and divorced from ordinary usage, then we
are forced to posit a lexical ambiguity between the colloquial and technical uses of our semantic verbs. But
if, instead, we use state our semantic theory with the terms as they are used in English—as ambiguous
between de dicto and de re readings—it keeps our semantic verbs lexically univocal. What would have
been two separate senses of our semantic verb phrases emerge as merely two different readings of our lexical
semantic postulates, and are no more ambiguous than “seeks”. Further, if we think, as is plausible, that the
de re/de dicto ambiguity is to be captured in terms of scope, then we can hold that the difference between
the colloquial and technical senses is a structural ambiguity. Accepting such a structural ambiguity seems
much more palatable than holding that our concepts of reference and truth are ambiguous between colloquial
and technical senses. Consider a comparison. Imagine that we are proposing to give a theory of action that
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1.7 Consequences
On my view, our semantic vocabulary is structurally ambiguous between two readings: a de
re reading and de dicto reading. These two readings yield two ways of doing semantics. On
the one hand, we can do semantics by specifying semantic significance using the de dicto
readings of our semantic locutions: we can do semantics de dicto. Or, on the other hand, we
can do semantics by reading our semantic locutions de re. Stating our semantic theory with
the de dicto readings of our semantic postulates allows our semantic theory to serve as a
theory of meaning or semantic competence in exactly the way envisioned by those working in
the Chomskian tradition. This is made possible because semantics de dicto provides us with
a novel form of semantic evaluation that overcomes several problems faced by views that
treat semantic evaluation as purely extensional. First, the de dicto readings of our semantic
verbs are not existence-entailing, so they can provide distinctive semantic values for empty
NPs, including empty names, and they also allow for a form of non-specific reference.33
Second, since ITVs are hyperintensional within their complements, they can assign semantic
values to expressions that are much more fine-grained than ordinary extensions; semantics
de dicto is able to assign hyperintensional semantic values.
The semantic values that semantics de dicto assigns to empty NPs will be of the same
type as the semantic values of the complements of intensional transitive verbs generally,
when they are read de dicto. The exact nature of these semantic values will depend on what
the best semantics for ITVs turns out to be. If we were to adopt Montague’s view that the
makes use of the notions of belief and desire. Clearly, “believe” and “desire” are intensional verbs; in fact,
they are paradigmatically intensional. Noun phrases in their clausal complements can be interpreted either
inside or outside the scope of the verb, yielding de dicto and de re construals of the beliefs and desires, and
they resist substitution within their complements. But now suppose that we insisted on stating our theory
with the extensionalized, technical, de re readings of “believes” and “desires”. This would save us the trouble
of having to come up with a theory that captures the intensionality of these verbs; and conrrespondingly,
we might think that the theory is clearer, because we know quite well what it is to believe something about
a particular object, as opposed to bearing a relation to some kind of finer-grained intermediary. But on the
other hand, using only this vocabulary would drastically distort, and severely cripple, our proposed theory of
action. It seems like many of our actions can only be adequately explained by the finer-grained, intensional
readings of belief ascriptions, and extensionalizing merely limits the theory’s expressive resources, likely
making the theory empirically inadequate. If extensionalizing has these consequences for a theory of action,
why should we extensionalize the vocabulary with which we state a theory of meaning?
33Of course, there are already some views on the correct semantic values for empty names. For instance,
Kripke [1973] and van Inwagen [1977], hold that many empty names, particularly fictional names refer to
fictional characters instead of ordinary objects, and that fictional characters exist. But this view of empty
names commits these theorists to drastically unintuitive claims like: “Sherlock Holmes exists” and “Vulcan
exists”. For other creationist views of fiction, see [Salmon, 1998], [Searle, 1979], and [Thomasson, 1999].
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semantic value of an ITV’s complement, when read de dicto, is an intensional quantifier,
then the de dicto readings of “refers to” and “applies to” would assign intensional quantifiers
as the semantic values of names and predicates. Alternatively, with Zimmermann [1993,
2001, 2006], we might hold that the de dicto readings of ITVs specify relations to properties,
in which case all names in our language would have semantic values of predicative type.
This would pair well with the view, advocated by Fara [2015], that names are predicates.
Or we might even hold that the de dicto reading of an ITV is non-relational, treating such
complements as adverbial modifiers, as in Forbes [2006, ch. 5]. On this latter view, and any
view which holds that the de dicto reading of an ITV should be understood nonrelationally,
the semantic values of names will not serve as ordinary arguments of the verb “refers”.
Rather, they will serve to modify either an underlying event or state, or to form a complex
predicate. Whatever semantics for ITVs turns out to be correct, it will have to account for
the intensional behavior of the object position on the de dicto reading, and so will assign a
semantic value to that position that accounts for the three features mentioned above.
In providing semantic values for empty names, semantics de dicto helps us make progress
on the problem of empty names; it shows us how empty expressions can be meaningful, and
make non-trivial contributions to the meanings of sentences in which they figure. And
moreover, the fact that the de re readings of our lexical postulates for empty expressions
are false allows us to retain a sense in which these expressions are genuinely empty. Many
views that provide semantic values for empty names fail to fulfill this desideratum. Further,
since the de dicto reading of an ITV is hyperintensional, the semantic value assigned to
the expressions in its object position will be extremely fine-grained. This allows semantics
de dicto to overcome problems of insufficient granularity that have historically kept truth-
conditional sematnics from issuing in interpretive theorems.34
The ability to accomplish these related tasks is part of what make semantics de dicto
such a good candidate for playing the role of a Chomskian theory of semantics. But there
34The problem of truth-conditional theories not being sufficiently fine-grained to issue in interpretive
theoriems has come to be called the Foster problem. It was presented as a problem for Davidson’s truth-
theoretic approach to semantics [Davidson, 1967a] by John Foster [1976], and was recapitulated in the
intensional setting by Scott Soames [1989]. Both Foster and Soames’s arguments rest on an extensional
construal of the premises from which T-sentences are derived. Soames’s argument in particular depends
explicitly on premises which involve predicates that are necessariliy satisfied by the same objects. If these
premises are hyperintensional, it blocks Soames’s derivations.
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are several further reasons. First, many of the reasons that Chomsky gives for rejecting
relational reference and application are that these semantic notions behave intensionally as
opposed to extensionally. For instance, Chomsky [1995, p. 21] offers the example of “al-
Quds” and “Jerusalem”, which are both supposed to be names for the same city: Jerusalem.
The force of the example comes from the intelligibility of the proposal to move al-Quds to
a site north of Jerusalem. In the example, these names co-refer on a de re construal of
reference, but on the de dicto construal of reference, they refer to different things, which
allows us to talk about moving one without moving the other. Insofar as Chomsky’s point
is that we can often refer to an object under one name but not under another, or move
between relational and non-relational senses of reference, my proposal captures Chomsky’s
point perfectly. Similar claims can be made about many of Chomsky’s other examples.
Chomsky often points to the instability and abstractness of referents as evidence for the
non-relationality of reference. For instance, London might be reduced to dust and be built
in another place, but we can refer to it all along. If we were referring to the concrete object
in the first place, it would pose a serious puzzle for how the referent of “London” could
move from a concrete object, to an abstract object, and then back to a concrete one. A
non-relational view of reference solves this puzzle. Lastly, Chomsky [2000, p. 178] often
challenges advocates of the Lewisian view of semantics to give an account of the reference
of expressions like “Joe Sixpack”, which seem to refer non-specifically. Semantics de dicto
handles this case straightforwardly, because it countenances a form of non-specific reference
that results from the non-specific reading of an ITV.
A final reason to think that intensionality is the right way of capturing Chomsky’s view
of semantics is that the truth of many intensional constructions, particularly reports of
searches, desires for, and beliefs in, depend crucially on facts about the intentions, beliefs,
and interests of the subject, and this is exactly what Chomsky claims is the case for reference
and application. Consider the case where London is destroyed and rebuilt in another place.
According to Chomsky, the conditions under which the rebuilt city is considered London
are determined by both psychological and social factors—they are not to be accounted for
metaphysically. Insofar as Chomsky thinks that fine-grained psychological factors play a
role in what it is to which words refer and apply, he seems to be saying that reference and
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application are intensional, in that they depend on facts about the subject’s psychology, or
are mind-dependent in some way. Just as “John seeks a dog” says something about John’s
psychology—i.e. John’s intentions, goals, beliefs, and desires—claims about reference may
partly concern psychological and social facts, and do not report relations to particular
objects.
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Chapter 2
Hallucination and the New
Problem of Empty Names
2.1 Introduction
The problem of hallucination is relatively simple: we often have perceptual experiences of
things that don’t exist.1 A man in a desert, due to a host of physiological and environmental
factors, may have a perceptual experience of an oasis, when in fact all that is in front of him
is an expanse of hot sand. The man’s experience still represents the world as being a certain
way—as containing an oasis—and yet there is no oasis that the man perceives. The content
of his perceptual experience cannot be dependent on an oasis, for by hypothesis there is no
such thing, and so we need to find an alternative account of how his perceptual experience
comes to represent what it does. Once we have such an account, we feel the real force of the
puzzle: why shouldn’t we generalize the account to all perceptual experiences, so that no
perceptual experiences depend on the objects perceived? This problem, together with its
cousin the problem of illusion, has delimited the space of possible views in the philosophy of
perception: the major views are individuated in terms of how they respond to the puzzle.
1Some philosophers may object to this phrasing, claiming that we can’t have perceptual experiences of
things that don’t exist. This objection is likely based on their commitment to a regimentation of English
where a “perceptual experience of” and other locutions for reporting intentional states are relational, and
existence-entailing. I am making use of ordinary English, and in ordinary English this is a perfectly accept-
able and common thing to say. The locution “to perceptually experience” is one of English’s many forms
perceptual ascription that has an intensional reading. Much more will be said about this below.
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The central claim of this paper is that the problem of hallucination is identical to a
problem in the philosophy of language: the problem of empty singular reference. We can
state the problem of empty singular reference roughly as follows: what is the semantic
value of an empty singular referring expression? This is, on its face, quite similar to the
question of: what is the content of a hallucinatory perceptual experience? But despite this
similarity, the problems have been addressed within separate philosophical subdisciplines,
and while both have developed sizable bodies of literature, these literatures have remained
largely disconnected.2 The problems are rarely discussed together, and no one, at least for
the better part of a century, has come close to explicitly identifying them.3
My goal in this paper is to show that this is a serious mistake; much theoretical progress
can be made through the recognition that the two puzzles are identical. The problem
of hallucination and the problem of empty singular reference are derived from the same
two general principles concerning representation, and have the very same conclusion. The
problems follow from the principles of Significance and Uniformity. The principle of
significance is the principle that empty representations are still contentful, and their content
is not trivial. The principle of Uniformity is the principle that our account of the content
of empty and non-empty representations should be uniform, from which it follows that
empty and non-empty representations have the same sort of content. These two principles
push us toward the same conclusion in both the case of perceptual experience and the case
of reference: representational content is not dependent on (existent) objects. Insofar as
externalism is a thesis about the object-dependent nature of content, the conclusion of this
2As an illustration of how the problems are treated separately, a recent volume on hallucination: Hal-
lucination: Philosophy and Psychology [Macpherson and Platchias, 2013] does not mention empty names
even once. Similarly, but in the opposite direction, an important collection on empty names, Empty Names,
Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence [Everett and Hofweber, 2000], does not mention hallucination one
in any way that connects to empty names.
3The problems are often treated as faintly analogous, and many philosophers may already have the
feeling that the problems are related. If you do have such a feeling, the virtue of this paper will lie in
articulating, and making explicit, that feeling, and then drawing out the consequences. The closest thing
I have found to an identification of the problems of hallucination and empty names is made by Russell
[1951, §XII]. However, much still has to be inferred from what he says the basis of the fact that he treats the
contents of perception and the contents of (not logically proper) names as descriptive. See also [Russell, 1921,
§X]. The connection between language and perception in Locke and Berkeley is discussed by Ian Hacking
[1975, Ch.s 3-5], although the parallel between hallucinations and empty names is not drawn explicitly. In
addition, Gareth Evans [1982, Ch. 1] draws parallels between certain problematic accounts of perception and
problematic accounts of Fregean senses, from which the analogy between hallucinations and empty names
can be extrapolated.
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argument can be seen as a form of internalism.
However, it is important to note that I am not endorsing this argument, nor am I en-
dorsing any form of internalism. Rather, I am demonstrating that one argument underlies
both problems, and that this identity has deep philosophical consequences. If the problems
are identical in the way I propose, we should expect there to be a clear mapping between
their spaces of possible responses, and this is exactly what we find: each response to the
problem of hallucination has a corresponding response to the puzzle posed by empty re-
ferring expressions, and so each view of perceptual content has a semantic counterpart.
However, while many of these semantic views have already been developed in the philoso-
phy of language, others have not. One notable option that has been overlooked is what I
call semantic adverbialism, the semantic counterpart of perceptual adverbialism. I discuss
semantic adverbialism, and propose a way of elaborating and defending semantic adverbial-
ism that draws on previous work. The route I propose is to treat semantic verbs such as
“refers to”, “applies to”, and “is true of” as intensional transitive verbs. Two of the most
fully developed approaches to the semantics of intensional transitive verbs provide them
with a non-relational semantics, and bringing these views to bear on our semantic verbs
allows us to develop a non-relational theory of the content of empty names, and of semantic
content more generally.
I will end the paper by showing that even if one is not inclined to accept semantic
adverbialism, the Anscombian approach that I adopted above in developing it is theoretically
enriching. In response to the problem of hallucination, Anscombe [1965] showed that verbs
of perception and sensation are intensional transitive verbs, and claimed that the correct
response to the problem of hallucination required determining the correct semantics for the
object positions of such verbs. Given the identity between the problem of hallucination and
the problem of empty singular reference, we can, and should, treat semantic verbs in the
same way: “refers”, just like “sees”, “senses”, and “hallucinates”, is an intensional transitive
verb, and the semantic value of empty referring expressions, just like the intentional object
of a hallucination, will be given by determining the semantic contribution of the NP in the
object position of intensional transitive verbs.4 As a consequence, each pair of responses
4I have argued for the claim that “refers to” and “applies to” are intensional transitive verbs at length
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to the problem of hallucination and the problem of empty names can be seen as resulting
from a particular view on the semantics of intensional transitive verbs. Thus, our account
of the semantics of intensional transitive verbs can inform our theories of both linguistic
and perceptual intentionality.
2.2 Intentionality
2.2.1 The Problem of Non-Existence
The problem of hallucination and the problem of empty singular reference are both ver-
sions of what is perhaps the central puzzle of intentionality: the Problem of Non-Existence.
The problem can be stated as follows: how do we manage to represent, talk about, think
about, etc. things that do not exist? There are two general approaches to accounting
for intentionality—the relational approach and the non-relational approach—and each of
them yields a different family of answers to this central problem.5 The relational approach
accounts for intentionality in terms of intentional objects: mental states and other repre-
sentations have their intentional features in virtue of a relation to an object, and this object
is what they are about or represent. On the non-relational approach, representations can
exhibit intentionality without being related to an object which they represent; they have
their intentional features intrinsically.
The relational approach has been around as long as the puzzle of nonexistence itself—at
least since the middle ages. Many medieval philosophers accounted for aboutness in terms
of intentional objects: our thoughts have intentional objects, which are what our thoughts
are about, or represent [see Pasnau, 1997, Perler, 2001a,b, Priest and Read, 2004]. On a
elsewhere, on primarily empirical grounds.
5In the philosophy of mind it is common to view intentionality as primarily, or solely, propositional,
and to make “intentional content” more or less synonymous with “propositional content”. With Tim Crane
[2014b], I think that this is a serious mistake. I see no reason why intentionality—or representation or
aboutness or directedness on an object—should be ascribed primarily to states expressed by propositional
attitudes as opposed to states expressed by intensional transitive verbs, such as “seeks”, “wants”, “fears”,
“hopes”, and “needs”, when these verbs take NP complements. These states seem like paradigmatic instances
of intentional mental states, insofar as they all have objects toward which they are directed. In what follows
I will primarily be considering non-propositional forms of intentionality, that are expressed with intensional
transitive verbs such as “represents” or “is about”. This is due to the fact that the problem of empty names
and the problem of hallucination, as I will reconstruct them, concern the intentional content of names, or
perhaps noun phrases, rather than the contents of whole sentences. But much of what I say about relational
vs. non-relational views of intentionality carries over straightforwardly to the propositional case.
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relational approach to intentionality, the main project is figuring out the nature of these
intentional objects—do they exist? are they concrete or abstract? what type of objects are
they [Crane, 2006]?6 According to some traditional views, since many of our thoughts and
representations are about things that don’t exist, and intentional objects are what these
representations are about, some intentional objects will fail to exist. These days this view
is typically attibuted to Meinong, who sums up what he takes to be the objectual approach
nicely:
That knowing is impossible without something being known, and more gener-
ally, that judgments and ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen) are impossible
without being judgments about and presentations of something, is revealed to be
self-evident by a quite elementary examination of these experiences. [Meinong,
1904]
Meinong holds that every representation represents something, and holds that “something”
ranges over objects. According to Meinong, the fact that there are such objects is what
validates inferences like the following:
(1) I imagined a unicorn.
Therefore I imagined something.
(2) John searched for a golden mountain.
Therefore John searched for something.
Given an objectual treatment of the object-position quantifier, it follows from these infer-
ences that some things do not exist.7 There are also relational approaches to the problem
of nonexistence that are non-Meinongian. One such approach is to claim the intentional
objects of our thoughts do exist, but they are just different than we thought they were:
we might, for instance, treat Sherlock Holmes as an existent abstract object—a cultural
artifact [see Kripke, 1973, van Inwagen, 1977, Salmon, 1998, Soames, 2005]. This route
provides a representation with an intentional object at the cost of denying that there is a
6The modern rehabilitation of the theory of intentional objects comes from Brentano [1973, Ch. 1].
7I will use the label “Meinongianism” for the position that there are objects that don’t exist. See
[Parsons, 1979, 1980], [Priest, 2000], Priest and Read [2004], [Routley, 1983], [Zalta, 1988].
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genuine problem of nonexistence. A third option is to revert to what some claim is the orig-
inal interpretation of Brentano’s claims, holding that intentional objects have intentional
inexistence, and so are somehow immanent to the mind [see Brentano, 1973, Crane, 2006,
Perler, 2001b].8 Within a framework where we explain representation in terms of intentional
objects, the problems of hallucination and empty singular reference can be stated together
simply: what are the intentional objects of hallucinations and empty singular referring
expressions?9
The other approach to problems of intentionality treats intentionality as non-relational.
On this view, a representation can represent something, or be about something, without
there being some object (or any other entity—of any type) which it is a representation of.
That is to say, on this view, representation, or aboutness, is not a relation [Goodman, 1976,
Crane, 1998, 2006, 2009, 2012]. Recall Meinong’s quote from above, and the inferences that
followed. According to the non-relationalist, the inferences in (1) and (2) are good ones,
and the claims in the quote from Meinong are true, but the non-relational view holds that
we have no reason to treat “something” as an objectual quantifier, or as generalizing over
an entity that serves as an argument to the verb. In fact, the non-relationalist points to the
fact that there is much evidence suggesting that “something” is not an ordinary objectual
quantifier, but a special quantifier, which quantifies over the semantic contribution of the
the NPs in the object positions of intensional transitive verbs, whatever that contribution
turns out to be [Moltmann, 1997, 2003a, 2004, 2008, 2013, Zimmermann, 1993, 2001, 2006].
8It’s important to note that we could also take intentional objects to be properties or collections of
properties. When I say “intentional object”, I mean to include any entity (in the broadest sense) that can
serve as a relatum of the representation relation.
9Even though it seems obvious that names and hallucinations are representations, it is rare to hear the
problem of empty singular reference posed in these terms. We don’t often inquire about the intentional
objects of names—we are more often inquire about their referents. I imagine that this is because stating
the problems this way—in terms of intentional objects—poses a dilemma: if hallucinations are genuinely
hallucinations, and empty names are genuinely empty, then it seems that we cannot provide them with
intentional objects without countenancing objects that do not exist. The dilemma is this: either we make
hallucinations into illusions and empty names non-empty, for instance, by positing that they actually relate
us to existent but abstract objects, or we countenance non-existent objects. That is to say, we can’t address
the problems of empty names and empty singular reference within an intentional object framework without
being Meinongians.
However, stating the problem in terms of intentional objects is still profitable, because it acknowledges the
fact that empty names have distinctive representational features, and that one way of accounting for such
features is to give a theory of intentional objects, some of which may fail to exist. Much the same is true
for hallucinations: asking about the intentional objects of hallucinations acknowledges that hallucinations
represent in non-trivial ways. Different hallucinations will represent different things, and so asking for the
intentional objects of hallucinations is one way of accounting for their distinctive representational features.
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More will be said about this below.
On the non-relational view of representation, what a representation is of is an intrinsic
property of that representation. Consider an example: a picture can be of a unicorn, or
represent a unicorn, without there being a unicorn that it represents, and it represents the
unicorn in virtue of its own properties, not in virtue of some relation that it bears to that
unicorn. The non-relational view takes the fact that unicorns don’t exist very seriously:
since unicorns don’t exist, they can’t be the relata of any relations, and so a fortiori they
can’t serve as intentional objects, the putative relata of the representation relation. Rather,
on the non-relational view, the painting might represent pictorially, or iconically, but not
in virtue of a relation to an object represented.
A prominent version of the non-relational approach to representation is descriptivism.
In what has turned out to be a microcosm of the relational/non-relational dispute, Russell
[1905] responded to Meinong’s theory of objects [Meinong, 1904] by treating empty names
as disguised definite descriptions. Russell analyzed these descriptions as contributing both
quantificational and predicative material to the content of sentences containing them. Be-
cause descriptions serve to introduce a mix of quantificational and predicational material,
they do not represent objects because of any relation that they bear to the object. Rather,
they help to specify a condition that object may or may not meet, and they represent what
they do independently of whether any object happens to satisfy that condition.10
Within the non-relational framework, the problem of hallucination and the problem of
empty names manifest themselves differently. What is required is that we provide empty
names and hallucinations with content that is not object-dependent: we need to supply
names with semantic values other than their referents, and hallucinations with content other
than the objects that they represent. Pairing different names with different descriptions is
10It seems extremely plausible that Russell’s treatment of names as definite descriptions, and his analysis
of definite descriptions as contributing quantificational and predicational material to the truth-conditions of
a sentence, undergirds much of the tendency to treat intentionality as a primarily propositional phenomenon.
According to Russell, definite descriptions are “incomplete symbols”, and do not represent any object, or
exhibit any form of intentionality, on their own, outside of the context of a sentence. Rather, it is the entire
sentence that is representational: it represents the world as being one way or another. This move allowed
Russell, and a host of philosophers following him, to treat the problem of non-existence merely an instance
of falsehood: the problem of non-existence was just a case of incorrect propositional representation. There
are, however, descriptivist views of names on which names are not incomplete symbols, and on these views,
names are self-standing, but non-relational representations.
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one way of providing empty distinctive representational contents, even in the absence of
objects satisfying these descriptions. For the descriptivist about names, “Pegasus” and
“Zeus” both represent, and do so distinctively, but not in virtue of bearing a relation to
objects which they represent. They both have representational, in this case descriptive,
content. In what follows, I will use the term “content” broadly, and as neutral between
relational and non-relational approaches to intentionality, even though it is sometimes used
more narrowly for a “way of representing an object”.11 More specifically, below I will
sometimes switch between saying that a representation or experience has content and that
it “represents something”, “exhibits intentionality”, or “is about something”.
2.2.2 The Anscombian Approach
Anscombe took the biggest steps toward connecting the two puzzles, and realizing that
the problem of hallucination and the problem of empty names were at bottom the same
problem of content. Anscombe realized that the problems of hallucination and illusion are
really problems concerning certain kinds of verbs: verbs of perception and sensation such
as “see”, “hear”, “smell”, etc. Anscombe pointed out that these verbs have readings that
are true even when the NPs in their object positions are empty, and that such cases are
just reports of hallucinations.12 Once this connection is made, traditional intentionality
11“Intentional content” is used this way by one of the main non-relational views in the philosophy of
perception: intentionalism. Inspired by Anscombe, intentionalists, most notably Tim Crane [1998, 2006,
2009, 2012, 2014a], hold that perceptual experience is fundamentally a form of representation. According to
Crane, every representation has an intentional object: this object is what the representation is of, or what it is
directed towards. But following Brentano [1973], Intentionalists also distinguish between a representation’s
intentional content and its intentional object. Intentional content, according to the intentionalist, is the
way a representation represents its object, whereas its intentional object is what it represents. On its
face, intentionalism, like the Anscombian view that inspired it, seems to be relational: it holds that every
representation has an intentional object. This would mean that hallucinations pose a problem for the
intentionalist, as they do for relational theories generally. But here the intentionalist falls back on two
related points. First, again invoking Anscombe, the intentionalist uses “intentional object” in the old sense
of “object”, as in “object of thought” or “object of desire”, to merely designate what it is toward which
a state is directed. They then couple this notion of “intentional object” with the possibility of giving a
reductive account of intentional objects: it may well turn out that what is really going on in cases of
representation is to be explained intrinsically [Crane, 2012, pp. 133-135]. On such a reductive view, talk of
intentional objects, and the relational conception of representation to which they seem tied, do not provide a
fully perspicuous account of the nature of representation, in terms of surface form. Rather, the intentionalist
allows that we might give an explanatory reduction of truths about the non-existent to truths about the
existent, and this explanation will turn out to be non-relational.
12In modern terminology, Anscombe showed that verbs of sensation are intensional transitive verbs
(ITVs). There is some debate, however, over whether “see” in fact has an intensional reading. There
is a longstanding debate over whether, when Macbeth hallucinates that there is a dagger in front of him,
whether he in fact sees a dagger. Thus the peculiarity of Macbeth’s question: “is this a dagger which I
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puzzles like the problems of hallucination and illusion can be understood as problems about
the semantic contribution of the noun phrases in the object-positions of these verbs. An
example will be helpful here. On Anscombe’s view:
(3) John hallucinated a dancing dragon
and:
(4) John saw a dancing dragon
are on a par with
(5) John searched for a dancing dragon.
Searches are a traditional instance of the puzzle of nonexistence, and so unsurprisingly,
accounts of search are often given in terms of intentional objects. On such a view, what
John is searching for is the intentional object of his search: a dancing dragon. Anscombe
keeps this terminology when she moves to discussing both verbs of search and verbs of
perception, claiming that “a dancing dragon” gives the intentional object of all three of
the states reported above. According to Anscombe, the key to solving the problem of
nonexistence is to give an account of the semantic contribution of the “a dancing dragon”,
as it occurs in the object positions of these verbs; an account of its contribution will serve
as an account of the intentional objects of both searches and perceptual experiences.13,14
see before me?”. For a recent argument that perceptual ascriptions have intensional readings, see Bourget
[2016].
13Although I don’t wish to take a strong interpretive stance here, Anscombe seems to think that the
contribution of the NP in the object position of an ITV to the truth-conditions of sentences like the ones
above is an object under a description. And insofar as Anscombe thinks that this semantic approach is the
right way to approach the problem of nonexistence, she seems to think that the intentional object of all
intentional states will also be an object under a description. If this interpretation is correct, then Anscombe
is still operating within the relational framework, and accordingly, her view faces the same problem that
we mentioned above: if one’s account of intentionality importantly involves an intentional object, then in
cases where that intentional object fails to exist, Meinongianism seems to be the only option. Thus, I
think Anscombe’s account, unmodified, suffers from the same defect that all accounts that make use of
intentional objects suffer from: they threaten to collapse into Meinongianism. However, Anscombe’s view of
the semantics of ITVs, as involving an object under a description, is not essential to her more general point.
14We might also be able to avoid a relational construal of Anscombe’s remarks by giving the right account
of an object under a description, or a so-called “qua-object”. Some views of qua-objects, for instance, that
in Szabo´ [2003a], do not treat qua-objects as objects at all. Other views, such as those in Landman [1989a,b]
and Fine [2003] do.
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The most important conclusion of Anscombe’s paper is the following: an account of
hallucination, and perhaps of intentionality more generally, can be given by providing a
semantics for intensional transitive verbs. And as Anscombe acknowledges, just as there
are relational and non-relational approaches to intentionality, there are also relational and
non-relational semantics for ITVs. It follows that each different view on the semantics of
intensional transitive verbs will yield a different theory of intentionality.15 The details of
how different views on the semantics of intensional transitives yield different accounts of
intentionality will be discussed in §6. But once we realize that the problem of hallucina-
tion and the problem of empty names are identical, Anscombe’s insight concerning verbs
of sensation can be straightforwardly extended to verbs that state the semantic features
of words. Just as “sees” and “senses” can report hallucinations, “refers” can report the
semantic features of empty names. As a consequence, the correct account of the semantics
of empty names will likewise be given by providing a semantics for intensional transitive
verbs. The next section will reconstruct the problems of hallucination and empty names in
a way that exhibits their identity.16,17
15Provided that we view our semantics in a realist way.
16Anscombe’s claims about verbs of sensation and perception were not completely without precedent.
Richard Cartwright [1987], in his classic article on Macbeth’s Dagger, cites G.E. Moore as distinguishing
between two senses of a perceptual verbs like “sees”. One sense is that on which it is true to say that Macbeth
is seeing a dagger when he hallucinates; this is what Moore calls directly seeing. Similarly, Cartwright also
cites Ayer as distinguishing between two senses of “sees something”. On one reading of “sees something”,
Ayer claims, there need not be something that one sees. Both the idea that “sees” has two senses, and
the idea that the quantifier in the object position need not export, can be seen as further confirmation of
Anscombe’s idea that “see” has a reading that is true even when the object position NP does not pick out
an existent object. Both of these properties are features of intensional transitive verbs.
17Gilbert Harman [1990], in the course of arguing for a somewhat different point, reiterates some of the
claims made by Anscombe years earlier. Harman emphasizes that perceptual experiences such hallucinations
are instances of the broader category of intentional states, which includes beliefs, desires, imaginings, and
paintings, and many anothers. An account of the representational features of hallucinatory experience,
he claims, will fall within the purview of a theory of intentional objects more generally. Remarking on
Macbeth’s dagger, Harman claims:
If a logical theory can account for searches for things that do not, as it happens, exist, it can
presumably also allow for a sense of “see” in which Macbeth can see something that does not
really exist [Harman, 1990, p. 38]
Thus Harman sees theory of hallucinatory perceptual experience as located within a theory that tries to
specify the intentional contents of representational states more generally. And similarly to Anscombe,
Harman thinks that this theory will be intimately connected to the project of providing a semantics for both
perceptual verbs like “sees”, and other intentional verbs like “seeks”, both of which are intensional transitive
verbs.
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2.3 Reconstructing the Arguments
This section will provide reconstructions of the problem of hallucination and the problem
of empty names, within the framework outlined above for discussing problems of intention-
ality. Once we have reconstructed the arguments in this way, we will see that the the two
main premises in the arguments are identical: they are two general principles concerning
representation.
2.3.1 The Argument from Hallucination
The traditional argument from hallucination is most often presented within the intentional-
object framework. Consider the following version of the argument from hallucination, due
to Jeff Speaks, which I take to be representative:18
1. In every experience there is an object of your awareness.
2. In the case of a hallucination, the object of your awareness cannot be a material thing.
3. The objects of awareness are the same in the case of hallucinatory and veridical
experience.
C1. Material things are never the objects of experience.
C2. Every perceptual experience has something other than a material thing as its object.
The phrasing of the first premise hides two important theoretical choices. First, it commits
us to the view that experiences are of objects, and second, that experiences consist in
a relation to these objects: the relation of awareness.19 The most general form of the
argument, as I will show, jettisons both of these assumptions.
18The original argument appears in Berkeley [1710]. Another version appears in Moore [1953], and is
used to argue for a sense-data theory of perception. Other versions appear in Crane and French [2016] and
BonJour [2016].
19However, if we construe “object” in “object of your awareness” in a suitably deflationary way—perhaps
in the old way, as Anscombe does—then [1.] does not commit us to awareness being a relation. But in
general, when we talk about “objects of thought” or “objects of awareness” or “intentional objects”, it
is not enough to merely say that such objects do not make the state in question relational. Rather, like
the intentionalist, we must tell a story about why their surface form is misleading, and why we are not to
construe “object” in the modern sense.
71
First, we need not be committed to the idea that awareness is awareness of objects,
or even that awareness is a relation. As we saw above, accounting for the representational
features of experience in terms of objects is just one possible approach. The incontrovertible
premise of the argument from hallucination is not that there are objects of which we are
aware in experience; rather, it is that in every experience, we are aware of something,
or, phrased another way, every experience is about something, just Meinong claimed in
the passage quoted above. Further, this something is distinctive: we can ask, of every
experience, “what are you aware of?” And “something” generalizes over whatever it is
that our answer provides. But it is a further step to say that “something” is an objectual
quantifier, which generalizes over an object that serves as an argument for the verb. In fact,
there is evidence that such quantifiers are not objectual: the quantifier “something” is a
special quantifier, and there is a significant debate about what these quantifiers range over,
or whether the are substitutional. Few linguists think that they behave in the same way as
ordinary objectual quantifiers like “some”. Consider an example: in a hallucination, I might
be aware of a vulture circling the room. It follows that I am aware of something. But it does
not follow that there is a vulture, or that “a vulture” contributes an object to the report of
my hallucination, and so it does not follow that “something” is an objectual quantifier. This
leaves us no reason to think that the semantics for special quantifiers should be objectual,
and accordingly, we have no reason to state the first premise in terms of objects, rather
than in a way that remains neutral on the semantics for special quantifiers.
Second, the argument is cast in terms of awareness, but the idea that in every experience
we are aware of something is meant to capture the idea that every experience of ours is
of something, has a subject-matter, or represents something.20 All three of these locutions
are simply attempts to get at the idea that the experience exhibits intentionality; that
is to say, “object of awareness”, as it is used in the argument, is basically synonymous
with “intentional object”. But as we saw in the last paragraph, intentionality need not be
explained within an intentional-object framework: it need not be construed as a relation,
20In saying that every experience represents something, I intend to use “represents” in a pretheoretical
sense. I don’t intend to commit myself to representationalism, or a representational theory of mind, or any
particular view of the mind at all, other than that mental states have intentional features. If “represents”
has come to be laden with too many theoretical commitments, feel free to substitute “exhibits intentionality”
or “is of something”.
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and the same goes for awareness. In what follows, if an experience or a representation
exhibits intentionality, I will say that it has content, but I use the term “content” in a way
that is neutral between relational and non-relational approaches to intentionality discussed
above.
With these modifications in hand, we can go back and revise the argument to make
it more general, freeing it from these theoretical assumptions. I have kept the terminol-
ogy of “awareness”, but the argument could just as well have made use of the notions of
representation or aboutness.
1.′ In every experience, we are aware of something.
2.′ In the case of a hallucination, what we are aware of is not a material thing.
3.′ What we are aware of in veridical experiences is the same (in kind) as what we are
aware of in a hallucinatory experience.
C1. We are never aware of material objects.
C2. We are always aware of something other than a material object.
Premise [1.′] modifies [1.] by using “something”, a special quantifier, and remaining neutral
on its semantics. Relational theorists are free to specify the premise by treating “something”
as an objectual quantifier, but it need not be treated that way. Further, in premise [1.′],
“something” serves as a generalization over whatever semantic contribution is made by the
noun phrase in the object position of “aware of”. If, for instance, I am aware of a dog,
then “something” generalizes over the semantic value of “a dog”, as it occurs in the object
position of the verb.21 This shows that “something” here generalizes over things of which I
am aware, but not in the sense of objects. Rather, a non-relationalist might interpret such
things as “ways in which I am aware”.
Premises [2.′] and [3.′] make use of the pronoun “what” as a pronoun referring to the
thing of which you are aware. In these premises, “what” is being used as a special pronoun.
21On many accounts, the semantic value of “a dog” is seen as a second-order property: a generalized
quantifier. But not every view of the semantics of special quantification sees “something” as generalizing
over a generalized quantifier, although Zimmermann [2001] does. Moltmann [2003b, 2008, 2013] treats such
quantifiers as quantifiers over the entities denoted by a certain kinds of nominalizations, which she thinks
are tropes.
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Similarly to special quantifiers like “something”, its values may not be objects: instead,
its values are whatever contributions are made by intensional NPs that ordinarily appear
in the object-positions of intensional verbs [Moltmann, 1997, 2003a, 2004, 2008, 2013]. In
general, special quantifiers serve as the antecedents for special pronouns. The key point
to take from this is that “something” and “what” can range over distinctive non-objectual
specifications of what we are aware of in experience. They allow for a non-relational way
of formulating the argument, while still capturing the way in being of a particular object
allows it to have distinctive representational features.
With the argument recast in this form, we can now go on to consider the arguments in
favor of its premises. The main premises are (1) and (3), while premise (2) is a definitional
premise. In what follows I’ll adopt the following terminology: I’ll call the first premise the
principle of Intentional Significance, and I’ll call the third premise the principle of
Experiential Uniformity. As we will see below, Experiential Uniformity actually
has two versions. On the one hand, it can be the claim that a single experience can have
the same content as a counterpart that differs only in that it is empty, or it can be the
claim that perceptual experiences generally have the same kind of content. The latter
version is, I believe, stronger, and implies the former, but it is correspondingly harder to
establish. These two different forms of uniformity will become important below when we
discuss arguments in favor of Experiential Uniformity.
Arguments for Intentional Significance
Defending Intentional Significance requires us to demonstrate that all of our experi-
ences, including the hallucinatory ones, represent something, or have content. Below I will
offer two arguments that hallucinatory perceptual experiences have content: the psycholog-
ical argument and the substitution argument.
The psychological argument begins by considering the role that hallucinations play in
our psychology: their cognitive role. The cognitive role of a representation is its causal
role; mental representations, including perceptual experiences, interact causally with each
other and other aspects of our psychology, and capturing these causal interactions is an
important way in which a psychological theory helps to explain behavior [Segal, 2000]. A
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representation’s cognitive role is the way it figures into this network of causal connections.
Hallucinations play an important cognitive role, and thus will figure into the explanations
of behavior given by a psychological theory. Most importantly, they can only fulfill this
explanatory roll if we attribute content to them.
Consider our example from the introduction: a man in a desert, due to his dehydration,
exhaustion, and the heat, hallucinates an oasis. This perceptual experience is important
to understanding his behavior: it causes him to run, screaming and overjoyed, toward a
particular spot in the desert where he perceives there to be an oasis. The man’s hallucination
plays an important role in explaining why he acted as he did: the direction and exuberance
of his run are only explicable because of what it was that he hallucinated, and where he
thought it was located. Moreover, different hallucinations will cause different kinds of
behaviors. If our traveler lost in the desert had hallucinated a pack of coyotes instead
of an oasis, he would likely have run away from where he perceived them to be, rather
than toward. This scenario shows that hallucinations are contentful; the man is overjoyed
because his hallucination has content: it is of an oasis.22
The second argument that hallucinations have content comes from substitutions of NPs
within reports of hallucinations. Suppose that John is having a hallucination of a giant
albatross. We can report his hallucination with (6):
(6) John is having a hallucination of a giant albatross.
But now consider a different hallucination that John might have had, one of a dancing
dragon, which we could report as in (7):
(7) John is having a hallucination of a dancing dragon.
On the face of it, John’s mental states—his hallucinations—represent the world as being
two very different ways. The first represents the world as containing a very large bird while
the second represents the world as containing a scaled, possibly fire-breathing creature
22Perceptions are sometimes not seen as exhibiting intentionality until further downstream in the cognitive
process: they are sometimes seen as “raw feels”. On this view of content, insofar as the representation’s
content is connected to its explanatory role in a psychological theory, even a “raw feel” will have content.
Thus I’m using the notion of content broadly.
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that has momentarily taken a break from whatever dragons normally do to dance. But if
hallucinations lack content, then the object-position of these sentences will not be able to
distinctively characterize John’s mental state, for his mental state is not contentful. His
hallucinations would not be of anything. But this is problematic for two reasons. First,
the sentences above seem true in the relevant circumstances, and they explicitly state what
his hallucination is of. This indicates that hallucinations exhibit intentionality. Second, if
hallucinations were not contentful, we should be able to substitute “a giant albatross” for
“a dancing dragon” without a change of truth-value.23 But in the circumstance where John
is ducking and screaming “albatross”, it would be absurd to say that he is hallucinating a
dancing dragon. Any plausible account of the contents of perceptual experience is going to
have to account for the fact that these two hallucinations are of different things. This is
the substitution argument in favor of the Intentional Significance of hallucinations.
Another way of making this argument is by appealing to a specific account of repre-
sentational content. Many philosophers of perception take the contents of perception to
be accuracy conditions [Siegel, 2010a,b]. If we treat representational features as accuracy
conditions, it seems impossible to deny that the two hallucinations represent in non-trivial
ways: what is required of the world for my perceptual experience of an albatross to be
accurate is very different than what is required of the world for my perceptual experience of
a dancing dragon to be accurate. Thus, taking on board the most widely accepted account
of perceptual content leads us directly to the truth of Intentional Significance.24,25
23On the assumption, that is, that expression content is compositional. See Szabo´ [2008] for a discussion.
24There are, however, several ways of denything that experiences have accuracy conditions. The first is
to be an Adverbialist, a` la Chisholm [1956]. Another is to hold, with Charles Travis [2004], that perception
requires “taking” in order to be assessable for accuracy: accuracy is a notion that only comes in further
down the cognitive stream. Or, we might, with Ned Block [1990, 1996], hold that perceptual experience
yields only raw feels.
25Accuracy conditions are typically captured propositionally, and so they lead to views on which per-
ceptual content is always propositional. I think such views are mistaken, for the following reason: if we
think, with Anscombe, that perceptual experiences are often reported using ITVs, and that their intentional
features can be captured by providing understanding the semantic contribution of the NP in the direct
object position of these reports, then a propositional view of perceptual content would require that these
reports in fact be covertly propositional. Such a view would require the reduction of intensional transitive
verbs to propositional attitude verbs. While many people defend this view [Quine, 1956, Larson et al., 1997,
Montague, 1974c], I do not think it is plausible as a general view of the semantics of intensional transitive
verbs. And more generally, I reject the idea underlies this sort of reduction: that all intentionality must be
propositional: I can think of something without thinking that anything is the case. See Crane [2014b] and
Szabo´ [2003b] for arguments to this effect.
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Arguments for EC-Uniformity
The third premise of the argument from hallucination is what I have called the principle of
Experiential Uniformity. The idea underlying this principle is that there is a kind of
content that is uniform across empty and non-empty representations. But as we saw earlier,
uniformity comes in two varieties. On the one hand, we can consider the content of a single,
non-empty representation and then compare it to an empty counterfactual counterpart. Or
we can consider the entire category of mental representations, and claim that within this
category, veridical and hallucinatory experiences should be supplied with contents of the
same kind. Below I will go through several arguments in favor of both forms of uniformity.
When we consider a single experience, arguments for uniformity make use of a Twin
Earth thought experiment. The arguments I give here are adaptations of the arguments
given in Segal [2000] for the claim that empty natural kind terms have content that is not
object-dependent.26 Consider our situation from the introduction where our traveler, John,
is hallucinating an oasis. Now consider Twin Earth, and his counterpart in the desert on
Twin Earth, Twin John, who is molecule for molecule identical to John. Suppose further
that the only difference between Earth and Twin Earth is that on Twin Earth, there is
actually an oasis in the desert that John perceives. I take the situation on Twin Earth
to be one that could very well arise. In defending Intentional Significance above,
I argued that hallucinations have content. What follows will be three arguments that the
content of John’s perceptual experience is the same as the content of Twin John’s perceptual
experience.
[EU1] The first is based on the notion of a cognitive role discussed above. Consider the
causal role played by John’s hallucinatory perceptual experience on Earth, P1, and compare
this causal role to that of its veridical counterpart on Twin Earth, P2. P1 and P2 seem to
interact causally with other aspects of John and Twin John’s psychologies in identical ways.
26Segal’s arguments are part of a sustained argument for internalism about mental content for kind
terms. As I mentioned above, I am not endorsing internalism here, since I am merely outlining the problem
of hallucination, and cataloguing what I take to be the best arguments for its premises. However, the
argument that underlies both the problem of hallucination and the problem of empty names can be seen as
an argument for internalism. In §5, I construct a master argument for the conclusion that the content of a
representation is not object-dependent. Segal’s Twin Earth arguments can be seen as an application of this
argument to the case of empty kind terms.
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For instance, in both of the cases, the perceptual experience causes its subject to run in
a particular direction, and to be excited at the prospect of quenching its thirst. That is
to say, the hallucinations figure into identical psychological explanations, and in order to
adequately play a role in a psychological explanation, we must attribute content to the
hallucinations. If the attribution of content is guided by a mental state’s causal role, then
the two representations, P1 and P2, will share whatever content is relevant to psychological
explanations. Of course it will be true that one hallucination is veridical but one is not, and
so in one sense, one is of something that the other is not, but in another sense they are of
the same thing: an oasis. Thus they will still share an important form of content: namely,
the kind of content that is relevant to psychological explanations.
[EU2] The second argument concerns the supervenience base of the content of a halluci-
nation. Consider again John and Twin John. They are molecule for molecule identical, but
John is hallucinating while Twin John is having a veridical perception. Consider the prop-
erties on which the content of John’s hallucination supervenes. These properties form the
supervenience base of the content of John’s representation. This might include any number
of his physical or psychological properties, together with relations to his environment (the
heat that has caused his exhaustion, etc). But importantly, in John’s case, there simply
is no oasis. Given that the only difference between the Earth and Twin Earth is that in
the latter, there is an oasis, it follows that the supervenience base for the content of John’s
hallucination is duplicated on Twin Earth. Supervenience bases are by definition sufficient
to necessitate things that supervene on them. This means that the content of John’s hal-
lucination is also present in Twin John’s case. Thus the two perceptual experiences share
intentional content, and this content is independent of the existence of the oasis.
[EU3] The third argument concerns the causal antecedents of John and Twin John’s
perceptual experiences. Consider how John’s hallucination on Earth came about: through
a mix of environmental and physiological factors, John’s brain was in a state such that it
appeared to him that there was an oasis in the desert. Thus there is a causal story we
can tell about how it is that John came to have the hallucination of an oasis, and given
Intentional Significance, how John came to have a contentful perceptual experience.
But now consider Twin Earth, where John and his environment are identical except for
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the presence of the oasis. All of the conditions that are jointly sufficient for John to have
a contentful perceptual experience of an oasis on Earth are also present on Twin Earth.
Thus, the sufficient causal conditions for having a contentful perceptual experience are
shared across the two cases, and so plausibly, the content for which these conditions are
sufficient is likewise shared across the two cases. These are the arguments for the first form
of Experiential Uniformity.
But there is a second form of Experiential Uniformity, one which concerns the entire
class of perceptual representations. This type of uniformity, which premise 3′ attempts to
capture, requires us to assign the same kind of contents to all perceptual representations, so
that perceptual representations are all of, for instance, objects or properties or collections
of properties, or have uniformly descriptive or uniformly adverbial contents. What kinds of
arguments can we give for this form of uniformity? What reasons do we have to think that
we should treat the intentional features of all perceptual experiences similarly?
[EU4] Suppose that we are trying to give a theory of the contents of perceptual ex-
periences: we are trying to state the representational features of perceptual experiences,
rather than merely talking about them at a high level of abstraction. This seems like an
important part of a psychological theory, since attributions of contents play an important
role in psychological explanations. But once we do try to state the representational fea-
tures of particular perceptual experiences in any way that is remotely specific, something
important happens. In giving this kind of theory, the theorist must distinguish between the
representations that are empty, and to be given one treatment, and the representations that
are non-empty, and are to be supplied with representational contents that are dependent
on existent objects. But the ability to make this kind of distinction is dependent on the
theorist’s beliefs about which of the perceptual experiences are veridical and which ones
are not. But now suppose he is wrong, and some of the representations he thought were
veridical, and object-dependent, turn out not to be. The theorist will be forced to revise his
assignment of content to the mental state that he thought was veridical: he will be forced to
assign it content of an altogether different kind, because of how an empirical detail turned
out. In taking this approach, we make our theory of mental content beholden to our current
ontological beliefs. Psychologists must wait for the deliverances of physics and metaphysics
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in order to assign contents to mental states. This seems like a problematic conclusion.
But even if one is willing to bite that bullet, there is another argument in favor of the
second form of uniformity. Many traditional versions of the argument from hallucination
rely the notion of subjective indistinguishability. Veridical and non-veridical experiences can
be subjectively indistinguishable—that is to say, they can be phenomenally identical. An
agent may not be able to tell a veridical experience apart from a phenomenally identical
but hallucinatory experience, nor may she be able to separate her veridical perceptual
experiences from her hallucinatory ones. This form of phenomenal indistinguishability is
often taken as support for veridical and non-veridical experiences being of a psychological
kind. Tim Crane encapsulates this thought nicely:
When two conscious experiences are indistinguishable for a subject, then the
experiences are of the same specific psychological kind. So for example, if my
genuine perception of the snow-covered churchyard and my hallucination of the
snow-covered churchyard are indistinguishable for me, then these experiences
are of the same specific psychological kind [Crane, 2005, p. 6]
That is to say, the inability of a subject to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical
experiences is taken to support what Martin [2004, 2006] calls the Common Kind Assump-
tion (CKA):
CKA Whatever fundamental kind of mental event occurs when one veridically perceives,
the very same kind of event could occur were one hallucinating.
Subjective indistinguishability is often invoked as a premise in other versions of the ar-
gument from hallucination precisely because it is seen to support the CKA: if the CKA
holds, we should expect veridical and non-veridical mental states to have contents of the
same type. Thus, subjective indistinguishability yields a fifth argument for Experiential
Uniformity:
[EU5] When two experiences are subjectively indistinguishable, they are experiences of
the same specific psychological kind. When two experiences are of the same specific psy-
chological kind, our account of their content should be the same. More specifically, if one
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of the experiences has content that is not object-dependent, then the same should be true
of the other experience. Veridical experiences are sometimes subjectively indistinguishable
from non-veridical experiences, both counterfactually and actually. One veridical experience
can be phenomenally identical to a counterfactual, hallucinatory experience. And further,
veridical experiences are indistinguishable—in terms of their veridicality—from hallucina-
tory ones. That is to say, one cannot determine, on the basis of their phenomenology,
which actual experiences are veridical and which ones are not. Thus we should give the
same account of the contents of all actual experiences.
I myself find this argument the least convincing of the five, because I find the connection
between indistinguishability and the CKA to be questionable. It is perfectly conceivable
that subjectively indistinguishable experiences may turn out to be of different psychological
kinds. In fact, this is exactly what the knowledge-first epistemologist denies: even though
we cannot tell knowledge from belief, knowledge is its own distinctive kind of mental state
Williamson [2000]. Of course, this is a slightly different claim, in that it concerns the attitude
in question (knowledge vs. belief) as opposed to the kind of content to which the attitude
relates us (object-dependent vs. non-object-dependent). But it is still perfectly possible for
the disjunctivist about perception to deny that hallucination and veridical perception are
of the same psychological kind even though we can’t tell them apart from the inside. As we
will see, analogs of each of these arguments are available in the case of empty names, and
their relative strengths and weaknesses carry over to the semantic case as well.
2.3.2 Empty Singular Reference
The problem of empty names is often presented as a problem for classical first-order logic.
Given an empty name in English like “Vulcan”, and a translation of that name into a
first-order logic as a, the axioms governing identity yield:
(8) a = a
The standard rules governing existential inferences then yield the following generalization:
(9) ∃x(x = a).
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This statement is to be interpreted as saying that Vulcan exists. But (9) is surely false, for
Vulcan does not exist: Einstein was right and LeVerriere was wrong.
One standard response to this puzzle is to move to a free logic.27 Free logics are logics
that admit empty names, but modify the inferential and semantic rules of classical logic
to avoid manifestly false conclusions such as (9). While there are many different ways to
set out a free logic, most versions modify the natural deduction rules of first-order logic
by restricting the instantiation of universally quantified statements to non-empty names.
Accordingly, when a is empty, we can never use a = a as a premise, because that would
require us to instantiate the universally quantified axiom of identity—∀x(x = x)—with
an empty name. But beyond modifying the inferential rules, the free logician can offer
three different types of semantics: positive, neutral, and negative, which yield what have
come to be called positive, neutral, and negative free logics. Positive free logics allow some
atomic sentences involving empty names to be true, neutral free logic stipulates that all such
sentences lack truth-values, and negative free logic forces all such sentences to be false.28
But while the logical status of empty names is an important issue, it is not the core
problem that empty names pose. The core problem they pose is this: empty names, like
non-empty ones, are semantically significant—they often affect the truth-conditions of sen-
tences in which they figure—and we need an account of how they do so. Call this the
principle of Semantic Significance. The fact that empty names are semantically sig-
nificant indicates that names have content or exhibit intentionality. By the “content” of
a linguistic expression, I mean the aspect of an expression’s linguistic meaning, relative to
context, that contributes to the truth-conditions of sentences in which it figures. A compo-
sitional semantic theory, if it is to be empirically adequate, must capture this contribution
to truth conditions by assigning content to empty names.
27But it is by no means the only response. Many respond instead by claiming that names are not
genuinely singular terms, but are rather general terms. While this may clash with the intuitions that names
are singular referring expressions, it allows us to keep the logic for our language classical. But there are
several different versions of this view. The view that names are actually abbreviated definite descriptions
was Russell’s, but the idea that names should be translated as descriptions in which the name itself occurs
in the predicate component of that description can be found in Tarski [1983], and is elaborated in Quine
[1940, 1950, 1953c] (although Quine himself cites Russell as his inspiration, rather than Tarski). The view
is defended in its modern form by Delia Graff Fara [2015], who holds, roughly, that names have the same
semantics as common nouns, and also by Zolta´n Szabo´ [2015].
28For more on free logic, see [Bacon, 2013, Crane, 2012, Lambert, 2003, Sainsbury, 2005], among many
others.
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The way a semantic theory captures the semantic significance of an expression it is by
assigning that expression a semantic value; semantic values serve to model the contribu-
tion an expression makes to the truth-conditions of sentences containing it. That is to say,
semantic values are modeling devices that a semantic theory assigns to subsentential ex-
pressions that allow the semantic theorist to illustrate how the truth-conditions of sentences
depend on the meanings of their constituents. Within an intensional semantic framework,
semantic values will rarely be ordinary objects or sets of ordinary objects; more often, they
will be functions that vary their values with various pieces of information, such as world,
time, and context [Lewis, 1970].
The relationship between the semantic value of an expression—a function—and its con-
tent is contentious; as with many modeling tools, the there is much debate over how re-
alistically such functions should be construed. Many semanticists and philosophers view
semantic values as mere devices whose primary goal is to allow for the derivation of the
truth-conditional content of declarative sentences.29 These philosophers view the semantic
values of subsentential expressions instrumentally. In their minds, a semantic theory has
done its job if it assigns semantic values to subsentential expressions that yield the correct
sentential truth-conditions, whatever those semantic values are. In what follows, for ease
of exposition, I will assume that such instrumentalism is not correct; I will assume that
the semantic value of an expression in an empirically adequate semantic theory must reflect
that expression’s content. On this view, the principle of Semantic Significance requires
a semantic theory to pair empty names with semantic values that capture their distinctive
contributions to the propositions expressed by sentences containing them. If you find this
assumption unpalatable, I invite you to revise the arguments below so that they concern
only the contents of expressions, rather than their semantic values. This revision will not
change the important features of the arguments.
Once we assign a semantic value to an expression in order to model its content, we can
consider how this semantic value would differ, if at all, in the counterfactual situation where
the name was non-empty. The view that the name should be assigned the same semantic
value as its empty counterpart is one form of what I will call the principle of Semantic
29This view is clearest in Quine [1960] and Davidson [1979].
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Uniformity. But in addition to this kind of uniformity, we might also think that the
semantic value of names ought to be uniform across the lexicon, so that the meaning of an
empty name does not differ in kind from that of a non-empty name. This is a second form
of the principle of Semantic Uniformity. With this terminology in place, we can state
the problem of empty names as follows:
1. Names, including empty ones, make non-trivial contributions to the truth-conditions
of sentences containing them. A semantic theory must account for this significance
by providing them with non-trivial semantic values [Semantic Significance].
2. By hypothesis, the semantic value of an empty name is not an ordinary object; plau-
sibly, it’s semantic value will be of a different, perhaps higher, type.
3. The semantic value of an empty name is the same as that of its counterpart in a
counterfactual situation that differs only in that the name is non-empty. [Semantic
Uniformity 1]
3′. The grammatical category of singular referring expressions is semantically uniform:
expressions of the same syntactic category should be assigned semantic values of the
same type [Semantic Uniformity 2].
4. No name, empty or non-empty, can have an ordinary object as its semantic value.
5. All names have something other than an ordinary object as their semantic value.
This is what I like to call the New Problem of Empty Names. Now let’s turn to the
arguments for its premises.
Arguments for Semantic Significance
What reasons do we have to think that empty names make a significant contribution to
the truth-conditions of sentences, or contribute distinctive contents to the propositions
expressed by sentences? There are two arguments, the first is the argument from commu-
nication, and the second is the argument from substitution.
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First, consider two people who both think that think that the devil—Lucifer—exists
(and if you believe that the devil does exist, then momentarily suppose that he doesn’t). If
the devil doesn’t exist, then these two people are making use of an empty name. In spite
of this, they manage to communicate thoughts with sentences involving “the devil” and
“Lucifer”. Like many other people, they come to form beliefs on the basis of utterances of
these sentences. Like many Christians, they likely have lots of beliefs about the devil: that
he exists, that he tempts people, wreaks havoc on Earth, torments the damned, etc. These
beliefs may figure prominently in the explanations of many of their behaviors. If we think
that an adequate psychological theory needs to explain behavior by ascribing contents to
mental states, then these beliefs are contentful mental states par excellence, even if they
are about something that doesn’t exist. Given that these mental states are contentful, it
seems overwhelmingly plausible that the contents of these beliefs are what are expressed by
sentences like “The devil tempts the righteous”. If such sentences did not express contents,
and more specifically, if “the devil” were not itself contentful, then it would seem impossible
to explain how such communication and belief formation occurs.
Thoughts about the nonexistent make up a significant portion of our cognitive lives, and
the sentences that express them form a correspondingly large portion of our discourse. This
is particularly true as we look further back into history. For instance, if you’re an atheist,
nearly all theological thought falls into the category of thought about the non-existent.
But on pain of having a radically incomplete explanation of the behaviors of many, if not
most human beings, we need to allow that we’re having contentful thoughts about the non-
existent. But now suppose that we hold that empty names are not significant. It follows
that the majority of religious assertions do not express propositions. It also follows that
there is nothing semantic that distinguishes “Lucifer” from “Jesus”. But we used those very
sentences to express and form beliefs thousands of times over, even without the sentences
expressing any content. This borders on absurdity. And the problem is magnified if we
consider how many false theories scientists have come up with over the centuries. If empty
terms are semantically vacuous, then there is a gaping hole in our ability to explain the
most basic communicative practices.
The second argument that empty names are semantically significant is what I call the
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argument from substitution. Consider the following examples:
(10) Sherlock Holmes is famous.
(11) Siegfried is an unappealing hero.
(12) Sherlock Holmes is more famous than Dr. Manhattan.30
Absent anterior theoretical commitments, it seems that these sentences contain genuinely
empty names and are are nonetheless true. And moreover, if we substitute one empty name
for another, we are often left with the strong feeling that the resulting sentence is false:
(13) Dr. Manhattan is famous.
(14) Superman is an unappealing hero.
This indicates that there is something relevant to the truth of the sentence that changes
when we substitute one empty name for another. The only difference between the sentences
is the name, which seems to indicate that the difference in truth-value must be on account of
the semantic contribution of the name.31 Now suppose that the semantic value value of each
of the names above is its extension. By virtue of the fact that they are empty names, their
extension is either a dummy object like the null set, or nothing at all. So, on the assumption
that our semantics is compositional, when we substitute one extensionally equivalent name
for another, the truth-value of the whole sentence must remain the same; this follows because
30The fact that you might ask yourself who Dr. Manhattan is is itself a testament to the truth of (12).
He is a character in Alan Moore’s graphic novel Watchmen.
31Even though these contexts look fully extensional, one might be tempted to respond by claiming
that the predicates in (10) and (11) actually create intensional contexts, and that this somehow absolves
us from needing to provide the names with distinctive semantic values. But suppose that this is true.
On what grounds do we ordinarily call a context intensional? Ordinarily, we call a position intensional
when expressions that occupy that position can be empty while the sentence remains true, and that the
substitution of co-referential expressions in that position can affect the truth value of the sentence. These
tests indicate that the expressions in these positions do not contribute their extensions to the truth-conditions
of the sentence. Perhaps they contribute their intensions. But this is exactly the phenomenon that we are
pointing to: “Superman” and “Dr. Manhattan” have null extensions, and given our intuitions about the
above examples, that cannot be what they contribute to the truth-conditions of (13) and (14). So calling
the contexts above intensional does not defend against the points made; far from it: it makes the point.
I take this as an argument for Semantic Significance: substitution tests show that names, including
empty ones, contribute non-trivially to the truth-conditions. This shouldn’t surprise us; empty names still
represent, and it seems plausible a name’s representational features will manifest themselves by affecting the
truth-conditions of sentences containing them.
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compositionality forces the truth-value of the whole to be a function of the semantic values
of the ultimate constituents. But this clearly contradicts our intuitions about the sentences
above. As a consequence, if we keep the assumption that our semantics is compositional,
the semantic values of empty names cannot be their extensions; different names must have
different semantic values of a higher type. This is the substitution argument for the semantic
significance of empty names, which pushes us to provide empty names with non-trivial
semantic values.
Arguments for Semantic Uniformity
Once we have decided on semantic values for empty names, which is a semantic theory’s
way of giving an account of content, there are reasons to think that this account should be
uniform across empty and non-empty names. Above I formulated two versions of Semantic
Uniformity, one that comes from considering a single empty name and its hypothetical
non-empty counterpart, and another claiming that the category of names should be lexically
uniform. This section will provide arguments for both in succession. Once again, the
arguments concerning a single name and its hypothetical non-empty counterpart will be
adaptations of the arguments given in Segal [2000], and make use of a Twin Earth thought
experiment.
Consider an empty name: take “Lucifer”. Presume, if you don’t already believe it, that
there is no such fallen angel. Semantic Significance implies that “Lucifer” contributes
importantly to the truth-conditions of sentences containing it. That is to say: it exhibits
intentionality, or has content. Now consider a world in which everything is exactly identical
to ours, except for that fact that the creature named in the Bible and the apocrypha exists.32
I will offer five arguments that the semantic value of “Lucifer” is the same across the two
possible cases.
[SU1] Suppose that an expression’s content plays an important explanatory role in a
theory of communication: how speakers manage to communicate with that expression is
32I think this is a possible situation, but Kripkean wisdom has it that if a name is empty, then it is
necessarily empty. Given that Lucifer does not exist, it follows that he could not have existed. I take this
to be a drastically counterintuitive claim, but if you are an orthodox Kripkean, just frame the argument in
terms of epistemic, rather than metaphysical, possibliity.
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(at least partly) to be explained by the intentional features of that expression. From it
follows that the semantic value of “Lucifer” is uniform across the two worlds mentioned
above. Here is the argument. In both of the worlds described above, the name “Lucifer”
behaves identically in discourse. It expresses and conveys beliefs that play identical roles in
psychological explanations. That is to say: the term plays the exact same causal role in the
communicative process. Whatever kind of content allows the empty term to play its role in
the actual world is also present in the second world in which the term is non-empty. This
means that the fact that Lucifer exists is not relevant to its role in communication. Given
our supplementary premises, it follows that the two names have the same semantic value.
[SU2] Semantic Significance shows that “Lucifer” has content. But now consider
the supervenience base of the content in the actual world, in which “Lucifer” is empty.
This supervenience base might comprise a set of properties like: the beliefs, expectations,
and intentions of many competent users of the name, and perhaps properties of groups
of such speakers that form the basis of a convention to use the name in the same way as
other members of the community. But this supervenience base will be duplicated in a world
that differs from the actual one only in that Lucifer exists. But this means that there is
shared content across the empty and the non-empty names, and they differ at most in their
extensions.
[SU3] Lastly, we can consider the causal conditions necessary for a name in a language
to have content. Still supposing that “Lucifer” is empty on Earth, we can consider the
diachronic conditions that are sufficient for the name to have content. These might include
many initial uses of the name, perhaps accompanied by false beliefs, causal chains of uses
extending from these initial uses, and perhaps certain kinds of conventions of using the
name to refer to the same thing that others in your community use it to refer to. Then we
can consider Twin Earth, which differs only in that Lucifer exists. All of these sufficient
conditions are still met on Twin Earth, and so the diachronic sufficient conditions for the
name to have content are also satisfied on Twin Earth. Given that the conditions sufficient
for content are identical across the two cases, and these conditions are shared, the names
should share content across the two cases as well.
But there is another version of Semantic Uniformity that is stronger than the first
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version. Instead of focusing on a single empty name and a possible non-empty counterpart,
it asserts that the grammatical category of names should be given a single kind of semantic
value: names should be semantically uniform. Within a type theory, this principle amounts
to the requirement that all names should be assigned semantic values of the same type.
This requirement embodies the often-endorsed constraint that there be a homomorphism
from the set of syntactic types to the set of semantic types. Uniformity of this sort should
be familiar from Montague’s PTQ [Montague, 1974b], where he assigns types of the highest
sort necessary to each syntactic category, and then extensionalizes them in special cases
using meaning postulates. In theories that are not type-theoretical, it might mean that our
semantic clauses state the semantic values of expressions in the same ways, and that our
reference clauses ought state truths whether or not the names are empty. For example, in
a Davidsonian theory, we might specify semantic significance using universally quantified
biconditionals.33
There are two main arguments in favor of the lexical semantic uniformity of names.
[SU4] The first argument comes from the epistemic constraints faced by semantic theorists.
In distinguishing empty from non-empty names, a semantic theorist does so to the best of
her knowledge. However, the theorist is almost certain to miscategorize at least one name,
because she, and theorists more generally, are almost certain to be wrong in at least one
of her beliefs about what exists. Now suppose that we decide to treat empty and non-
empty names differently in our semantics. This means that how the theorist applies the
different treatments depends on her current state of our scientific or metaphysical knowledge:
we make our semantics beholden to our current ontological beliefs. But this is surely
unacceptable. If we were to handcuff our semantics in this way, every time we made a new
ontological discovery, we would be forced to revise both the meaning of a word as well as the
type of meaning it has. With each new ontological discovery, we would likewise discover that
our semantic theory in fact specified a word’s contribution to compositionally determined
meanings in the wrong way. When we discovered that Vulcan didn’t exist, we didn’t go
back and revise the lexical meaning of “Vulcan”, or claim that in fact, “Vulcan” actually
33On some views, such biconditionals will still require the move to a free logic, as in Sainsbury [2005].
However, Larson and Segal [1995] state their semantic theory in a Davidsonian way without a free logic, but
hold that the correct semantic theory may be false on account of the fact that some names are empty.
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turned out to be a description. Rather, it seems clear that the meaning stayed the same
and the world simply turned out differently than we thought. Perhaps this point can be
encapsulated by saying that our semantic postulates need to be obvious, since knowing them
does not require speakers to know complicated or hard-to-come-by scientific or ontological
facts.
[SU5] The second argument actually serves as an argument for both versions of the
uniformity principle. It is plausible that one goal of semantic theorizing is to capture
what speakers know about their own language. However, speakers cannot distinguish any
particular empty name from a possible non-empty version of the same name. Nothing in my
semantic competence nor anything in our pretheoretical conception of meaning, can separate
the empty from the non-empty names. Thus, with respect to speaker’s semantic knowledge,
and all of the relevant linguistic information, the content of a name like “Lucifer” is identical
with that of its non-empty counterpart. This consideration counts in favor of supplying
names with semantic values other than objects. But more broadly, insofar as semantics is
supposed to reflect a speaker’s knowledge of meaning, it cannot give a non-uniform semantics
for the grammatical category of names. It seems implausible that speakers are drastically
and consistently mistaken about the meanings of their own words, even though they may
be drastically mistaken about what exists. The only way to accommodate this fact within
a semantic theory is to give a semantics for the category of referring expressions that is
uniform and not object-dependent.
Thus we have five total arguments in favor of Semantic Uniformity, three that ap-
ply to a single name and its counterfactual counterpart, and two that draw on general
considerations about the grammatical category of names.
2.4 Identity of the Arguments
Above I provided reconstructions of the problem of empty names and the problem of hal-
lucination as puzzles of intentionality, and presented several arguments for their premises.
While I’m sure you’ve already noted many of the similarities between the puzzles, I’ll now
attempt to make them explicit, and in so doing, I’ll construct one central argument from
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which both particular arguments can be derived. This central argument can be seen as a
master argument against the object-dependence of content. Insofar as internalism is the the-
sis that mental and linguistic content do not depend on objects in the world, the argument
can be seen as a master argument for content internalism. Keep in mind, however, that I
am not endorsing this argument; it is simply instructive to have such a master argument
because responses to it help us categorize the various views on intentionality.
Both the problem of hallucination and the problem of empty names concern representations—
in one case perceptual experiences, and in the other case names—which fail to bear any
relation to ordinary material objects. The first premise in both arguments is what we can
call the principle of Significance: despite not bearing any such relation to ordinary ma-
terial objects, empty representations, like all representations, exhibit intentionality. That
is to say: every representation represents something.
The second premise is a definitional premise. By definition, empty representations do
not represent ordinary objects. In the perceptual case, hallucinations are just perceptual
representations where there is no ordinary object represented—the world is fails to comply,
and likewise in the case of empty names—empty names are representations that fail to have
an ordinary object corresponding to them.
The third premise is the principle of Uniformity: our account of the intentional fea-
tures of empty and non-empty representations should be uniform. In both arguments, there
are two versions of the Uniformity premise. The first version considers a single empty rep-
resentation, and making use of its significance, argues that this significance is also present
in a counterfactual situation in which the representation is nonempty. The second version
of the Uniformity premise concerns the entire category of representations in question: in
the first case, perceptual experiences, and in the second, names.
Together, these premises entail the conclusion that no representations for which the
problem of nonexistence can arise represent ordinary material objects. On most views of
intentionality, the ability to represent the non-existent is a pervasive feature of represen-
tation, and on some traditional views of intentionality, the possibility of representing the
nonexistent is even criterial for intentionality.34
34See Caston [2001] for a historical discussion of this and other features of intentionality.
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But this confluence of the premises of the arguments is not the only evidence we have for
their identity. The arguments for each of the premises are also nearly identical. Consider the
arguments for the perceptual and linguistic versions of Significance. The first argument
for each version notes the role that empty representations play in their respective domains.
In the perceptual case, empty representations play a significant role in the explanation
of behavior, and in the linguistic case, empty names play an integral role in a theory of
communication. The second argument for significance involves how empty NPs contribute
to the truth-conditions of reports of hallucinations, and sentences involving empty names.
Substitution of one empty NP for another in both cases affects the truth-conditions of the
sentences, which indicates that these NPs contribute important semantic material to the
truth-conditions of sentences containing them. This serves as a second argument that both
hallucinations and empty names are significant.
The arguments for uniformity in the two cases are also nearly identical: each of the
arguments EU1-EU5 correspond closely to the arguments labelled SU1-SU5. The first
three arguments in each case are based on a Twin Earth scenario. We can call them,
respectively, the argument from explanatory role, the argument from supervenience, and
the argument from causal antecedents. Arguments EU4-EU5 and SU4-SU5 both concern
actual experiences and words, without resorting to counterfactuals, and they try to establish
that the kind of content that a theory should assign to representations should be uniform
across the entire relevant category.
The fact that the arguments can be reconstructed in such close forms, and the fact that
even the arguments in favor of the premises are nearly identical, points to an underlying
identity. The problems appear to come from the same general principles concerning rep-
resentation, simply applied to two different domains. Of course, there will be differences
that arise from the application of the principles to two different kinds of representations,
but the core ideas remain the same: empty representations are contentful, empty repre-
sentations share (their kind of) content with non-empty representations, and so non-empty
representations cannot have object-dependent content. This argument is a brief version of
a master argument against object-dependent content. As we will see in the next section,
many views on perceptual and linguistic content can be categorized according to where or
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whether they reject the argument. In this sense, isolating this core argument serves an
important unificatory role: it unifies what seemed to be several disparate problems in two
different subdisciplines in philosophy into a single, succinct argument.
Let me ward off two potential objections. First, you might object that I have not
shown that the problem of hallucination and the problem of empty names are identical,
and that instead I have merely shown that there is a structural analogy between them.
Structural analogies, you might claim, are not identities, and further, structural analogies
are cheap, and can be found merely looking at the problems in a sufficiently abstract
way. These are legitimate worries. However, the core of the worry comes from the fact
that it is unclear how to argue for the identity of two puzzles in any way other than by
exhibiting structural analogies. It is also unclear what the identity conditions for puzzles
or arguments really are. What has been established is that the problems are structurally
identical down to a shockingly fine level of detail, and it doesn’t matter one way or another
whether one thinks this is sufficient to have established an identity. My goal is to show that
the two problems have spaces of solutions that are identical, and so should be approached
and prospectively solved together. All that is necessary for this is that the premises and
conclusion are sufficiently similar to show that each way of responding to the argument—by
either denying a premise or accepting the conclusion—is available in both the perceptual
and linguistic case.
Second, one might object that I have based my arguments for the identity of the problems
on my own reconstructions of the problems, and these reconstructions might not be faithful
ones. Further, one might even claim that I have even curated the arguments in favor of
the premises so that they would come out looking maximally similar. With respect to the
first claim, I don’t deny that there was a process of reconstruction involved, but I do deny
that the reconstructions I have given, particularly of the problem of empty names, in any
way distort their most important aspects. In fact, the opposite is true. My account of
the problem of empty names makes it out to be a problem about our semantic account of
names generally, which makes it broader and more pressing than most other versions. If I
can be accused of distorting the problem, it is by presenting the strongest version of the
problem. And even if the problem I presented is not what people ordinarily have in mind
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when they think of the problem of empty names, what I have presented is still a problem
of empty names. Lastly, it is definitely true that I have selected the arguments in favor of
each of the problems so that they match. But this is not a criticism—it is a testament to
the identity of the problems. The fact that the very same arguments work to establish the
conclusions in both the case of hallucinations and the case of empty names shows just how
similar the problems actually are. The ease of transfer from the perceptual to the semantic
case supports the underlying identity, rather than calling it into question.
2.5 The Space of Possible Responses
The major views in the philosophy of perception can be individuated in terms of how they
respond to the problem of hallucination. Following Tim Crane, we can isolate four such
views: sense-data theory, intentionalism, adverbialism, and disjunctivism. We can further
divide these views into relational and non-relational views: sense-data theory and disjunc-
tivism are committed to relational views of perception, while intentionalism (arguably) and
adverbialism are non-relational theories. Each of these views responds to the problem of
hallucination in a distinctive way, and then develops the response into a general theory of
perceptual content. But given the identity of the problem of hallucination and the problem
of empty names, each response to the problem of hallucination has a corresponding response
to the problem of empty names, and as a consequence, each general view of perceptual con-
tent has a corresponding view on the semantic value of a name. That is to say: the space
of possible solutions to each of the problems is identical. The goal of this section is to
map each perceptual view onto its semantic counterpart, and show how this yields some
unrecognized views on the semantics of empty singular referring expressions.
Sense-data theory accepts both the premises and the conclusion of the argument from
hallucination. The sense-data theorist accommodates the conclusion by claiming that the
objects of perception are uniformly non-physical, mental enttiies called sense-data. These
entities are what we are aware of in both cases of hallucination and cases of veridical
perception, although in the veridical case, we may also be indirectly aware of ordinary
objects. There is a perfectly analogous view in the philosophy of language that results from
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accepting both of the premises of the argument from empty names. It is the view, famously
attributed to Locke, that words refer to ideas. These ideas are mental entities, and they play
the role of intermediary between words and the world. In the case where a name does not
have a worldly bearer, it still refers, as all names do, to ideas in our minds. Thus, Locke’s
view of names introduces a “veil” of ideas between words and the world, just as sense-data
theory introduces a veil of immaterial, mental entities between mind and world.35
The second relational response to the problem of hallucination is disjunctivism. Dis-
junctivism, characterized minimally, is the view that whatever the contents of hallucinatory
experiences are like, they are different in kind from the contents of veridical perceptions.
Thus, disjunctivism can be seen as the outright denial of Experiential Uniformity. 36
The goal of denying Experiential Uniformity is to maintain that veridical perceptual
experiences are genuinely relations to material objects. Thus the disjunctivist keeps rela-
tionality at the expense of uniformity. There is a clear analogue to this view in the case
of names. Many semanticists and philosophers of language wish to treat ordinary names
as bearing a causal relation to ordinary objects, treating them as mere tags. This is the
Millian view of names. But no such possibility is available for empty names, unless one tells
a very complicated story about how we interact with abstract or non-existent objects. The
other option, which is an options sometimes adopted, is to hold that empty names have a
totally different semantics than non-empty ones: perhaps they are not even genuine refer-
ring expressions. This is the disjunctivist view of empty names, minimally characterized,
and perfectly analogous to the view in philosophy of perception. One version of this view is
to hold the view, discussed by Szabo´ and Thomason [Fortchoming], that empty names have
descriptive contents while non-empty names have objects as their contents, and to make
this a principled epistemological distinction.
The first non-relational view in the philosophy of perception is intentionalism. The
intentionalist claims that, at bottom, experience is not a relation, but is rather a form of
35Locke usese the terms “primary signification” and “secondary signification”. On Locke’s view, a word’s
primary signification is an idea, and its secondary signification can be an object in the external world. For a
modern incarnation of the Lockean view, see Davis [2003], who holds that the meaning of a word is an idea.
36Depending on the disjunctivist’s views on hallucinatory experience, the disjunctivist may also deny
Intentional Significance. If one thinks that hallucinatory experiences do not have genuine accuracy
conditions because they lack objects, then they must deny Intentional Significance.
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representation, and the world may or may not be how we represent it to be. According
to the intentionalist, what a mental state is about, or what it represents, is, by definition,
its intentional object. As Tim Crane [2009], the main proponent of intentionalism, puts it:
“since intentional objects are what we think about, desire, or hope for, and we can think
about or desire or hope for things that do not exist, some intentional objects do not exist.
These can be called ‘mere intentional objects’.” Treating mental states in this way—as
always about, or directed toward, or representing an object—seems to make mental states
relational. But Crane uses intentional “intentional object” to capture the idea that every
mental state is of something, without claiming that this surface relationality is the ultimate
metaphysical story about perception. Rather, the intentionalist holds that thought about
the non-existent can ultimately be explained reductively, in a way that is non-relational.
Crane [2012] argues that this reductive explanation will be a psychological one, but will
particular to different cases.
There is a nearly perfectly analogous view on the semantics of names. The intentionalist
maintains that mental states, including hallucinations, have intentional objects, but that
hallucinations have non-existent, “merely intentional” objects. The corresponding linguistic
view is that of Parsons [1980], on which all names denote objects, with empty names
denoting non-existent objects. Parsons likewise gives a reductive view of what it is for
linguistic representations to be about the non-existent. According to Parsons, each non-
existent object is in fact just a collection of properties that is not instantiated. However,
the intentionalist might not want to hold that hallucinations have intentional objects, in
order to avoid commitment to merely intentional objects. This is a view suggested in Crane
[2005]. This sort of view is one on which hallucinations have content, but they do not have
intentional objects. This view also has an analogous linguistic view: it is analogous to the
orthodox, non-Evansian Fregean view on which empty names have senses but do not have
referents.
The last response to the problem of hallucination is adverbialism. Adverbialism is a
thoroughly non-relational approach to experience. The adverbialist’s view is that to sense,
or experience something white is not to experience an object, but rather to experience in a
particular way : whitely. In general, it treats verbs (and verb + PP combinations) that seem
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to express binary relations—such as “senses”, “experiences”, “is aware of” and “sees”—as
in fact complex, one-place predications. It does this by treating the object-positions of these
verbs as modifiers, mofidying the verb, rather than as noun-phrases which contribute an
object that acts as an argument to the verb. The NPs in the object-positions of the verbs
rather serve to modify how it is that we sense, experience, or are aware.
While this view is a relatively well-known view in the philosophy of perception, few
people have recognized that there is a corresponding view available in the philosophy of
language which treats names as referring in particular ways, as opposed to referring to
things. This, which I call “semantic adverbialism”, is the view that reference is not, or is
not always, a relation. On a non-relational view of reference, when I say I am referring
to Superman, I mean that I am referring in a particular way—the “Superman” way—but
there need not be any object to which I am referring. Further, when I say that a particular
word—like “Superman”—refers to Superman, I am not saying that there is an object to
which this word bears some relation, the reference relation. Semantic adverbialism can be
seen as a way of working out the idea, famous from Quine, that linguistic expressions are
meaningful, without having meanings:
I feel no reluctance toward refusing to admit meanings, for I do not thereby
deny that words and statements are meaningful. McX and I may agree to
the letter in our classification of linguistic forms into the meaningful and the
meaningless, even though McX construes meaningfulness as the having (in some
sense of “having”) of some abstract entity which he calls a meaning, whereas I
do not. I remain free to maintain that the fact that a given linguistic utterance
is meaningful (or significant, as I prefer to say so as not to invite hypostasis of
meanings as entities) is an ultimate and irreducible matter of fact; or, I may
undertake to analyze it in terms directly of what people do in the presence of
the linguistic utterance in question and other utterances similar to it [Quine,
1953c].
Quine, of course, thought that the right way to do away with unwanted reference was
to translate names into a regimented language as predicates—“Pegasus” as “Pegasizes”—
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and then treat them as Russell did, as contributing both quantificational and predicative
material. But this version of the non-relational approach to reference is not forced on
us. There are other ways to represent non-relationally. Think again of our example from
section 2, of how a painting represents. It represents by having certain intrinsic features: the
locations of the brushstrokes, the colors, etc. It represents by being a painting of a certain
kind, or of a certain sort [Goodman, 1976, Ch. 1]. Much the same is true for semantic
adverbialism: “Superman” refers to Superman by being a representation of a particular sort,
or representing in a particular way, and these features—the way it represents or the kind
of representation it is—are intrinsic.37 Thus, the identity of the space of possible responses
to the problem of empty names and the problem of hallucination has paid dividends: we
now have a new, relatively unexplored view of the semantic of empty names: semantic
adverbialism.38
2.6 Semantic Adverbialism and Intensional Transitive Verbs
Recall from above Anscombe’s claim that the problems of hallucination and illusion are
really problems of how to provide a semantics for intensional transitive verbs. My claim
is that given the identity, or close structural analogy, of the problem of hallucination with
the problem of empty names, this strategy is should be extended to verbs that we use to
specify the semantic significance of names. Anscombe claims that perceptual verbs like
“perceives”, “sees”, and “senses” are intensional transitive, and giving an account of the
semantic contribution of the NPs in their object positions, on their intensional readings,
yields an account of hallucination.39 I have argued in other work, on both empirical and
theoretical grounds, that the same is true for the V + PP combinations “refers to”, “applies
to”, and “is true of”; each of these has the semantics of an intensional transitive verb.
This means we can apply the Anscombian proposal to solve the problem of empty names;
whatever the best semantics for the intensional reading of an ITV turns out to be will yield
37Ways and sorts are both forms of modifiers: deciding between them rests primarily on our decision of
whether to make use of an event-based semantics.
38For an early adverbialist view about perception, see [Chisholm, 1956]. See also: [Tye, 1975, 1984], and
[Quine, 1953b, 1960, 1969].
39For a new argument that perceptual verbs such as “sees” and “perceives” have intensional readings, see
Bourget [2016].
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an account of the semantic value of an empty name.
Just as there are relational and non-relational approaches to intentionality, so there are
relational and non-relational approaches to the semantics (for the intensional reading) of
intensional transitive verbs, and each different view of the semantics of intensional transitive
verbs yields the foundation for a different theory of intentionality. Thus, each pair of
corresponding solutions to the problems of hallucination and illusion can be paired with a
single approach to the semantics of ITVs. For the purposes of our discussion, we can restrict
our attention to “perceives” and “refers”. On relational views of intentionality, the primary
question to answer is: what is the nature of intentional objects? The very same is true for
relational approaches to intensional transitive verbs: there are many approaches, and the
are differentiated by what objects they take to be the relata of the relation expressed by an
ITV. Consider one very early and influential relational treatment: according to Montague
[1974b], on their intensional readings, ITVs like “seeks” express relations to functions from
worlds to sets of properties: they express relations between the subject and an intensional
quantifier. This approach can be applied to yield views of both hallucinations and empty
names. We can, with Mark Johnston [2004], treat the object of hallucination as a collection
of properties: the collection of properties that a scene or object is experienced as having in
the hallucination. Similarly, one approach to the semantics of empty names treats them as
denoting intensional quantifiers. Thus, Montague’s approach to ITVs pairs with, or maybe
even yields, a view on both the metaphysics of hallucination and an account of semantic
value of an empty name.
On the other hand, two recent well-developed approaches to the semantics of intensional
transitives, due to Forbes [2006] and Moltmann [2008, 2013], provide ITVs with a semantics
that is nonrelational. Since these views can pursued to yield the foundation for an adverbial
view of content, I want to dwell on them at a bit more length. On Forbes’ view, intensional
NPs, serve as arguments to a special thematic role in logical form, but importantly, the
argument they provide is not the theme of the verb. Instead, it serves as a modifier. On
his view, Intensional verbs are theme suppressed. Moltmann proposes a semantics for ITVs
on which the intensional complements of ITVs are given a syncategorematic semantics,
and so do not provide an argument to logical form at all. Rather, they contribute to the
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specification of an overall truth-condition for the sentence. This provides a second non-
relational option. In what follows, I will focus primarily on Forbes’ view, but I think that
Moltmann’s view would could also be employed to develop an adverbial theory of content.
Consider a paradigmatic intensional ascription:
(15) John is searching for a dancing dragon.
On the approach outlined in Forbes [2006], the logical form of (15) is (16):
(16) ∃e(Looking-for(e) & Agent(e,John) & CHAR(e,a dancing dragon).
We can paraphrase this as follows: John is engaged in a search that is characterized by being
for a dancing dragon. The key part of this semantics is the special thematic role CHAR,
which is a relation between the event and the semantic value of “a dancing dragon”, which
in this case is a generalized quantifier. CHAR serves to specify satisfaction conditions
for the search, effectively playing the role of a modifier; I will discuss how CHAR serves
to specify satisfaction conditions for searches below. However, the most important thing
is that CHAR does not provide the theme of the search; “a dancing dragon” is not the
direct object of the ascription, and its semantic value is not what John is looking for. In
other words, the generalized quantifier denoted by “a dancing dragon” is not the theme,
or object, of the search. In nonspecific searches, there is no theme; instead, CHAR serves
as an adjunct or modifier. This approach is similar to the proposal for that-clauses made
by Pietroski [2000], and echoed by Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri [forthcoming 2017] in their
discussion of narrow content. The idea is that content-ascribing clauses are associated
with a special thematic role, which they call CONTENT, that specifies the content of a
particular clausal psychological verb, such as “believes” or “thinks”. We can see CHAR as
a content-specifying modifier.
“Refers to”, like “look for”, is an intensional transitive verb, so we can apply this
semantics to “refers to” to develop a non-relational theory of reference. First, consider a
report of speaker’s reference:
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(17) John is referring to a dancing dragon.
We can give a semantics for this as follows:
(18) ∃e(referring-to(e) & Agent(e,John) & CHAR(e,a dancing dragon).
This semantics yields that John is the agent of an event of referring-to, and that event is
characterized by being one of referring to a dancing dragon.
But what about the references of words? How might this proposal help with their
features? In order to apply this view to words, we need to invoke states, along with events.
This is a proposal defended by Parsons [1990]. Consider (19):
(19) “Unicorn” refers to unicorns.
We could provide a semantics for this as follows:
(20) ∃s(referring(s) & Subject(s,“Unicorn”) & CHAR(s,unicorns).
Roughly speaking, this semantics interprets (19) as saying that there is a state s that is a
state of referring, the subject of the state is the expression “Unicorn”, and the referring is
characterized as being to unicorns.
However, this proposal makes little progress unless we can give an informative explana-
tion of how the novel thematic role CHAR works. Both Forbes and Moltmann’s proposals
face the problem that they do not provide truth-conditions for intensional transitives com-
pletely at the level of logical form. In order to specify truth-conditions, they must resort to
stating a separate condition on what it takes for the entire construction to hold, invoking
what has come to be called the decompositional approach. In Forbes’ case, for instance, he
states a meaning postulate that connects CHAR(e,Q) to a complex condition that specifies
what it takes for a quantifier to characterize an event.
(21) (char(Q))(e) iff (for any ⇀e such that R⇀ee, for Qx, there is some e′ that is part of
⇀e such that Fe′ and x is a theme of e′)
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This schematic biconditional links CHAR, in the logical form above, to the idea of success
conditions for the search, which, on Forbes’ view, are necessary conditions, as represented
by the “Necessarily” operator above. In the schema above, F stands in for a verb that
would specify what success would amount to; in the case of “searching” or “looking for”,
the instance of F would be “finding”. The idea is that, in any event that qualifies as a
successful F (or search), one must find Qxs. Thus, if I am searching for three dogs, in order
for my search to be successful, there must be a course of events ⇀e that has three parts, in
each one of which I find a particular dog.
This view provides us with an interesting advance in the study of adverbialism. In
the philosophy of perception, Adverbialism was traditionally proposed as an alternative to
the so-called “act-object” account of perception. Instead of perceptual states being rela-
tional, they were monadic states of particular sorts. In being monadic, it has traditionally
been held that adverbialism is inconsistent with accounts of content based on truth- or
accuracy-conditions. This is due to the fact that truth-conditions seem to require, for their
specification, relations to objects in the world. The conditions can only be specified if we
pick out those objects, and say how things stand with them. Thus, adverbialism is typically
seen as at odds with the dominant view of perceptual content, which is given in terms of
accuracy conditions.
This worry is even more pressing in the semantic case, where plausibly, the goal of the
theory is to state the truth-conditions of English sentences. What good would a theory of the
contents of empty names be if it did not help us to specify the contribution that empty names
make to truth-conditions? But Forbes’ approach to the semantics of CHAR provides a
mechanism for assigning accuracy-conditions to perceptions, and so is also capable of serving
to assign reference- or satisfaction-conditions to empty and non-empty linguistic expressions.
The general idea is that, on the de dicto reading of either a perceptual ascription or an
ascription of reference, the NP occurring in the object-position of the verb is not the verb’s
theme, but rather characterizes the way in which the subject of the ascription refers or
perceives. The details of how to assign accuracy- and reference-conditions to such ascriptions
remain to be filled out, but this provides a clear framework in which such an adverbialist
project can be pursued. And lastly, this proposal can also accommodate someone who is
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inclined toward a traditional adverbialist approach, on which perceptual states do not have
accuracy conditions. In such a case, one can simply drop the meaning postulate above, and
leave CHAR as a primitive.
I take the above outline to merely be suggestive of how we might pursue an adverbial
theory of semantic content. However, even if one is not inclined toward adverbialism,
treating the various approaches to the problems of hallucination and empty names as tied
to the semantics of intensional transitives is still theoretically enriching. Other approaches
to the two problems emerge from competing views of the semantics of ITVs. For instance,
one view of the semantics for ITVs treats them as denoting ordinary objects that may
fail to exist. This is the approach in Priest and Read [2004]. This pairs with a view
of intentionality that treats representations as about objects that may fail to exist: the
Meinongian view. On this view, both hallucinations and empty names will have intentional
objects, and these intentional objects will be non-existent. We might also treat ITVs as
expressing relations between the subject of a sentence and a property, as in Zimmermann
[1993, 2001, 2006]. There are corresponding views of intentionality: consider the view that
names have predicative type, and actually denote properties [Fara, 2015, Szabo´, 2015], or
the view that the content of a perceptual experience is a property Siegel [2010a,b].
One last example will suffice to demonstrate the connection between the semantics of
ITVs and theories of intentionality. One major strand of thought concerning intentionality
is that intentionality is something fundamentally propositional. One way of putting this
thought is that all content is propositional content. This view is not often articulated, but
it is implicit in much talk of content.40 This type of view is entailed by views that take
perceptual content to be accuracy conditions. Accuracy conditions, in being assessable for
correctness, or truth, differ from non-propositional contents, and it is this assessability that
makes content distinctively propositional. Such propositional views of intentionality have a
corresponding theory of the semantics for intensional transitives, the view that the correct
semantics for ITVs is one that reduces them to propositional attitudes. This view is often
called “Propositionalism” about ITVs, and has been championed at one point by Montague
40Byrne [2001], McDowell [1994], Sellars [1956], Siegel [2010a,b], Tye [1995], Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri
[forthcoming 2017].
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[1974c] and by a host of others: Larson et al. [1997], Larson [2002], Quine [1956] all argue
for propositionalism about ITVs.
While there are many other views on the semantics of ITVs, and many other views on
the nature of intentionality, the connections I have drawn above between different accounts
of the semantics of ITVs and different theories of intentional content should suffice to show
that the semantics of representational verbs like “perceives” and “refers” stands to play an
important role in a theory of intentionality. Since both the problem of hallucination and
the problem of empty names are instances of intentionality’s central puzzle, the problem of
non-existence, the semantics of ITVs has a central role to play within both semantics and
the philosophy of perception.
2.7 Conclusion
I take myself to have shown the following: the problem of hallucination and the problem
of empty names are both puzzles of intentionality. But they have many more specific
similarities: the most general forms of the arguments come from the very same premises,
and the arguments for these premises coincide. This points to an identity between the two
problems, or at least a very fine-grained structural analogy. If the two problems are in fact
identical, their spaces of possible solutions should likewise be identical; and this is largely
borne out: all of the major responses to the problem of hallucination in the philosophy
of perception have corresponding views that serve to respond to the problem of empty
names. All other things being equal, an argument for a particular response to the problem
of hallucination serves as an argument for the corresponding response to the problem of
empty names. Lastly: my preferred response to both the problem of hallucination and the
problem of empty names is the Anscombian one: the solution to both problems is to provide
a semantics for intensional transitive verbs. Just as Anscombe argues that “perceives” and
“sees” are intensional verbs, I have argued that “refers” is an intensional verb; a solution
to the problem of empty names hinges on our finding its correct semantics.
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Chapter 3
Intensionality and Phrasal Unity
3.1 Introduction
Quine is famous for doing violence to grammar in order to avoid metaphysical extravagance.
He had a particular aversion to intensions, and engaged in much logical and grammatical
wrangling in order to avoid commitment to intensional entities. Of course, grammatical
violence did not worry Quine in the slightest; in general, he was not concerned with the
semantics of natural language. Rather, he was interested in regimenting natural language
in ways that would make it suitable for scientific theorizing, a purpose for which he con-
sidered natural language irremediably unclear. And so as one would expect, many of the
grammatical hoops through which Quine and his nominalist contemporaries jumped in their
regimentations have been dismissed by analytic philosophers as bad linguistics.
However, there is one strategy that Quine endorsed out of his distaste for intensionality
that was dismissed too soon; I will argue that this strategy is the correct way to under-
stand intensionality generally, and it is vindicated by modern linguistics. In an attempt to
ban attitudinal objects from his ontology, Quine [1960, Ch. 6] endorsed a view on which
propositional attitudes were not relational, as the surface form of their ascriptions seems to
suggest. Rather, on this view, the logical form of propositional attitude ascriptions is that of
a complex but unary predication: the material inside the attitude verb forms a unit with the
verb. Quine [1956] also gestures toward an analogous view for intensional transitive verbs
like “hunt” and “seek”, although he stops short of endorsing it. Such views did not begin
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with Quine; rather, they are versions an idea developed by Nelson Goodman [1976] and
Israel Scheﬄer [1963]. Their idea was as follows. Sentences such as “John is hunting a lion”
and “John believes that the earth moves” have intensional readings, and on these readings,
the expressions in the verb phrase are bound together more tightly than on readings that
are fully extensional. Thus Goodman and Scheﬄer hold that where there is intensionality,
there is additional phrasal unity, and they often try to bring out this unity with hyphenated
paraphrases, as in “John is lion-hunting” and “John believes-that-the-earth-moves”.
Heightened phrasal unity is a phenomenon that manifests itself in several places in nat-
ural language. For instance, we observe it in various forms of compounding, in idioms, and
in incorporation. The idea undergirding heightened phrasal unity is that sometimes, for
the purposes of semantic interpretation, phrases behave like words; syntactically complex
phrases receive interpretations that we would ordinarily expect to provide for morphologi-
cally complex lexical items such as compounds. Quine and Goodman’s paraphrases bring
out exactly this point: phrases such as “hunting a lion” or “hunting lions” have readings
that are best interpreted in the same way as “lion-hunting”, which is a complex lexical item
denoting a unified kind of activity.
The way I will argue for this view is by showing that intensional verb phrases such
as “seeks a lion” and “needs a meal” are instances of semantic incorporation. Semantic
incorporation is the semantic counterpart of the morphological (or syntactic, depending
on who you ask) phenomenon in which a nominal in the object position of a transitive
verb forms a unit with the verb, and comes to denote a unified activity. Examples of
this phenomenon in English are often expressed via compounding with a hyphen, although
they can also be fully lexicalized: Mary may apple-pick, horseback-ride, or babysit. As it
turns out, many of the criteria for determining whether a transitive verb phrase expresses
an incorprated meaning are identical to those for determining whether the construction is
intensional. Most notably, the ability for an indefinite in the object-position of a transitive
verb to be interpreted nonspecifically is criterial for both intensionality and incorporation,
although there are several other overlapping criteria as well.
My proposal is that the nonspecific nominals in the object-positions of ITVs should
be treated as verbal modifiers that combine with the verb to form new verbs. The view
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I adopt for ITVs is an adaptation of the semantics for pseudo-incorporated constructions
given by Dayal [2003, 2011], but incorporates important elements of a closely related se-
mantic proposal for ITVs given by Graeme Forbes [2006]. However, the novelty of my
proposal comes from giving an account of an otherwise elusive notion—heightened phrasal
unity—and then showing how intensionality is best treated as a special case of one form of
heightened phrasal unity: incorporation. The rest of this paper will proceed as follows. In
§2, I discuss the traditional proposal, due to Quine, Goodman, and Scheﬄer, to treat the
material in intensional contexts as helping to form a unary predicate, and discuss what their
proposal looks like when taken seriously as a proposal concerning the semantics of ITVs.
In §3, I lay out and clarify the notion of phrasal unity, and discuss various instances of
the phenomenon that we find in natural language. §4 discusses incorporation, particularly
semantic and pseudo-incorporation, at length. In §5, I argue that ITVs meet all of the
criteria for expressing incorporated meanings. In §6 I make a semantic proposal for ITVs,
arguing that intensional NPs act as verbal modifiers, whose semantics should be handled
within derivational morphology, and in §7 I consider whether the proposal can be extended
to intensional clausal verbs, including the traditional propositional attitude verbs.
3.2 Intensionality and Hyphenation
Suppose that we have a picture of Pickwick, the character from Dickens’ novel The Pickwick
Papers. On the one hand, the picture represents Pickwick—it is a picture of him. But on
the other hand, Pickwick does not exist—he is a fictional character, so in another sense
we are inclined to say that the picture is not of anything at all, at least as far as being
of something is supposed to be a relation. Goodman [1976, Ch. 1] presents this puzzle as
motivation for the following view. When we say that a picture is of Pickwick, and speak
truly, what we are in fact saying is that it is a Pickwick-picture. Here it is worth quoting
Goodman:
. . . much as most pieces of furniture are readily sorted out as desks, chairs,
tables, etc., so most pictures are readily sorted out as pictures of Pickwick, of
Pegasus, of a unicorn, etc., without reference to anything represented. What
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tends to mislead us is that such locutions as “picture of” and “represents”
have the appearance of mannerly two-place predicates and can sometimes be
so interpreted. But ‘picture of Pickwick’ and ‘represents a unicorn’ are better
considered unbreakable one-place predicates, or class-terms, like “desk” and
“table”. [Goodman, 1976, p. 21]
And Goodman continues:
Some confusion can be avoided if in the latter case we speak of a ‘Pickwick-
representing-picture’ or a ‘man-representing-picture’ or, for short, of a ‘Pickwick-
picture’ or ‘unicorn-picture’ or ‘man-picture’. [ibid.]
Goodman is here claiming that sometimes we have reason to believe that what initially seem
like argument places in a relational phrase turn out, instead, to be classifying the activity
or object denoted by the head of the phrase. This is in keeping with the common finding
that certain NPs, particularly definite and indefinite descriptions, behave predicatively. But
Goodman goes further than this. Not only should we treat the expressions in such positions
as modifiers; we ought to treat these phrases as semantically unified; these phrases come to
function like unary predicates. Goodman captures this proposal with a paraphrase in which
he moves the noun to a position in front of the head of the larger phrase, and compounds
them using a hyphen.
Scheﬄer [1963] and Quine [1960] make similar proposals for indirect speech reports and
attitude ascriptions. Scheﬄer’s view is a thoroughly nominalist view, on which sentences
such as
(1) Galileo said that the earth moves
are to be treated as in (2):
(2) Galileo spoke a that-the-earth-moves utterance.
According to Scheﬄer, “that-the-earth-moves” forms a predicate of utterances, serving to
classify utterances as of one type or another. He ulimately extends this view beyond ut-
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terances to the case of propositional attitudes as well. Quine’s view in Word and Object is
similar, but perhaps even more extreme. Quine originally cites Scheﬄer’s view approvingly,
but then proposes to treat (1) as in (3):
(3) Galileo said-that-the-earth-moves.
On Quine’s proposal, “said that” is an operator that takes a clause and forms a unary,
compound predicate. Thus, Quine’s proposal imputes an extremely high degree of unity to
the verb phrases of indirect speech reports and attitude ascriptions.
At first pass, you might be tempted to dismiss these proposals as ad hoc maneuvers
to which Goodman, Scheﬄer, and Quine resort to avoid commitment to unwelcome inten-
sional entities, to which most linguists are now totally accustomed. But these views were
originally dismissed not because they were seen as ad hoc; rather, they were dismissed be-
cause Davidson [1966, 1967b, 1968] argued, forcefully, that they were non-compositional.
However, as we will see below, hyphenation does not indicate that the resulting phrase is
unanalyzable, and lacks logical structure altogether. Instead, it indicates that the phrase
exhibits increased unity: its structure is different, and tighter, than the structure of other
VPs, but this structure—at least in one sense—is still transparent to the grammar.
3.2.1 Intensional Contexts
Before I explain exactly what it is in which this additional unity consists, I want to be
clear about the contexts and features that motivate Goodman’s introduction of the hyphen
in the first place. Goodman is pointing to what we now call intensional contexts, which
are characterized by a cluster of peculiar features. First, intensional contexts seem to resist
existential quantification: we can’t existentially generalize into these positions, whether they
contain names, definite descriptions, or indefinite descriptions, and so such contexts are free
from existential import.1 Also, when an indefinite description appears in such a context,
1In the case of transitive verbs that take phrasal as opposed to clausal complements, the inability to
quantify in and bind a variable of in object position is a strong reason to think that the object positions of
these verbs do not provide arguments. This indicates that there is a deep connection between intensionality
and argument structure, which is a point that is not often or fully appreciated. However, there are ways
of quantifying into non-argumentative positions; for instance, we can use second-order quantification to
quantify into predicate position, or we can quantify over ways, or make use of other forms of non-nominal
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it can be interpeted in two ways: it can be given a non-specific interpretation or it can be
interpreted specifically. Third, these contexts have traditionally been seen as resisting the
substitution of coextensive expressions, so that substitution of coextensive expressions can
yield a change of truth-value.
The distribution of contexts that exhibit these features is varied. Goodman provides
the examples of a noun phrase that includes an intensional preposition: “of”, and a sin-
gle intentional verb: “represents”. But these features are most familiar because they are
characteristic of intensionality generally; we typically observe the above feaures in both
the so-called Intensional Transitive Verbs (ITVs) such as “seeks”, “owes”, “needs”, “repre-
sents”, and “resembles”, and also in verbs that take clausal complements, such as “believes”,
“desires”, “thinks”, and “knows”, among many others. For the remainder of the next two
sections, I will limit my discussion to the case of ITVs, but later I will generalize my points
to intensional verbs with other kinds of complements.2
The three properties just discussed, which we can call Nonexistence, Nonspeci-
ficity, and Opacity, are often seen as the defining features of ITVs.3 However, while
certain paradigm instances of ITVs—such as “seek”, “owe”, and “resemble”—exhibit all
three features, the presence of any one of these features does not require the presence of the
others. Instead, whether or not these features are present depends partly on which verb
and noun phrase the verb phrase comprises. For instance, “need” exhibits Nonexistence
and Nonspecificity, but allows for substitution, “worship” exhibits only Nonexistence,
while “recognize” exhibits only Opacity. This has led to some debate as to which proper-
ties should be considered criterial for intensionality. In what follows, I will mostly treat the
quantification. See Rayo and Yablo [2001] for discussion.
2There are also a large number of intensional nouns, such as “picture”, “debt”, “search”, and “need”,
many of which are nominalizations of corresponding verbs. These nouns also allow for the formation of
phrases that exhibit additional unity, and this unity can likewise be captured with hyphenation. However,
even though I followed Goodman in motivating the discussion with an intensional noun, in what follows I
will mostly confine myself to discussion of intensional verbs.
3Given a sentence of the form NP V NP′, we can characterize Nonexistence and Nonspecificity
precisely as follows:
Nonexistence: NP Vs NP′ has a reading which fails to entail NP′ exists, where NP′ is upward-entailing.
Nonspecificity: NP V NP′ has a reading that fails to entail NP Vs a particular NP′.
Opacity NP V NP′ has a reading that fails to entail NP V NP∗, where NP′, and NP∗ are extensionally
equivalent.
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ability for indefinite NPs to be interpreted nonspecifically as criterial for the intensionality
of a transitive verb. My reason for this is as follows. Nonspecificity has clear seman-
tic ramifications, and interacts with other aspects of our semantic machinery in ways that
Opacity and Nonexistence do not. Importantly, it has effects on dicourse structure, in
that it licenses only certain forms of anaphora, and is not easily explained ontologically, by
positing non-existent objects or senses. In light of this, it seems plausible that if we can un-
derstand how it is that indefinites relate to the verb, and receive nonspecific interpetations,
this will go some distance toward helping us understand why no noun phrases within these
positions are existence-entailing, and why such contexts resist substitution of co-extensive
NPs. Thus, for the remainder of the paper, I’ll make the plausible but defeasible assumption
that the availability of a nonspecific reading for an indefinite is the most basic feature of
ITVs.
The three features just discussed form just a small portion of a collection of intercon-
nected intensional behaviors that we observe within the complements of intensional verbs.
For instance, intensional NP complements can be replaced by quantifiers, but only by very
particular sorts of quantifiers called special quantifiers [Moltmann, 1997, 2003b, 2004, 2008,
2013]. Special quantifiers are typically combinations of a quantificational determiner to-
gether with the morpheme “-thing”, such as “something”, “everything”, and “the same
thing”. Inferentially, these quantifiers serve to replace the entire NP complement of an
ITV, and they allow for modification, as in the following examples:
(4) a. John is searching for a unicorn. ⇒
b. John is searching for something.
c. John is searching for something magical.
Further, anaphoric reference to the complements of intensional verbs is permitted, but only
with a very restricted, nonstandard set of pronouns called special pronouns: “the same
thing”, “that”, “what”, and “one”.
(5) a. John is looking for a horse.
b. Bill is looking for ∗it/∗him/∗her too
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c. Bill is looking for one/that too.
d. Bill is looking for what John is looking for.
Lastly, we can perfectly well talk about the identity conditions of certain intentional objects,
even if they are nonspecific. If John and Mary are both looking for an assistant, there
is a sense in which they are looking for the same thing, even if their searches will be
satisfied by different entities. Thus there is also a notion of special sameness or special
identity. This indicates that each of our ordinary logical notions has a special counterpart in
intensional contexts. This parallel points to an important but underappreciated conclusion:
our entire apparatus of reference, quantification, identity, and anaphora is mimicked within
the complements of intensional verbs, but functions in the absence of any genuine reference
or existential commitment. This non-committal logic of intensional contexts extends well
beyond traditional questions of intentional identity, but remains largely unexplored.4
One last important feature is that constructions involving ITVs have two readings, which
sometimes go by the names “specific” and “nonspecific”. For the sake of generality, I prefer
to use de re for what would be called the specific reading, and de dicto for the nonspecific.5
The basic contrast is that between (6) and (7):
(6) John is seeking a horse.
(7) John is riding a horse.
While (6) and (7) are superficially similar, (6) has both a de dicto and a de re reading,
while (7) has only one reading, the de re reading. We can bring out the de dicto reading of
4This intensional mimicry is extensive. For instance, there are even “special plurals” and “special
existence”. As an illustration of the latter, consider the fact that John, when he searches for a unicorn, is
not searching for something that does not exist. He is searching for an existent unicorn, not a non-existent
one. What good would a nonexistent unicorn do him? Of course, we know that unicorns don’t exist, so
he is searching for something that does not exist. But this simply means that there is a special sense of
“existence”—a sense that patterns with the rest of the special logical machinery. Special plurals, as we will
see later, are plurals that do not have any serious semantic effect: they have this status when they are found
on bare plurals in the object positions of ITVs.
5However, this is a simplification. Fodor [1970] shows that specificity and opacity can vary independently
of each other, and as a result there are in fact four readings of these sentences. In addition to the nonspecific,
opaque reading and the specific, transparent reading, there are also what Fodor calls the nonspecific, trans-
parent reading and what Szabo´ [2010] calls the specific, opaque reading. As I have said, I am provisionally
taking nonspecificity to be the core property of ITVs, but I think my proposals provide an illuminating way
of dealing with opacity as well.
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(6) as follows:
(8) John is seeking a horse—but no particular one.
But this reading is not available for (7):
(9) ∗John is riding a horse—but no particular one.
When we substitute an empty kind term such as “unicorn” for “horse”, it is only the
de dicto reading of (6), which is unavailable for (7), that stands a chance of being true.
Additionally, while nonexistence and nonspecificity are not always present together, there
is reason to think that they are connected: when an indefinite or an empty term appears in
an intensional context, the NP will fail to export, and the following inference will be invalid:
(10) NP Vs Q N 9
Q N is/are such that NP Vs it/them. Moltmann [1997]
This inference can be invalid either because exportation entails existence or because expor-
tation entails specificity. When this inference is invalid, it is common to treat the verb as
having an intensional, de dicto reading that does not imply its de re reading, and it also
indicates that one reading will license only special quantification, anaphora, and identity,
as noted above.6
3.2.2 Hyphenation
Goodman’s hyphenation strategy is an attempt to capture the important features of the de
dicto reading of these constructions, and bring out the underlying source of their intensional
behaviors. But how exactly are we supposed to understand the hyphenated paraphrases, and
what exactly do they bring out? First and foremost, let’s try to understand the paraphrases
themselves. Consider the some paradigm cases of intensional phrases, together with their
paraphrased Goodmanian counterparts.
6The inference is first used as a test for the intensionality of a transitive verb by Moltmann [1997], but
subsequently discarded. Richard [2000] takes the presence of the two distinct readings elicited by the test is
taken as criterial for intensionality.
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(11) a. picture of a unicorn
b. unicorn-picture
(12) a. search for a dog
b. dog-search
(13) a. need a mechanic
b. mechanic-need
The first thing to notice is that the original phrases are syntactically complex; they have
internal syntactic structure. But the paraphrases themselves are compounds, which at least
have a claim to being complex morphological items. Presuming, for the moment, that this
is correct, the paraphrases turn phrases that themselves have a syntactic structure into
lexical items that are, arguably, syntactically simple; intuitively, “unicorn-picture” is a bare
nominal and “dog-searched” is an intransitive verb. Instead of syntactic structure, however,
the paraphrases have structure that needs to be accounted for by derivational morphology.
This relocation of complexity from the syntax to the morphology will have important
effects on semantic interpretation. What will these effects be? First and foremost, the nouns
that are compounded with the verb clearly play a different role than ordinary referential
nouns or noun-phrases. Rather than contributing an argument to logical form, they serve
as adjuncts or modifiers: they specify the kind of search or picture in question. Plausibly,
such compounds are going to denote kinds of objects or kinds of events. But if these are
lexical modifiers, then the interpretation of the entire compound will be handled by the
lexicon, rather than by a syntactically driven compositional semantics.7 Insofar as these
compounds are interpreted in the lexicon, they will receive a much more unified semantic
interpretation than what would have been provided for the original phrase. Such unified
interpretations for phrases are instances of what I call “heightened phrasal unity”.
However, it’s important to keep in mind that these paraphrases are just that: para-
phrases, and I am not claiming that intensional transitive VPs are intransitive verbs, syn-
tactically speaking. Rather, as I will argue below, these paraphrases capture the relevant
7Assuming that we view the lexicon as comprising the rules of derivational morphology. More on this
below.
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semantic structure of the un-compounded constructions, and express meanings of the same
kind. Insofar as the phrases express unified meanings, they exhibit additional phrasal unity.
The next section is devoted to spelling out this notion of additional phrasal unity, and ex-
amining the ways that it is manifested in natural language.
3.3 What is Heightened Phrasal Unity?
The simplest way of thinking of additional phrasal unity is as follows: sometimes phrases
behave like words. Or, more precisely but less concisely, sometimes what seems to be a
phrase with complex syntactic structure functions, for the purposes of semantic interpre-
tation, like a single unit. Cases where we observe heightened phrasal unity—including
idiomaticity, compounding, and incorporation, all of which I will discuss below—challenge
the idea that there is a strict division between how syntactically complex phrases are in-
terpreted and how morphological items are interpreted, and, as we will see below, apparent
syntactic complexity will, in certain cases, be best treated as morphological complexity.8
Consider first some examples in which phrases actually gain morpho-syntactic unity,
and as a consequence are treated as (something like) units for the purposes of semantic
interpretation. Mary can go horseback-riding. Bill might be a part of a pay-to-play scheme.
Terry and Suzy might be going house-hunting. Angela may be waiting to be done babysit-
ting so she can go whitewater rafting. And Sue and Felicia might realize that this is a
chicken-and-egg situation, or that a certain politician has an out-of-touch policy. These
examples, at first glance, seem disparate. However, each of them has the feature that what
formerly were phrases have gained additional unity and are now interpreted as (complex)
morphological items. In most of these cases what was formerly either an argument or an
adjunct is compounded with head of the phrase and seems to function as a modifier.
8It is important here to distinguish between several different notions of “word”, and clarify what I mean
by “morphological item”. With DiSciullo and Williams [1988], I hold that morphology is highly productive.
Morphology has rules for the formation of morphological items (what I will call “words”) from morphological
atoms. Similarly, syntax has rules for the formation of phrases from syntactic atoms. DiSciullo and Williams
[1988] hold that the lexicon is the place for expressions that are not derivable from either syntactic or
morphological rules; it is like a jail: it is only for the lawless. These are “listemes”; they are in the lexicon
because their meanings must be memorized, and they can be either morphological items or phrases. In what
follows, I will use the terms “word” and “lexicon” in a way that differs from theirs; I will use “word” to
mean morphological items, whether atomic or complex, and “lexicon” to be the place where such expressions
reside.
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There are two general ways that we can think of how this happens. On the one hand,
we can see it as a syntactically driven phenomenon. It might be that the reason that these
phrases seem unified from the perspective of semantic interpretation is because a syntacti-
cally complex phrase has been lexicalized, and now serves as a syntactic primitive. But we
might also look at the underlying mechanism that is responsible for the compounding, incor-
poration, and lexicalization that we observe. This mechanism might have to do with facts
like frequency, institutionalization, salience, or any number of other semantic, conceptual,
and pragmatic factors. On this view, there are various semantic or conceptual factors that
push phrases to gain additional unity, and these factors can ultimately result in structures
like the ones above. One fact that counts in favor of the latter, semantic options is that
we sometimes observe the signs of additional phrasal unity without overt morpho-syntactic
manifestation. Such observations are primarily instances of two phenomena: idiomaticity
and semantic incorporation. In these cases, we observe the features of additional phrasal
unity without overt morphological or syntactic marking, which indicates that additional
phrasal unity can be a purely semantic phenomenon. In the remainder of this section I will
discuss idiomaticity, and the next section will be devoted to incorporation.
Idiomaticity is perhaps the clearest instance of additional phrasal unity in the absence
of morphological marking. Consider a few examples: John might have kicked the bucket
or he might just be sawing logs. After he wakes up, he might be shoot the breeze with
his friend about some run of the mill happenings. In these examples, what seems to be a
syntactically complex phrase gets treated, for the purposes of semantic interpretation, as a
single unit. When we say that John kicked the bucket, we mean that he died, while if he
is just sawing logs, then we mean that he’s asleep. If John is shooting the breeze, it means
he’s chatting.
The traditional view on idioms is that their additional unity is ultimately due to their
syntax: the traditional view was that idioms have no internal syntactic structure, and that
their semantics is completely noncompositional; they have been treated, more-or-less, as
syntactic primitives.9 On this view, what seems, on the surface, to be a phrase with a
9For more on this topic, see: Katz and Postal [1963], Katz [1973], Chomsky [1980]Geeraerts [1992],
van der Linden [1993].
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certain structure in fact is a syntactic unit, and so receives a unified meaning, as if it were
a lexical item. Thus there is a mismatch between the apparent structure of the phrase and
its underlying syntax and resulting interpretation. Importantly, the resulting interpretation
cannot be predicted on the basis of the meanings of the words and the compositional rules
that accompany them.
Quine’s view of intensional contexts, which I discussed briefly above, has been interpreted—
on my view incorrectly—as an example of this idea. On this way of viewing Quine, inten-
sional verbs, together with the material in their complements, form syntactically unana-
lyzable units that lack internal structure. Of course, Quine’s proposal is not, technically
speaking, a syntactic proposal, since Quine didn’t believe that natural languages had syn-
taxes. Rather, it is a proposal concerning how we should regiment sentences of natural
language in the language of first-order logic, and subsequently provide them with an inter-
pretation. But if we were to view Quine’s proposal as a syntactic one, we could spell out his
proposal in terms of syntactic constituency. In syntactician’s terminology, the units that
are “visible” to the semantics, and interpretable, are called constituents, and constituency
is the primary notion in terms of which syntacticians attempt to give an account of phrasal
unity.10 Roughly speaking, a constituent is anything that has a construction history out
of syntactic primitives, whatever those syntactic primitives turn out to be.11 Consider the
following simple example:
(14) John hit Bill.
We take it for granted that (14) has a particular history of construction: a syntax. This is
what syntactic diagrams exhibit. On most syntactic theories, “hit Bill” will occupy a VP
node, which is built from the DP “Bill” and the verb “hit”, together with tense. Thus, both
“Bill” and “hit Bill” are considered phrases, because they have a history of construction from
syntactic primitives. However, on most standard syntactic theories, “John hit” will not be
10In the generative tradition, at least. In other traditions, such as dependency grammar, constituency is
not a basic notion.
11Syntactic primitives are plausibly any of the morphological items discussed above, if we think that there
is a strict distinction between morphological productivity and syntactic productivity. They are simply the
smallest units that are visible to the syntax.
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a constituent of the sentence, and will not be considered a phrase, because it does not have
the appropriate kind of construction history. The correct account of constituency groups
words that function together into phrasal (or clausal) units, and draws phrasal boundaries
in the correct places. To use a common philosophical metaphor, to carve (14) at its joints,
our account of constituency must make “hit Bill” a phrase, but keep “John hit” from being
one; “hit Bill” is a unit available for semantic interpretation, while “John hit” is not.
The notion of constituency is important when we consider the interaction of syntax
with semantics. Ordinarily, semantic interpretation will assign a meaning to each basic
constituent, and these meanings will compose in a way that, roughly, mirrors the syntactic
composition of the sentence. Each complex constituent will be assigned a semantic value
that has been determined by those of its constituents.12 Thus, ordinarily, the constituency
structure—i.e. the syntax—of a sentence will guide, or at least constrain, the relations of
determination between the semantic values of the constituents themselves.
Nearly every introductory syntax textbook introduces what are called “constituency
tests” [Radford, 2004, Carnie, 2006]. Constituency tests are supposed to be rough-and-ready
tests that identify constituent structure. The idea is that certain kinds of manipulations and
substitutions show that some groups of expressions form phrases while others do not. When
a particular group of expressions fails a constituency test, we can (defeasibly) conclude that
the group of words has no construction history, and further, that the group of words does
not serve as a self-standing, meaning-bearing part of a sentence.
Thus, if we characterize his view syntactically, Quine holds that “the earth”, as it
occurs in “believes the earth moves”, is not a syntactic constituent of the sentence, and
so does not receive its own interpretation. The intensional verb “seals off” the material
in its complement, and forces the entire VP to function as a unit in logical form. Once
this “sealing off” is effected, words inside of intensional predicates are, from the perspective
of the semantics, no different from the letters inside of a word. To illustrate, on Quine’s
view, “the earth”, as it occurs in “John believes the earth moves” functions analogously to
“devas” as it occurs within the predicate “is devastating”: it is not “visible” from the point
12Of course, if we countenance a level of representation that interacts with the semantics, which we can
call LF, then there may be movement or other operations present at this level that are not strictly speaking
syntactic.
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of view of semantic interpretation. Only certain units are “visible” to the semantics, and
available for semantic interpretation. This is why Quine famously claims that you cannot
quantify into intensional contexts; in order to quantify into such a position, the position
must be an argument place, which can be occupied by a variable, and argument-places
within a sentence must be occupied by a constituent of the appropriate type. But, on a
view such as Quine’s, intensional contexts do not have constituent structure. Quantifying
into them is like trying to quantify in to the middle of a word.
However, the linguistic consensus on idioms has largely shifted; idioms are now often
seen as retaining some internal structure, and having a semantics that is at least partly com-
positional. This change was due to largely to influential arguments given by Nunberg et al.
[1994], who argue that, contrary to traditional wisdom, idioms are not frozen expressions,
and they still retain syntactic structure. Instead, they claim that idiomaticity is a funda-
mentally semantic phenomenon, and that many idioms—for instance, expressions like “pull
strings” and “take advantage”—seem to retain some compositional structure, even if they
receive nonstandard interpretations. They argue that such expressions are idiomatically
combining expressions—expressions that are limited in how they combine with others—and
that these idiomatic modes of combination are the source of the extra unity that idioms
exhibit. On their view, in order to yield idiomatic readings, the expressions within idioms
must combine in highly restricted, idiomatic ways, and within certain specific syntactic
configurations. Such syntactic and sortal restrictions show that the words within idioms
are, in a certain way, “meant for each other”, and that there is something important about
that specific syntactic configuration for expressing the idiomatic reading. Any syntactic or
selectional variation will make the idiomatic reading unavailable. This idea that some words
combine in only certain highly restricted ways in order to yield a particular meaning is one
form of additional phrasal unity. So while idioms still possess a history of construction,
semantic factors can make certain constructions inflexible, and make it so that certain in-
terpretations of syntactic primitives are only available within a small selectional range, and
in certain syntactic configurations. In other words, semantic factors can provide additional
phrasal “glue”.
We can see this more clearly if we look closely at how idioms behave when we test their
119
expressions for constituency. Consider the example “I shot the breeze with Alex”. The
following tests are attempts to see whether “the breeze” is a constituent of the sentence.
(a) ∗The breeze was shot with Alex. Passivization
(b) ∗It was the breeze that I shot. Clefting
(c) ∗The breeze is what I shot with Alex. Pseudo-Clefting
(d) ∗There’s breeze that I shot with Alex. Expletive
(e) ∗The breeze, I shot with Alex. Topicalization
(f) ∗I shot it with Alex. Proform Substitution
(g) ∗The breeze is such that we shot it. Raising
As the prefixed stars indicate, “the breeze” fails the tests. But what does it mean to fail
such a test? Does it show that “the breeze” is not a syntactic constituent of the sentence?
Clearly, the results of these tests are not ungrammatical. So it seems reasonably clear that
“breeze” is still a syntactic constituent. Rather, in each of the starred cases, the idiomatic
reading, which is the one we are interested in, becomes unavailable. That is to say, certain
readings appear only in very restricted range of syntactic configurations. If a word fails
the tests because the relevant reading becomes unavailable, the word is best interpreted as
part of a larger unity. It is only when they are treated as part of that larger unity that the
relevant reading is available. We can see these tests as detecting what I will call semantic
constituency. When we rearrange certain phrases, and run them through constituency tests,
we test for whether the word contributes to a certain reading on its own, or whether it is
required to be in a certain syntactic configuration to contribute as it does. If the reading
is unavailable when we rearrange sentences in this way, the expression in question is not
a semantic constituent of the sentence; rather it only has the relevant meaning when it
appears with certain other expressions in certain syntactic configurations.
The notion of semantic constituency does not just concern the syntactic configurations
on which certain readings are available. Rather, as the idea of an idiomatically combin-
ing expression indicates, “semantic glue” can impose certain tight selectional restrictions
which affect semantic constituency. For instance, “kick the bucket”, on its idiomatic read-
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ing, requires that “kick” combine with “the bucket”; “smack the bucket” does not have an
idiomatic reading. Thus idioms are both syntactically and selectionally restricted. This
illustrates an important connection between selectional restrictions of words and the degree
of unity possessed by phrases in which they appear. The tighter a word’s selectional re-
strictions, the higher the degree of unity possessed by phrases in which it appears. If, for
instance, a reading is only available for a phrase when two specific words are co-present, it
indicates that the phrase has an extremely high degree of unity, perhaps that of a frozen
expression or idiom. Selectional restrictions are violations of what Gareth Evans [1982, p.
101] calls the Generality Constraint. The idea behind the Generality Constraint is best
expressed by Evans himself:
If we hold that the subject’s understanding of ‘Fa’ and his understanding of
‘Gb’ are structured, we are committed to the view that the subject will also be
able to understand the sentences ‘Fb’ and ‘Ga’, and a common explanation for
his understanding of ‘Fa’ and ‘Fb’ [Evans, 1982, p. 101].
Evans is arguing that a phrase being structured requires something like free recombinability
of its parts. In order for their to be a genuine joint to carve between F and a, it must
be the case that the subject who understands one can vary each of the parts freely and
understand the result, within the constraints of syntax. It seems, then, that limitations
on this kind of free recombinability indicate a lack of structure: they indicate an increased
unity between the parts that fail to freely recombine. One way to preserve Evans’ principle
while accommodating such failures is to claim that such failures do not genuinely have
subject-predicate structure, and so are not instances of Fa and Gb. The question then
becomes one about what structural features provide the extra unity that ultimately leads
to such failures of recombination.13
What emerges from this view is that the idiomaticity comes in degrees, and since id-
iomaticity is an instance in which phrases take on additional unity, phrasal unity comes in
degrees. There are degrees to the selectional restrictions on idiomatic readings, and there
13Moltmann [2003b, 2004, 2008, 2013] seems to be getting at something similar with her discussion of
the Substitution Problem and the Objectivization effect. She seems to be indicating that intensionality is
somehow connected to argument structure, and that intensional contexts do not provide arguments. This is
not the exact point at issue here, but it is related to the ideas of phrasal unity and semantic recombinability.
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are degrees of syntactic inflexibility. And moreover, these restrictions can be present even
when they are not overtly marked in the syntax or morphology. What is needed is a theory
of how such additional unity affects semantic interpretation; I will make a proposal for how
this works in section 6 below. But we should keep in mind that neither selectional nor
syntactic restrictions need result in overt morphological marking: phrases may gain unity
without showing either of these overt signs.
My view is that we should interpret Quine’s proposal in this light, and once we do, it
can serve as a plausible view of intensional contexts. Quine’s view is defensible if we allow
that there are idiomatic modes of combination and degrees of phrasal unity. Even more
specifically, the idea that intensional verbs “seal off” their complements from quantification
is exactly to say that they serve as idiomatically combining expressions that serve to forge
a higher degree of unity with the expressions in their complements. Davidson’s traditional
criticisms of the Quinean proposal, to the effect that it would render intensional contexts
noncompositional, only find their mark when we interpret Quine’s view as one which at-
tributes the highest degree of unity to intensional phrases; it is only when a phrase has a
very high degree of unity will it lack compositional structure altogether. When we allow
that there can be degrees of unity that are lower than that of a lexical item with no struc-
ture, but higher than that of a freely recombinable phrase, the idea that intensionality is
added phrasal unity allows us a new tool for understanding intensionality. The next section
discusses one final form of additional phrasal unity—incorporation—of which, I will claim,
intensionality is best treated as an instance.
3.4 Incorporation and Phrasal Unity
Incorporation is another phenomenon in which phrases gain additional unity, and it will
occupy our attention for the majority of the remainder of this paper. My claim will be
that intensional transitive verbs exhibit nearly all of the semantic features of incorporation
structures, and thus are best treated as expressing incorporated meanings. I will then go
on to show that, while intensional transitives in general do not display the formal, morpho-
syntactic signs of incorporation, they are syntactically inflexible and exhibit selectional
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restrictions in a way characteristic of additional phrasal unity.
3.4.1 Syntax and Morphology
Traditionally, the term “incorporation” has been reserved for the process by means of which
one of a transitive verb’s internal arguments forms a morphological (or syntactic) unit with
the verb [Baker, 1988, Mithun, 1984, Farkas and de Swart, 2003, Borik and Gehrke, 2015].
Most of the debate concerning incorporation has centered on whether this process is lexical
or syntactic. In typical cases of incorporation, the object-position nominal undergoes a
process of movement and is adjoined to the front of the verb, which in English is often
indicated with hyphenation. Linguists who view incorporation as a lexical process tend to
treat the result as a compound, while those who treat it as a syntactic process do not treat
the result as a compound.14 Ordinarily, incorporated nominals are stripped of number and
case markings, determiners, and all other morphology; that is to say, they are typically
bare NPs (N0s) as opposed to DPs. We observed these features in the examples we saw
above: horseback-ride, bike-ride, duckhunt, babysit, any apple-pick, although these English
examples are just one of several kinds of incorporation.15 However, more recently it has
come to light that the range of nominals that can display the features of incorporated
nominals is actually broader than just these bare nominals; for instance, as Dayal [2003,
2011] shows, Hindi can incorporate full NPs. This phenomenon, in which nominals are
incorporated that retain some morphological markings and perhaps determiners as well is
known as pseudo-incorporation. More on this terminological distinction below.
One of the core, and most stable features of incorporated nominals is that they do not
refer to specific objects. Further, verb phrases that incorporate nominals typically denote
a unitary activity, and display the characteristics of intransitivity.16 Here we also observe
that just as there can be degrees of transitive, there also seem to be different degrees of
14Baker [1988, 1996], for instance, treats incorporation as a form of head movement, and thus as a
syntactic process, rather than a lexical one. Thus he contrasts incorporation with compounding. However,
DiSciullo and Williams [1988] take a lexical approach.
15See Massam [2001] for a categorization of the different kinds of incorporation. These English examples
are instances of what she labels Type 1 incorporation. See also Borik and Gehrke [2015].
16Incorporation is most often associated with so-called “polysynthetic” languages [Mithun, 1984, 1986,
Baker, 1988, 1996], although Mithun [2009] argues that incorporation is not necessary for a language to be
polysynthetic.
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incorporation; in English, for example, “babysit” is much more fully incorporated than, say,
“apple-pick”.
3.4.2 Semantic Incorporation
Recently, however, semanticists have begun studying the semantics of incorporation in-
dependently of its syntax and morphology. Semantic incorporation is the name for the
semantic analogue of the morpho-syntactic process of incorporation outlined above. The
term “semantic incorporation” was coined in seminal work by van Geenhoven [1998] to
denote the behavior of obligatory narrow-scope indefinite NPs within the complements of
transitive verbs. Van Geenhoven claimed that these structures are best construed as having
a semantics on which the indefinite narrows the scope of the verb, as opposed to providing
it with a thematic argument. Semantic incorporation can thus occur in the absence of overt
syntactic or morphological marking; we sometimes observe it in constructions whose syntax
still seems to involve a transitive verb with a morphologically unincorporated direct-object.
Carlson suggests that this occurs with English bare plurals that receive an existential in-
terpretation, with English bare singulars, and with weak definites in English. There is also
a wealth of cross-linguistic evidence that some transitive verbs that do not morphologically
incorporate their internal arguments still express incorporated meanings. Carlson [2006] is
particularly interested in the formal variation of structures that can express incorporated
meanings. On his view, and in his terminology, the meaningful and the formal bounds of
incorporation do not coincide; rather, the former outrun the latter significantly.
Pseudo-incorporation and semantic incorporation are closely related, and are often con-
fused, so it is important for us to be careful with our terms. Pseudo-incorporation is a
phenemenon in which a nominal displays some of the features of incorporation, typically
all of its semantic features, but may retain morphological and even definiteness markings,
and so is not fully morphologically incorporated. This morphological flexibility allows full
NPs to be pseudo-incorporated. Pseudo-incorporated nominals also exhibit a higher degree
of syntactic flexibility than fully incorporated nominals, and sometimes allow for modifica-
tion Borik and Gehrke [2015]. However, pseudo-incorporated nominals are still subject to
some syntactic and morphological restrictions; for instance, incorporated nominals cannot
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be true definites. Thus the term “pseudo-incorporation” is distinct from both traditional,
morpho-syntactic conceptions of incorporation, and the purely semantic concept of semantic
incorporation. Pseudo-incorporated structures are ones that are semantically incorporated
and meet certain less demanding morphological and syntactic requirements than traditional
incorporation structures.
The criteria proposed in the literature for detecting incorporation vary quite significantly
from author to author. Carlson [2006] explicitly attempts to distill the various formulations
and proposals into six standard criteria for detecting semantic incorporation, and then
proposes a seventh of his own. Because Carlson is attempting to unify disparate criteria,
I will, for the most part, use his criteria in characterizing semantic incorporation. Carlson
claims that for a nominal to be considered incorporated, the following six criteria must be
satisfied: it must (1) be an indefinite, rather than a definite or quantified type of noun
phrase, (2) receive a nonspecific interpretation, (3) be interpreted as narrow-scope only,
not showing any interactions with other logical operators, (4) receive an existential, rather
than a generic reading, (5) be incorporated into a verb that is a stage-level, rather than an
individual-level predicate, and (6) receive a number-neutral interpretation.
Three important classes of nominals that Carlson claims are semantically incorporated
are English bare singulars, weak definites, and bare plurals, although the phenomenon
occurs even more frequently in other languages.17
(15) Mark attended class.
(16) Susan rode the train.
(17) Mary picked apples.
In each of these cases, the object-position nominal is interpreted as a nonspecific indefinite;
there is no specific class that Mark attended, train that Susan rode, nor apples that Mary
picked. Further, none of the object-position nominals display any scoping interactions. No
tense or modal operators can scope between the verb and the nominal. The fourth criterion
17In the case of West Greenlandic, van Geenhoven [1998] classifies all indefinites that take obligatory
narrow scope as semantically indefinite.
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comes from Carlson’s work on bare plurals. He holds that when a bare plural combines with
a stage-level predicate, the bare plural receives an existential interpretation. Mary did not
pick apples generally, she picked some apples, and Susan did not ride trains generally; rather,
she rode some train. Further, all of the three verbs are stage-level predicates: they are true
of a temporal part of their subjects. And lastly, each of the NPs seems to be number neutral;
none of the nominals give rise to singularity implicatures, or force any particular numeric
reading. However, insofar as (17) is number neutral, it cannot be interpreted as meaning
that Mary picked any particular set of apples, even though that is one of its readings. The
number-neutrality of each of the examples comes from the fact that the activity is a unitary
kind of activity.
There are two other features of incorporated nominals that Carlson does not discuss,
but that I think are important to round our our set of criteria. One feature that was
traditionally proposed to distinguish incorporated nominals from unincorporated ones was
that incorporated nominals were “discourse opaque”, they supposedly did not introduce
discourse-referents, and could not support discourse anaphora. It has turned out that with
respect to discourse opacity, there is significant variation across languages and across types
of anaphora, but it is worth noting that with respect to Type 1 incorporation in English,
discourse anaphora does not seem to be licensed. For instance, (18) sounds bad:
(18) Mary went apple-picking; they were delicious.
This even seems to be anomalous when we use a bare plural to characterize what Mary did,
as in (19):
(19) Mary picked apples; they were delicious.
Here it seems that the pronoun forces us to interpret the bare plural specifically, as indicating
that Mary picked some specific apples that were delicious. This indicates that there are
two separate ways to interpret statements like (17): a specific way and a nonspecific way.
This is notable, since such statements are typically not taken to be ambiguous, and the
specific/nonspecific ambiguity is typically taken to appear only in the case of intensional
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verbs, a category into which “pick” is typically not seen as falling.
The last feature I will discuss was mentioned briefly above. Incorporation structures
typically exhibit a lower degree of transitivity. For instance, consider “bikeride”, an instance
of incorporation that is crosslinguistically attested. When the nominal “bike” is incorpo-
rated into “ride”, it is not that “ride” exhibits decreased transitivity. Rather, the whole
construction takes on the features of intransitivity. But this is also true when transitive
verbs take bare singulars, bare plurals, weak definites, and nonspecific indefinites. When
Mary is picking apples, the entire VP “picking apples” exhibits decreased transitivity, indi-
cating that it might best be classified as a single syntactic unit: an intransitive verb. Thus,
one way of thinking of the extra unity exhibited by VPs that don’t fully incorporate their
direct objects is that they are at a middle point between a V + NP structure and a single
IV structure. Intransitivity, of course, is not a criterial feature, because the classification
of a verb as intransitive in the first place depends on many of the semantic features we
mentioned above. However, it is a useful diagnostic.
3.5 Intensional Constructions are Incorporated
I am now going to argue that Intensional Transitive VPs, on their intensional readings,
meet all of Carlson’s criteria. This shows that intensional transitive VPs express incorpo-
rated meanings, and serve as another category of semantically incorporated construction in
English. Subsequently, I will argue that intensional transitives also exhibit syntactic and
selectional inflexibility, which makes it plausible that they are best construed as pseudo-
incorporation structures. I will then extend my reasoning to other intensional verb phrases,
such as intensional NPs like “picture of a dog”, and intensional verbs that take clausal
complements, like “believes”, “desires”, and “hopes”.
3.5.1 Semantic Features
Consider several paradigmatic examples of constructions involving intensional transitive
verbs:
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(20) John looking for a dog.
(21) Bill needs the antidote.
(22) Jill wants a new pair of shoes.
(23) Javier believes in ghosts.
(24) William is hunting dodos.
Recall that such constructions have two readings, a de dicto reading and a de re reading. In
the case of (12), John may be looking for a particular dog, or he may be looking for a dog,
but not a particular one. Above we called this feature Nonspecificity, and it is present
in all of the above examples. For the moment let’s focus on the nonspecific reading of these
constructions. I will discuss Opacity and Nonexistence below.
Consider the features of semantic incorporation listed above, and then consider, in the
case of each of the above examples, whether the nonspecific readings of the examples above
exhibit them. First, incorporated nominals must be indefinites; the object-position NP in
(12) and (22) are clearly an indefinites, (21) is a weak definite, while (23) and (24) are bare
plurals, which are definitely not definites. Second, the indefinite must receive a nonspecific
interpretation. This is clearly the case: the ability to interpret the nominals in the object-
position of an ITV nonspecifically is characteristic of their nonspecific reading, and is often
taken as criterial for the intensionality of a transitive verb. Third, incorporated NPs take
obligatory narrow scope. This is also one of the features that is nearly criterial for the
nonspecific reading of intensional transitives. First, the readings of intensional transitive
verbs are often individuated in terms of the different scopal readings. But the nonspecific
reading is invariably the one on which the NP takes the narrowest scope. This is borne out
by the fact that the nonspecific reading is unavailable if any operator scopes between the
verb and the noun.
Thus far we have seen that ITVs, on their nonspecific reading, exhibit the first three
features of semantic incorporation. Given that the term “semantic incorporation” was orig-
inally use by van Geenhoven [1998] to characterize the semantic behavior of indefinites that
take obligatory narrow scope, it seems that we can already say that intensional transitives
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are semantically incorporated. However, I want to show something stronger than just the
claim that ITVs incorporate their intensional complements in van Geenhoven’s sense. Con-
sider Carlson’s fourth criterion: on the de dicto readings of (12)-(24), do the nominals get
existential readings? The definitely do: insofar as any of these exhibit generic behavior,
they definitely do not have the ordinary universal reading of a generic. This shows that
intensional indefinites meet Carlson’s fourth criterion. Additionally, each of the ITVs above
are stage-level predicates, as is nearly the entire class of ITVs.18 This shows that ITVs meet
the first five of Carlson’s criteria.
Additionally, as we saw at the end of section 2, ITVs also exhibit unusual behavior with
respect to anaphora. As an illustration, suppose that we were to continue (12) as follows:
(25) John is looking for a dog. It is a dalmation.
Clearly this continuation forces the original sentence to take a specific reading. But on the
intensional reading this continuation does not make sense. We can, however, continue it in
the following, intensional way:
(26) John is looking for a dog. It has to be a dalmation.
Here the continuation with “it” is itself nonspecific, because “it” is in the scope of another
intensional operator, “has to”. In general, nonspecific readings of indefinites in intensional
contexts can only ground certain special kinds of anaphora, in which certain kinds of pro-
nouns occur inside of the scope of other intensional operators. As noted above, these are
called “special pronouns” To see them in action, consider (27):
(27) John is looking for a dog. Bill is looking for the same thing/one too/what Bill is
looking for.
Thus “one”, “what”, and “the same thing” all function as special pronouns. But more
importantly, this kind of restriction on anaphora is a form of discourse opacity, and indicates
18However, one exception is verbs of resemblance. This is in itself an interesting finding, since verbs of
resemblance have so far resisted analysis within traditional approaches to ITVs.
129
that these indefinites do not introduce ordinary discourse referents. This indicates that there
is a certain kind of semantic unity on the part of the itensional verb phrases; nonspecific
indefinites do not contribute to semantic structure in a way that is fully accessible to
referring expressions used later in the discourse. Another point that supports this view is
that “that” seems unacceptable. Suppose that intensional complements are semantically
unincorporated. Now suppose that they contribute an argument to the verb. We should
perfectly well be able to say “Bill is looking for that, too”. But this sounds anomalous.
This indicates that nonspecific indefinites do not contribute arguments that serve as the
themes of their verbs. These behaviors are easily explained by treating such indefinites as
incorporated; for instance, Dayal [2011] provides a semantics for pseudo-incorporation in
Hindi that involves theme-suppression, effectively treating the indefinite like a modifier.
Additionally, intensional “transitive” verb phrases with nonspecific indefinites display
significant signs of reduced transitivity. On the most widely cited account of transitivity,
in Hopper and Thompson [1980], there is a multidimensional scale of transitivity, and
intensional transitives with nonspecifically interpreted indefinites in their complements score
extremely low on this scale, especially in terms of the individuation of O (the object), the
affectedness of O, in terms of agency, as well as several other axes.
I have left the question of number-neutrality for last, partly because it is the property
that intensional verb phrases do not seem to exhibit. In other words, there seem to be
obvious examples of intensional states directed toward explicitly quantified NPs, such as in
the following examples:
(28) John is looking for three dogs—but no particular ones.
(29) John wants three dogs—but no particular ones.
These examples seem to provide genuine cases in which the quantified NP in object posi-
tion makes an important difference to the attitude, and the truth-conditions of the sentence.
And moreover, in the literature on incorporation, it is a nearly universally held that quan-
tified NPs never exhibit the signs of incorporation. Is it plausible to think that these types
of intensional verb phrases actually have an incorporated semantics? I think it is plausi-
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ble, for the following reasons. First, there are examples of noun-verb compounding that
involve numerals, such as “three-dog search”, “three-ball juggling”, “four-hit night” (in
baseball). On many views, numerals are not quantificational, but are rather adjectives. If
they are adjectives, these numerical compounds come to look much more like traditional
N-V compounds, such as “brown-dog search”, “federal-spending oversight”.
Number-neutrality typically concerns quantification, which in turn typically concerns
how many things there need to be, for instance, of a certain kind, in order for a certain
sentence to be true. But given that the sentences above are intensional, and there need not
be dogs or unicorns or anything of the sort, these quantifiers do not have their ordinary
force. Why do they not have their ordinary force, you might ask? The traditional answer
is that they are in the scope of some kind of intensional operator, which gets rid of their
quantificational force. However, my answer is simply that, when they are interpreted non-
specifically, these constructions are not genuinely quantificational, but rather contribute to
the specification of an activity of a certain kind. They are numerical adjectives that figure
into compounds, and they ultimately serve to modify verbs. This, I take it, is a vindica-
tion of the idea that intensional ascriptions can be genuinely number-neutral, insofar as
number-neutrality requires quantification.
3.5.2 Nonexistence
So far, I’ve made the case that the de dicto readings of intensional transitives should be
treated as semantically incorporated by showing that they exhibit all of the properties
laid out by Carlson. But it might be the case that even if ITVs have an incorporated
semantics, incorporation might not be unique to intensional verbs; I have yet to discuss
how incorporation explains Nonexistence or Opacity. For all I have said, intensionality
might be a feature that goes well beyond incorporation. In this section I will discuss
Nonexistence, and I will discuss Opacity below when I make a semantic proposal for
intensional verbs.
It might seem problematic for my account that there seem to be verbs with an incorpo-
rated semantics that are existence-entailing, such as (17). If there are incorporated verbs
that are existence-entailing, how can it be that the intensionality of ITVs is explained by
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their status as incorporated? But suppose, in light of the above arguments, that (17) has a
semantics similar to that of (30):
(30) Mary apple-picked.
This is the consequence of showing that “picked apples” has an incorporated reading. If
it does have an incorporated reading, it seems that it must have a semantics like that of
(30). However, it doesn’t seem that (30) is existence-entailing; if (30) is an apt paraphrase
of (17), in the semantics, the nominal seems to play the role of a classifier or a modifier: it
modifies the main verb. I take this structure to be characteristic of incorporated meanings
generally. In light of this, it seems perfectly possible for Mary to go apple-picking without
there being an apple that Mary picked; she might, for instance, have gone with a group and
not actually picked the apples, or they might have turned up and the apples were all too
green to be picked.
What we do find is that structures with incorporated semantics are existence-entailing
in a different, degenerate way. For instance, (17) entails that Mary engaged in a particular
kind of activity, and engaging in such an activity might entail that apples exist. This seems
to be the case for constructions like the following:
(31) Joe ate salmon.
(32) Joe salmon-ate.
It might be a fact about eating that there must be some small amount of salmon that Joe
ate, but the way that “Joe salmon-ate” entails the existence of salmon is different than the
way that “John caught a salmon” does. If there is existential commitment on incorporated
constructions, the nonspecificity of the nominal only allows for existential commitment in
the way that a mass noun is existentially committing, since the nominal is plausibly bare,
and must be interpreted nonspecifically. Consider an analogy. If I babysit, does it follow, in
virtue of the form of the sentence, that there is some baby whom I sat? Clearly not. It seems
much more plausible that the existential entailments of structures that express incorporated
meanings have their existential commitments in an altogether different way, perhaps via a
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kind of lexical presupposition. This leads us to the view that no semantically incorporated
constructions are existence-entailing, at least in a way with which semantic theory should
be concerned. An analogy may be helpful here: perhaps apple-picking necessitates the
existence of apples in the same way that drinking water necessitates the existence of H20.
Semantics has very little to say about this form of existential commitment; such commitment
is a metaphysical fact, perhaps to be captured lexically.19 If such a story is correct, then
sentences like (17) are on a par with sentences like “John duck-hunted” in terms of their
existential entailments, as long as both express incorporated meanings.
3.5.3 Opacity and Restriction
Carlson’s last criterion is what he calls “restriction”. Restriction is the phenomenon that
incorporated meanings can only be expressed by particular kinds of verbs and nominals; not
just any transitive verb + noun combination can express an incorporated meaning. Some
languages, for instance restrict incorporation to a small number of distinctive verbs. For
instance, Pawnee only allows incorporation with three verbs: hit, grab, and burn, while
allowing all sorts of variation in the type of nominal incorporated. But on the other hand,
there can also be restriction in the type of nominals that can be incorporated, without
restriction on the types of verbs that can incorporate them.
Restriction on the nominal is most apparent from the case of near synonyms. Consider
the following examples:
(33) a. Mike went to prison/∗penitentiary. Carlson [2006]
b. The ship is at sea/∗∗ocean/∗lake... Carlson [2006]
c. Mike went to jail/to court/on death row.
d. The ship is at anchor/at harbor/at shore.20
Carlson’s proposal is that this kind of restriction is due to a form of semantic enrichment ;
19This idea is closely related to Bloomfield’s problem, which poses the question of how a semantic theory
can provide a genuine theory of meaning without also being required to be a theory of everything. We need
to set limits on the aspirations of a semantic theory, if we genuinely hope to achieve its goals. I’m grateful
to Zolta´n Gendler Szabo´ for the analogy.
20I’m again grateful to Zolta´n Gendler Szabo´ for the examples in (33-c-d).
133
the activity in question is a characteristic kind of activity, one that may play an important
social role, or for which speakers have a well-developed schema. Semantic enrichment, in
this sense, should remind us of idiomaticity: there are particular forms of words that are
used to describe certain activities, and these forms are used even when there is a synonym
in the area that would do just as well from the standpoint of literal meaning. Semantic
enrichment binds certain words together for the purposes of describing a notable activity
or object. Thus, semantic enrichment is similar to collocation, and may be the result of
frequent use, familiarity, or some other conceptual or pragmatic mechanism.
As I understand Carlson, restriction is just a form of additional phrasal unity. Restric-
tion in Carlson’s sense is a special kind of selectional restriction in which certain words
must be used in order to express a particular kind of meaning, in this case, an incorporated
meaning. This phenomenon—that certain words must be used in order to express incorpo-
rated meanings—is a phenomenon that we observed above with idioms. In order to express
the thought that we ordinarily express with (34):
(34) Justin and Alex shot the breeze,
the very words “shot” and “breeze” are required. We can’t, for instance, express the same
meaning with a synonym; (35) does not have an idiomatic reading, and sounds nonsensical:
(35) Justin and Alex shot the gentle wind.
This is the same behavior exhibited by the examples in (33). There is a way in which
the specific choice of words are essential for expressing the intended meaning, and that
meaning can only be expressed when the words co-occur. Thus, the words are “meant for
each other”. This is additional phrasal unity at its clearest.
As with idioms, it is helpful to consider this form of added phrasal unity as a violation
of the generality cosntraint. Ordinarily, the generality constraint is seen as connected to
selectional restrictions; violations of the generality constraint are supposedly cases where
selectional restrictions are not met. But the generality constraint shows something more
than this—it shows that certain thoughts can only be expressed with certain forms of
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words. It is not that violations of the generality constraint are unintelligible, or result in
category mistakes. Rather, they yield meanings that are not the intended meanings. They
yield different thoughts than the one that would be expressed had the correct words been
chosen. In other words, violations of the generality constraint can show that words combine
idiomatically.
Intensional constructions exhibit restriction, and violate the generality constraint. This
shows that they both meet Carlson’s criterion of restriction, and exhibit the phrasal unity
characteristic of such constructions. Consider the following examples:
(36) Bill resembles a dog.
(37) Bill is petting a dog.
Clearly, (37) does not have a nonspecific reading; “pet” is an extensional verb, and as such,
there is no reading on which “a dog” is interpreted nonspecifically. On the other hand, (36)
does seem to have a nonspecific reading, which we can bring out with “but no particular
one”. The point that we can take from these kinds of substitution failures is that there is
a kind of interaction between indefinites and intensional verbs that yields the nonspecific
reading. Neither an intensional verb nor an indefinite on their own are sufficient to yield a
nonspecific reading, and fail to do so when they combine with other kinds of expressions.
Thus it seems that the nonspecific reading is not predictable on the basis of the ordinary uses
of these expressions. Both an intensional verb and an indefinite description are necessary
to generate the relevant reading. Further, this reading is fragile. We do not get nonspecific
readings for sentences like “Bill resembles some dog”, “Bill resembles at least one dog”,
or “Bill resembles exactly one dog”. Thus, substitutions either for the verb or within the
complement can make the intensional reading unavailable. This shows that there is a more
intimate relationship between an intensional verb and its complement than there is when a
verb is extensional.
Moreover, intensional verbs themselves form a small subset of the class of all the verbs
in the language. The fact that we can only get incorporated, nonspecific readings with a
small class of verbs is itself a form of restriction. In order to get a truly intensional reading,
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we must combine both an intensional verb and an NP of the right sort; thus, intensional
verbs exhibit restrictions on both the side of the verb and the side of the nominal. This
indicates that there are certain kinds of readings that are available only in virtue of the
choice of the words themselves; substitution of a synonym is will not even yield a sentence
with the same meaning.
3.5.4 Syntactic Features
Constructions involving intensional transitive verbs exhibit syntactic inflexibility, and their
direct objects fail many of the constituency tests above. Consider how we might apply
these tests to the intensional reading of constructions involving ITV, such as the following:
“Socrates resembles a pig”.
(a) ∗A pig is resembled by Socrates. Passivization
(b) It is a pig that Socrates resembles. Clefting
(c) ∗There is a pig that Socrates resembles. Clefting 2
(d) A pig is what Socrates resembles. Pseudo-clefting
(e) ∗A pig, Socrates resembles. Topicalization
(f) ∗Socrates resembles it/that/him/her. Proform Substitution
(g) ∗A pig is such that Socrates resembles it. Raising
The issue here is whether the tests listed distort the non-specific reading, or make it un-
available. In many cases, they do. Each time we move the intensional NP from the object
position to another syntactic position, it becomes difficult to hear its nonspecific reading.
This sounds even worse when we add “but no particular one” to the end of the tests.
What is also notable is the fact that of these tests, the ones that seem to most closely
preserve the reading are the ones that make use of special pronouns. For instance, in
the case of Pseudo-clefting, the new construction uses the pronoun “what”, which is a
special pronoun. Similarly, Moltmann categorizes expletive uses of “it” as special pronouns.
The reason this counts in favor of syntactic inflexibility is that special pronouns serve the
function of preserving the intensional readings of complements to which they refer—that is
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what makes them special. But now note that in the tests which do not make use of special
pronouns, the nonspecific reading is almost completely unavailable.
This indicates that the nonspecific complements of intensional verbs have a decreased
degree of constituency: the meanings that they help to express are only available within a
certain small syntactic range. Similarly to how such meanings are available within small
selectional ranges, these tests show that there is some heightened degree of phrasal unity
that is due to the particular syntactic configuration of a phrase. This is a form of failure of
free recombinability. Expressions that freely recombine are ones that have a lower degree
of unity—there is nothing idiosyncratic about them, and they are not outliers in terms of
the frequency of their use. They lack all semantic and syntactic glue.
3.6 A Semantic Proposal: Lexical Modifiers
There is broad convergence between the semantic approaches to ITVs and the semantic
approaches to incorporation. This, in itself, should provide some evidence that the two
phenomena are semantically related. In fact, van Geenhoven and McNally [2005] even treats
intensional transitive verbs as incorporated, adapting and refining the property account of
intensionality proposed by Zimmermann [1993] to overcome several obstacles. Further, both
Moltmann [1997, 2008, 2013] and Forbes [2006] propose views of intensional transitive verbs
that are very closely related to views proposed for the semantics of incorporation structures;
both views can be seen as proposals concerning how an object position nominal comes to
form a semantic unit with an intensional transitive verb. More on both of these views below.
My proposal is that we treat the semantics of incorporated constructions, and so also
the semantics of intensional transitives, just as we treat the interpretation of noun-verb
compounds. Apple-picking is a particular kind of picking. Horseback riding is a particular
kind of riding. And searching for a dog is to engage in a particular kind of search. We can
create such noun-verb compounds almost at will, but they are only lexicalized in certain
cases, when the activity in question becomes notable. But many constructions that are not
explicitly compounded can express the same kind of meaning. The correct way to treat these
constructions semantically is in terms of verbal modification, and, in the case of intensional
137
NPs, in terms of noun modification. Thus, nonspecific indefinites in intensional contexts
will be modifiers, or adjuncts. But they are not just ordinary modifiers, like “quickly”.
Rather, the modifiers in compounds bear a much more intimate relation to the verb than
ordinary adverbs; the modifiers used in compounds are lexical modifiers, and help to form
a new, unified kind of activity.
Most semantic approaches to incorporation treat incorporated nominals as having de-
noting properties. For instance, van Geenhoven [1998], Espinal and McNally [2011], and
DiSciullo and Williams [1988] all treat incorporated nominals in this way. The question is
just what role the property denoted by such a nominal plays with respect to the verb. On
several views of incorporation, the property restricts the range of a variable that plays the
role of the theme of the activity. For instance, van Geenhoven [1998] treats the incorporated
nominal as a property that restricts the range of an existentially bound variable. Chung
and Ladusaw [2003] make use of a special predicate modification rule; however, the truth-
conditions they derive are identical to those provided by van Geenhoven. The problem with
these views, as I see it, is that they fail to do justice to the fact that the readings we seem
to be getting are the same readings that we get for fully incorporated structures; if “Mary
picked apples” has an incorporated reading, its semantics should be the same as that of
“Mary apple-picked”. But the semantics of the latter explicitly involves verbal modification.
The only account that treats the incorporated nominal as a verbal modifier is Dayal
[2003, 2011]. Her view is that the relation between verbs like “pick” and “apple-pick” is like
that between “cook” and “boil”. Just as every event of cooking involves some manner of
cooking, a particular manner-of-cooking verb may suppress the manner argument. I propose
that this is exactly how intensional transitives work. Consider a new example. John might
be hunting. Just as with cooking, every event of hunting may require a way in which John
hunted. Now suppose John is hunting ducks. Its semantics might be exactly like that of
“duckhunting”, which now no longer has an argument-place for the manner in which John
hunted, nor does it have a theme argument.
On Dayal’s view, the property denoted by the incorporated nominal serves as a verbal
modifier, saturating a special, non-thematic argument place reserved for the manner in
which the activity is pursued or carried out. In other words, the property allows the
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incorporated construction to denote a new type of event that is a subtype of the old. Dayal
represents this formally as follows:
(38) a. catchTV = λxλyλe [catch(e) & Agent(e) = y & Theme(e) = x]
b. catchINC−V = λPλyλe [P-catch(e) & Agent(e) = y]
where ∃e[P-catch(e)] = 1 iff ∃e′[catch(e′) & ∃x[P(x) & Theme(e′) = x]]
Dayal’s example is that of mouse-catching, but her example can be transposed easily to the
examples that we’ve been using. The important thing to notice is that the variable P is in
the position of a verbal modifier, and so P − catch is really a unified lexical item. Dayal
then gives her semantics for this lexical item, and it is here that she distinguishes verbs that
are existence-entailing from those that are not.
Recall earlier our discussion of whether incorporated verbs were existence-entailing, and
consider a few examples:
(39) a. Mary apple-picked.
b. Anu mouse-caught.
c. Mary bike-rode.
d. Bill babysat.
It is my view that none of these constructions are, strictly speaking, existence-entailing.
Strictly speaking, existence-entailingness is a matter of logical form. But consider the log-
ical form that Dayal provides for such incorporating verbs in (39-b). It does not have an
argument-place into which an existential quantifier can generalize. Nor, in fact, is there
any quantificational material, which is exactly what we would expect from an account of
semantic incorporation, since, in receiving an incorporated semantics, the semantic effects
of determiners and other morphological markings on the nominal are undone. Thus, if there
are existential entailments here, they are a lexical matter. For instance, it might be a fact
that events of certain kinds, such as mouse-catchings, must involve mice, but that is a piece
of lexical or world-knowledge, and not part of the structure of the semantics for incorpo-
rating verbs. This is why Dayal gives the existence condition for “catch” separately, as an
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additional piece of information in the lexicon. Structures that are semantically incorpo-
rated do not entail existence structurally, for there are no genuine quantifiers or entity-type
arguments to bind in logical form.
Thus, distinguishing existence-entailing from non-existence entailing incorporating verbs
merely becomes a matter of providing a lexical addition for these verbs, but it is not
a fact about the compositional semantics of intensionality or of incorporation. Further,
on the standard neo-Davidsonian assumption that a verb denotes a set of events, verbal
modification of this sort will yield a subset of those events. This means that monotonicity
inferences like “John is searching for a dog, therefore John is searching for a mammal” can
be treated as material inferences concerning classes of events. That is to say, the semantic
treatment that validates certain inference patterns for intensional transitives is going to be
given in terms of the algebra of events.
The final proposal, then, is as follows. Given constructions like
(40) John seeks a dog
(41) Bill needs a massage, and
(42) That’s a picture of grandma,
we ought to construe the nominals inside the scope of the verb as pseudo-incorporated.
Most importantly, we ought to construe their semantics on the model of Dayal’s semantics
for pseudo-incorporation, where the object-position nominal in fact acts as a modifier of
the verb or noun, and gets a unified semantic interpretation. Thus, (40) should be given a
semantics like the following:
(43) seekINC−V = λPλyλe [P-seek(e) & Agent(e) = y]
The question is, what exactly is a P-seeking? And what does it take for an event to be a
P-seeking? One way to give a more precise answer, and derive specific truth-conditions is by
invoking a suggestion due to Graeme Forbes [2006]. Forbes’s view is in many ways similar
to Dayal’s. Forbes also works within an event-semantic framework. Like Dayal, Forbes
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holds that on the de dicto reading of an ITV, the NP in its object position is non-thematic.
Instead, Forbes introduces a special thematic role, called “CHAR”, that serves as a relation
between the event and the denotation of the quantificational NP. His core idea is that
nonspecific nominals in the object positions of ITVs characterize the activity in question
as one of particular sort. But more specifically, Forbes gives an account of characterization
in terms of satisfaction conditions. The NP in object position specifies what is required
for the search (or need, or want, or desire, etc) to be satisfied, and we can use this idea of
satisfaction conditions to spell out what it means for an activity to be a P-seeking.
However, giving an account of P-seeking, or of intensional transitive verbs more gener-
ally, in terms of success or satisfaction conditions conditions cannot be the correct account
generally. Satisfaction conditions, in terms of which nearly all accounts of ITVs have been
formulated, seem to only be relevant to a small number of intensional verbs. Consider how
could we provide satisfaction conditions for verbs such as: “resemble”, “admire”, “scorn”,
“respect”, “sculpt”, “draw”, or many other verbs. What is it for a resemblance to be satis-
fied? or to be successful? Or admiration? What would it be for a state of admiration to be
satisfied? What about a state of scorn? Could we explain scorn in terms of its success or
satisfaction conditions? Could we explain what it is to sculpt a bust of Beethoven in terms
of success conditions in a way that is informative?
My own approach to intensionality differs in the following way. Dog-searches are different
from domesticated-canine-searches. Why? Because they are different kinds of events. Why
are they different kinds of events? Well, partly because the agent of the event has different
intentions in the two cases. Insofar as the agent has different intentions, this is sufficient
to classify the events as distinct. It is not the success conditions that differentiate two
intensionally equivalent searches from one another, it is their intrinsic features: features of
the events themselves.
3.7 Intensional Clausal Verbs
I have argued that we ought to provide the de dicto reading of ITVs with a semantics
identical to that of verb phrases that incorporate their nominals. On this view, the inten-
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sional NP in the object position of an ITV serves to modify the verb, just as is the case
with noun-verb compounds. But since the nominal is not morphologically incorporated, I
proposed that this phenomenon is an instance of increased phrasal unity. However, above I
also claimed that intensionality generally is an instance of increased phrasal unity, but have
said little about intensional clausal verbs: intensional verbs that combine with questions,
infinitival clauses, or whole sentences to form verb phrases. What reason do we have to
think that they should likewise be treated as instances of additional phrasal unity?
One main reason to think that the intensionality of verbs with clausal complements is
relevantly similar to that of ITVs is that all intensional verbs allow special quantification
within their complements, but special quantification is not admissible within the comple-
ments of extensional verbs. Examples will be helpful here:
(44) John is looking for a red Cadillac. ⇒
John is looking for something.
(45) Jerry expects to become famous. ⇒
Jerry expects something.
(46) Ortcutt knows how to tie his shoes. ⇒
Ortcutt knows something.
(47) Mary believes that a comet will hit the earth tomorrow. ⇒ Mary believes some-
thing.
In addition to allowing for special quantification, clausal intensional verbs allow for the whole
special apparatus within their complements: they allow special anaphora and identity, but
disallow their ordinary counterparts. Consider the following examples:
(48) John is looking for a Cadillac. Bill is looking for one too.
(49) Jerry expects to become famous. Bill expects that too/the same thing.
(50) Mary believes that a comet will hit the earth tomorrow. Jill believes that too/what
Mary believes/the same thing.
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Moreover, special quantification over clauses, just like special quantification over NPs, pat-
terns with predicative uses of indefinites, allowing modified special quantification:
(51) Mary is a professor. ⇒
Mary is something impressive.
(52) John became a nurse. ⇒
John became something noble.
(53) Jerry expects to become famous. ⇒
Jerry expects something unlikely.
This indicates that there is a connection between certain non-standard argument structures—
namely ones where NPs are used predicatively—and the admissibility of special quantifica-
tion in the whole range of intensional verbs.[Moltmann, 2003b, 2004, 2008].
The fact that special quantifiers are only admissible in the complements of intensional
verbs and in cases where descriptions are used predicatively gives us reason to think that
there is an underlying similarity that accounts for why such nonstandard quantification is
appropriate, and that this similarity is structural. Additionally, the very same constituency
tests that serve to show that ITVs are syntactically inflexible serve to show that proposi-
tional attitudes are syntactically inflexible. I won’t go through all of the tests here, but
the conclusion is what you’d expect from the above discussion. In the case of a senten-
tial complement, if there is an indefinite in the complement position of the sentence, the
indefinite reading is distorted when it is moved to the subject position, passivized, or ma-
nipulated in a way that does not involve a special pronoun. These manipulations, just as
with ITVs, manage to leave only the de re reading available. Similarly to ITVs, the test
for whether quantifiers export from clausal complements serves, in surprising fashion, as a
test for syntactic inflexibility.
In light of this underlying similarity, I propose to treat intensional clausal VPs as having
the same semantics as phrasal compounds, in which an entire phrase or clause serves as a
single modifier. Consider the following examples of phrasal compounds from the British
National Corpus:
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(54) a. She also knows that the media tendency to lump together women singersong-
writers in a “gee whiz, gosh, women are now making it” syndrome is patron-
ising, if not pernicious. (BNC, A7S190)
b. Bombay-based Anil put India’s failure to exploit its manpower and mind power
and its lack of excellence in sport, economics and the arts down to a “Learn
what is there and don’t question it” attitude (BNC, HAE4088)
Carrying these kinds of examples over to the case of intensional clausal verbs, consider the
case of belief, and suppose that John believes that the earth moves. I propose to treat the
semantics of (55) as given by (56):
(55) a. John believes that the earth moves
b. John has a that-the-earth-moves belief.
(56) a. John wants to walk on the moon.
b. Jon has a PRO-walk-on-the-moon desire.
Thus, John has a particular kind of belief, or believes in a particular way. Further, just as
in the case of intensional transitives, there is additional phrasal unity present, underscored
by the fact that the semantics of such constructions is like that of the above kinds of
compounds. Insofar as ordinary compositional semantics is not responsible for the semantics
of various kinds of compounds, it will not be responsible for deriving the internal semantics
of compounds such as the ones in (55) or (56).
We can give a schema for the semantics of ICVs as follows, using belief as a model:
(57) believeINC−V = λPλyλe [P-belief(s) & Agent(s) = y]
Exactly analogously to the case of ITVs above, the intensional material within the comple-
ment plays the role of a modifier, modifying the verb “believes”, which is a predicate of a
state. Roughly speaking, this state treats the material within intensional clauses as cate-
gorizing the state as one of a particular kind. The question, then is to provide a semantics
for P-belief, which will be a matter for the semantics of compounding.
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This view of propositional attitues is almost exactly the view suggested by Goodman
[1951] and defended by Israel Scheﬄer [1963], although both of their views treat the material
in the complement of a propositional attitude verb as a unified predicate of inscriptions.
Consider the following propositional attitude ascription:
(58) Smith believes that the earth moves.
Their idea is to treat “that the earth moves” as a predicate of the things that Smith
believes-true, namely inscriptions, yielding an analysis like the following:
(59) ∃x(That(the-earth-moves)x & believes-true(Smith,x))
This analysis, of course, is outmoded, insofar as it treats belief as a relation to an inscription.
But the core insight is that the material within the complement of the PA verb plays a
predicative, rather than a referential role, and forms a tighter unit with the PA verb than
do groups of expressions in ordinary contexts.
3.8 Conclusion
I take myself to have begun the process of providing a theory of phrasal unity. However, a
full theory of phrasal unity, on which we examine the different ways, and degrees to which,
phrases take on additional unity would require a book-length examination. I merely take
myself to have pointed to, and described instances of the phenomenon, and then categorized
intensionality as special case of one such instance. The idea that intensional phrases exhibit
extra unity, and that such phrases should be generally categorized as instances of semantic
incorporation is, to my knowledge, a new idea, as is the view that we should treat inten-
sional phrases as having a unified interpretation that is determined compositionally through
modification. These ideas, I believe, make it plausible that Quine, Goodman, and Scheﬄer
detected something deep in their initial attempts to account for intensional contexts with-
out resorting to intensional entities; this vindicates their attempt to connect intensionality
with argument-structure. Further, in line with their initial aims, this also casts doubt on
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the idea that we should pursue the semantics of intensional phrases in the way that we have
since Carnap; if intensionality is a matter of phrasal unity and argument-structure rather
than a matter of intensional types, it should redirect our efforts in attempting to account
for the puzzling features of these structures.
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